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This work explores the commissioning arrangements in the NHS after the adoption of 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). The thesis aims to explore how these new 
commissioning arrangements have affected the decision making process and why 
commissioners select the providers that they do. This data is then used to see whether or 
not the service is being subjected to privatisation as was feared with the introduction of 
the Health and Social Care Act (2012). This work will begin by exploring definitions of 
privatisation and marketisation before embarking on a description of the shape of the 
private sector in the NHS. This is followed by the development of an internal/external 
pressure conceptual framework, adapted from the work of Pettigrew et al. (1992) to 
understand the pressures that commissioners may face in the selection of providers. The 
research was underpinned by symbolic interactionism and studied the work of two CCGs, 
using example services to explore their decision making processes. The thesis explores the 
themes that emerged from the data by using the internal/external pressure conceptual 
framework and then discusses to what extent privatisation has occurred in the NHS using 
the earlier definitions. The research concludes that the ability of the commissioners to 
freely select providers is severely limited and that as such, the selection of private 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 
 “dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƌĞĂůůǇ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ?. Those were the words of Sir David 
Nicholson (quoted in Timmins 2012, p 15) the then NHS Chief Executive about the 
Health and Social Care Act (2012). It neatly encapsulates the nature of the Health 
and Social Care Act (2012) and what it could mean for the National Health Service 
(NHS). As an institution, the NHS is a significant part of English culture, with 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶEŝŐĞů>ĂǁƐŽŶŽŶĐĞƌĞŵĂƌŬŝŶŐ ? “ƚŚĞE,^ŝƐƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞƐƚƚŚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂǀĞŶŽǁƚŽĂƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ? ?/ƚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇremains one of the most 
popular public institutions UK (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?&ŽƌƐŽŵĞmodern politicians, 
notably Andrew Lansley and Jeremy Hunt, it represents a continuation of previous 
policy and the culmination of a long legislative process to make the NHS more 
responsive through the delegation of commissioning to General Practitioners (GPs) 
once again. The question of continuity or change, could represent a risk to the 
fundamental tenet of the Health service - that of free care at the point of use - 
encouraging the use of private providers in the service i.e. privatisation. The Act has 
generated intense debate about what it represents for the health service and the 
future impact it could have. This thesis sets out to identify the potential effects of 
the Health and Social Care Act (2012) and how it may have changed the 
commissioning landscape.  
 
This thesis explores how the new powers gained by GP commissioners through 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) - the core element of the new reforms - 
might influence decisions about the selection of providers. In theory, the new 
commissioning arrangements provide GPs with powerful new commissioning tools, 
allowing them to utilise a market of providers, decommission them, or fine 
providers that they feel are not delivering. However, the manner in which this 
manifests itself in practice could differ and this is the focus of the research: how 
commissioners use these tools in practice. These reforms take place within a new 
NHS framework, which it is claimed has further entrenched competition and market 
practices within the service (Pownall 2013). The Act has given commissioners more 
than 60% of the total NHS budget (Timmins 2012). Primary care commissioning has 
previously existed in the NHS (Miller 2012) so the concept behind the new reforms 
are not new. But the latest clinical commissioners appear to have more power than 
any previous incarnation. The objective of this study is to understand how these 
commissioners reach decisions about which services they commission and the 
rationale for those choices. Then the impact of these decisions on the health 
service will also be explored, to see if there is evidence of privatisation or 
marketisation.  
 
The approach explored the manner in which decisions were reached and what 
influence the new framework has had on the commissioners. The study further 
categorised the framework into internal and external pressures and the effects of 
these were explored in the two CCGs. This indicated which types of issues could 
influence commissioners, and whether the regulatory framework would wield 
greater or lesser influence than local needs/ concerns.  
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Through the use of case studies, this study explored research questions relating to 
decision-making, how the choices of commissioners affect the delivery of these 
services, and whether or not they were more likely to pursue a private provider 
over a public one.  
 
This chapter will provide some further context to the reforms. First it will explore 
the nature of privatisation and marketisation before placing the reforms in a 
legislative context. This includes the legislative process that the Act took through 
Parliament, before a brief discussion of what constitutes the core elements of the 
reforms. The structure of the thesis will be outlined at the end of the chapter.  
  
Context of this study 
Background  ? the creation of the Health and Social Care Act 
(2012) - Primary Care Led Commissioning 
 
Since its inception, the NHS has relied on the medical profession for the delivery of 
healthcare. This arrangement was largely dependent on the government allowing 
the medical profession to regulate itself and control the delivery of care. During 
that period, ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞE,^ ?ƐŝŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?'WƐ were a smaller group of 
private practitioners contracted to deliver care but were largely relegated to a 
subsidiary role in comparison to more powerful hospital doctors (Gabe, Calnan and 
Bury 1992).   
 
This changed during the 1980s and the election of successive Conservative 
Governments, which brought a shift towards market principles and management, 
ƌĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐ  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?until then the status quo (Dopson 2009). This 
challenged the dominance of the hospital doctors. The Griffiths Report (1983) and 
the introduction of private sector style managers and market principles altered the 
trĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚo the delivery of 
healthcare.   
 
The introduction of the NHS Community Act (1990) introduced the internal market 
dividing the NHS into purchasers and providers, arguably moving away from a 
hierarchical system to a market-based one (Exworthy et al 1999). This introduced 
competition with the aim of creating a market to drive and improve performance, 
shifting the balance of power away from hospital doctors to primary care 
commissioning arrangements. This also indicated a move towards primary care-led 
commissioning, with the use of the internal market stimulating competition and 
creating a situation in which GPs became more powerful, through the use of 
mechanisms such as fundholding (Smith et al. 2004).  
 
The creation of fundholding further altered the power balance within the NHS in 
favour of GPs and primary care-led commissioning. It put the onus on GPs to 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƐƉĞŶĚ ? ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ where they thought it would benefit their 
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populations. It also created an environment in which semi-autonomous NHS Trusts 
were able to act like private providers, competing with one another (Klein 2007).   
 
The election of New Labour in 1997 brought further reform of the NHS. It led to the 
creation of the Primary Care Groups (PCGs) - later Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) - 
which integrated clinical and fiscal decision making into one body, maintaining a 
role for primary care commissioning, including GPs who took on leadership roles. In 
addition, it was during this period that there was increased use of private provision 
within a mixed economy of provision. This included the expansion of the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) and use of Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) in 
order to help with the demands placed on the service and to manage waiting list 
targets. Through this, the private sector began to take on a more active role in the 
delivery of health services. Furthermore, Foundation Trusts were able to generate 
funds through the delivery of private care, blurring the lines between the public and 
private sectors (Field and Peck 2003). This gradually left governments open to 
accusations of privatisation, with the use of private provision unpopular with the 
public. However, Labour Governments argued that care remained free at the point 
of use and the way in which services were delivered was of less importance.  
 
These reforms provided the foundation for primary care-led commissioning and the 
inclusion and, importantly, the acceptance of private providers within the broader 
health service. Subsequently, further reforms moved the NHS towards cooperative 
working between the public, private and third sectors  W those organisations which 
are not part of the public or private sectors (Baines et al., 2010). Since the 
introduction of the purchaser/provider split there existed expectations that the 
NHS would behave more like a marketplace and more efficiently. It was against this 
backdrop that there would be a change of government in 2010 and within this 
context the next set of NHS reforms took place.  
 
Privatisation/Marketisation in healthcare 
 
Since the 1980s, both privatisation and marketisation of public services have been 
explored by scholars (Pollock 2004, Krachler et al. 2015, Leys and Player 2011). 
During the 1980s there was widespread privatisation of public utilities which also 
came hand in hand with marketisation and the rise of managerialism (Talbot 2001). 
These changes have also been observed in the healthcare sector. Over the 
subsequent 20 years, there has been a growth of resource spent on private 
providers, with notable increases in the 2000s, under New Labour administrations 
(The Nuffield Trust 2015). However, the NHS remains largely publically funded and 
provided (Arora et al. 2013). There are also multiple competing definitions of what 
constitutes privatisation and marketisation and what role they have played in 
healthcare. However, the NHS remains a predominantly publically provided and 
funded service.  
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The previous section highlighted some important legislation which developed the 
role of private providers in the health service and other policies which attempted to 
replicate the effects of the market. As in many other public services, there has been 
a growth in the use of these techniques and the Health and Social Care Act (2012) 
pushed the NHS further towards operating like a market. As was stated by a 
previous head of Monitor, a regulatory body with the responsibility to enforce 
competition in the NHS, when the Act was in the process of passing through 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ  “tĞĚŝĚ ŝƚ ŝŶŐĂƐ ?ǁĞĚŝĚ ŝƚ ŝŶƉŽǁĞƌ ?ǁĞĚŝĚ ŝƚ ŝŶ ƚĞůĞĐŽŵƐ ?  ?dŝŵŵŝŶƐ
2012, p 87). This approach to public services illustrates what the potential effects of 
the Health and Social Care Act could be. This thesis seeks to understand the 
implications it has not only for decision making but also the ramifications on the 
involvement of private providers and market forces within the NHS. Will the new 
framework, by further entrenching competition between providers and purchasers, 
 ‘ŶƵĚŐĞ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƐŝŶŐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?Kƌ ǁŝůůƚŚĞƌĞŽrganisation 
mean that the commissioning service is unable to function as it was intended?  
 
This study is also mindful of the wider context where public services are operating 
with reduced budgets as successive governments have pursued policies of 
 ‘austerity ? (Pownall 2013).  Healthcare has not been fully exposed to these policies, 
ĨĂĐŝŶŐĂ ‘ĨƌĞĞǌĞ ?ŝŶŝƚƐďƵĚŐĞƚ (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?. However, this has still resulted 
in annual decreases to the NHS budget, with large numbers of CCGs and NHS Trusts 
facing large deficits (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ &ƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? KŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ƐŝĚĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ?
financial year over 66% of Trusts were in deficit (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐůĂĐŬŽĨ
resource is also reflected on the part of CCGs with around a quarter of CCGs also 
reporting deficits (Bostock 2016). The resource pressures which the NHS faces 
could influence the decision making processes and the manner in which 
commissioning takes place.  These competing pressures coming from the new 
regulatory framework will be further explored in chapter three.  
 
In the following chapter the definitions of privatisation and marketisation are 
defined. It is a complex area, with little agreement between scholars (Powell and 
Miller 2015) but this thesis provides a working definition which was then used in 
the fieldwork element.  This is followed by an exploration of the empirical literature 
on the role of the private sector and how it has existed alongside the NHS 
throughout the history of the service. 
 
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) 
 
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) represented one of many reforms of the 
health service. Some argue that it is the most radical reform since the introduction 
of the NHS (Ham, Dixon and Brooke 2012), while others argue that it represented a 
continuation of previous policy (Timmins 2012). This section will outline how the 
Act was passed through Parliament and the discourse around the reforms. The last 
part will briefly outline the framework in which commissioning took place after the 
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CCGs were authorised and the Act took effect in England from April 2013, which will 
be further expanded upon in subsequent chapters.   
 
The Act was developed by the Shadow Health Secretary, Andrew Lansley. While in 
opposition, Lansley was allowed to develop the policy and once in government was 
given the autonomy to implement it, as long as it matched the broader legislative 
agenda of the government (Timmins 2012). The Act represented more than just the 
reinforcement of the role of primary care-led commissioning after a long period of 
managerialism. Lansley reportedly rejected a less radical reform proposed by civil 
servants (Ibid 2012). The key platform of the reform was to create GP consortia to 
deliver commissioning for the majority of the NHS budget. This included abolishing 
PCTs and empowering regulatory bodies with new statutory powers (Ibid 2012). 
These new consortia would be universal for all GPs, who would also form the 
executive decision-making groups within the consortia. The initial proposals 
suggested that they would ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ  ‘ ? ? ?-£80 billion of the £100 billion NHS 
ďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚƌĞƚĂŝŶŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽthose of 
the PCTs but would differ in several key ways. The GPs would not be responsible to 
a Chief Executive but rather to their own elected head (a clinician) alongside a new 
public accountability framework. This would increase the power of GPs in the 
commissioning process, marginalising managers (Ibid 2012). The aim was for the 
consortia to be responsive to the demands of their populations and further provide 
clinicians with the ability to alter budgets as and when required (Ibid 2012).  
 
What made this reform differ from those previously introduced by Labour 
Governments was the sheer scale. It was more complex than had been intended as 
the whole Act broke up the existing manner of commissioning healthcare and 
replaced it with a system which was entirely new. This system meant to allow the 
service to run itself (Timmins 2012). There were also clauses which bound the 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƚŽ  ‘ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚincreased the widespread opposition to 
the reform. This opposition manifested itself both through public protests and 
through resistance from professional bodies. Even within the Royal College of GPs, 
which might have been broadly sympathetic to the aims of the reforms, remained 
staunchly opposed (Timmins 2012). Within the Coalition, there were some who 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞ ƚŽ  ‘ĐŚĞƌƌǇƉŝĐŬ ?ƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞƉĂƌƚƐŽĨ
the NHS (Ibid 2012).  As a result, the government accepted an unprecedented 
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ  ‘ƉĂƵƐĞ ? ?Many critics pointed out the potential implication that the 
private sector would have to deliver care in the NHS (Krachler and Greer 2015). This 
opened up debates about the nature of privatisation and how the new regulatory 
framework could enable private providers the ability to work within profitable parts 
of the NHS (Ibid 2012). 
 
The subsequent Act had over 2,000 amendments before it was finally passed, and 
the nature of the reforms meant that they were somewhat diluted. Commissioning 
would be carried out by majority GP consortia, now renamed  ‘Clinical 
Commissioning Groups ? (CCGs) and these groups had to include some allied health 
professionals as a concession. They were also to be scaled up in size while 
maintaining universal GP membership. The new regulatory framework was still to 
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ďĞ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚ ? ǁŝƚŚ DŽŶŝƚŽƌ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ƚŽ  ‘ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?
(Health and Social Care Act 2012), highlighting the role of different types of 
providers. GPs would have oversight of the majority of the NHS budget, albeit less 
than initially intended. While the Act was not the first piece of legislation to open 
up the NHS to competition law, the new powers of the regulatory framework 
created a new dynamic (which is further explored in chapter two).  
 
Arguably the reforms continued in the tradition of previous Labour health policy 
and some have argued that it was ƐŝŵƉůǇ “ĂůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ƐĞŶƐŝďůĞ ?ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ of [changes] 
ƉƵƚ ŝŶ ƉůĂĐĞ ďǇ dŽŶǇ ůĂŝƌ ?  ?>Ğ 'ƌĂŶĚ ƋƵŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ dŝŵŵŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? dŚĞ ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ
further expanded on the principles laid out by the Labour Governments; Practice-
based commissioning (PbC); Total Purchasing; the role of patient choice and the use 
of private providers to deliver care (Miller 2012). The effect of these reforms is 
explored in this thesis.  
 
Some however, argued that the policy represented a much more radical departure 
from previous policy maintaining ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŶŝƚŝĂů ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŚĞƌƌǇƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ
services and back door privatisation (Peedell 2011). Some speculated that there 
could be several situations in which this could happen (Pollock and Price 2011). 
There was also speculation that there could be other scenarios in which the NHS 
would become further marketised (Dixon and Ham 2010). The context in which 
commissioners operate, and what sort of influence it will have on the selection of 
providers, was investigated more fully. The access that private providers have 
gained was also examined. There is the additional challenge of resource savings 
that are required of the NHS alongside this period of considerable organisational 
change. This can did also represent a further challenge to commissioners.  
 
Structure of the reforms 
 
The reforms have brought in primary care-led commissioning in the form of Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs). The CCGs are responsible for over 60% of the NHS 
budget having replaced the PCTs, the total amount being over £70 billion (The 
<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ &ƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? dŚĞ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĚĞƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞbudget is delivered through the 
Department of Health. NHS England (NHSE) regulates the spending of CCGs while 
also purchasing some additional services and funding the regulatory bodies. The 
services that CCGs are responsible for commissioning include specialist, community, 
mental health and hospital services (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ?As the centrepiece of 
the reform and being the largest NHS commissioning group, it is the CCGs which will 
be the focus of this study. Exploring their decision-making process in the new NHS.  
 
The CCGs operate in a framework that includes regulators with additional powers 
to promote competition while needing to assist in providing integrated care in an 
increasingly complex system. Some of the regulatory bodies that were initially part 
of the reforms have been merged, and currently there are three key regulators; 
NHS Improvement, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and NHS England. When 
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examining the framework, the key bodies with regards to commissioners are NHS 
Improvement and NHS England. The CQC has a more indirect role through the 
management and authorisation of providers (Care Quality Commission 2017). These 
roles will be outlined in the subsequent chapters.   
 
NHS Improvement is a new body which consists of several other regulatory groups 
which have merged (NHS Improvement 2017). The purpose of the group is to 
oversee and bring together several different organisations under one umbrella, 
maximising their effectiveness (NHS Improvement 2017). For CCGs, the key part is 
that of Monitor which previously existed in a stand-alone capacity. Its key 
responsibility is to  “ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚ patient choice and prevent anti-competitive 
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŽĨ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?  ?Health and Social Care Act 
2012). In this capacity it has the ability to intervene in behaviours contrary to this, 
which could potentially include cooperative working arrangements between sets of 
commissioners/providers (Hudson 2013), and has a role in regulating both 
providers and purchasers. It also has the duty to enforce competition law, ensuring 
that procurements are correctly undertaken. If a provider believes that a 
procurement was handled incorrectly, there is a mechanism for them to challenge 
the decisions made (Health and Social Care Act 2012). This legal mechanism further 
distinguishes the reforms and the new regulatory framework from previous 
legislation, as this could have subsequent ramifications on the decisions of 
commissioners.  
 
NHS England, which commissions the remainder of the NHS budget, has a dual role 
of both allocating the CCG budgets and regulating the groups. The regulation of 
CCG financial performance is where NHS England could influence commissioners. In 
this capacity they can become involved in the affairs of the commissioners if they 
are viewed as underperforming. Currently, there are more than twenty CCGs which 
have been deemed financially inadequate resulting in NHS England putting them in 
 ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?  ?E,^ ŶŐůĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? dŚŝƐ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĐĂŶ ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĂďůǇ
influence commissioners, as many may prefer to maintain their independence (Ibid 
2016).  
 
Through the reforms there are additional bodies which have a direct role in public 
accountability. These include the Health and Wellbeing boards (HWB), which are 
intended to provide patients with a voice and to further represent the public to 
NHS commissioners. They are also intended to provide assistance in the 
commissioning of services. However, their role remains unclear, and their 
effectiveness in the current climate is limited (Humphries and Galea 2013). This is 
an additional strand of accountability that has formed as a result of the Health and 
Social Care Act. It provides commissioners with an additional consideration when 
selecting new services, having to justify their choice to an external organisation, as 
well as in public meetings. The reform therefore has dual accountability for clinical 
commissioners, to the public (both through HWB and public meetings) and to NHS 
England, ensuring fiscal competency, all providing additional influences on the 
commissioners.  
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The framework does not utilise new bodies, or concepts, but provides existing 
agencies with more power to implement their rulings/decisions. The manner in 
which this manifests itself while being examined and how this framework could 
affect commissioners will be looked at in chapter three.  
 
The new structure has created a system in which competition needs to be 
promoted by the framework, while ensuring that care remains integrated. This new 
framework also allows for private providers to challenge the decisions of 
commissioners in a court of law. Such potential challenges provide some of the 
impetus for this research, exploring the new commissioning arrangements and 
what they mean for the NHS.  
 
This thesis sets out to discover the effect these reforms would have on 
commissioners, whether as intended they would be able to pursue strategies they 
believe to be beneficial for their local populations, or if they would be forced into 
making decisions as directed by the framework created by the Act.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
 
The general research questions that will be explored in this thesis are: 
 
1. What influences the decisions of commissioners in the/during the 
commissioning process? 
2. Why do commissioners select certain providers over others? 
3. How has this affected the private/public balance in the NHS? 
 
The structure of the rest of the thesis is as follows, after this introduction, chapter 
two is a narrative review which examines the nature of private involvement in the 
NHS. First, it will outline the theoretical approach to the work and present 
competing definitions of what constitutes privatisation and marketisation. The 
second part of the chapter will examine the empirical literature relating to the 
shape and size of the private sector and how it has grown alongside the NHS.  
 
Chapter three will examine the empirical literature relating to commissioning in the 
NHS. The first part will critically engage with the literature and explore how primary 
care commissioning has existed previously in the NHS. This provides context to the 
second part of the chapter which explores the regulatory framework created by the 
Health and Social Care Act (2012), the internal/external pressures faced by 
commissioners, and how this could influence the decision making processes. These 
internal and external pressures are characterised through a framework which 
explores these pressures to assist in understanding how they may affect the 
decision making process. The main argument here is that the commissioners will 
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face a myriad of pressures which could affect the decision-making process and this 
is explored. 
 
Chapter four will set out the methodology used in the project. It will put forward 
the rationale of the research design and how the data was collected. It will also 
include information about how the data was analysed and what steps were taken 
to ensure the quality of the data. The study used an iterative methodology to 
explore the decision-making process in two CCGs, tracking specific services to utilise 
as examples. This should help to illustrate how commissioners reach decisions in 
the new system and whether this has resulted in growing use of private providers, 
or new market mechanisms to assist in selecting providers. The CCGs were chosen 
in order to be comparable with both having access to a range of private providers, 
allowing commissioners to choose these providers if they wanted to, or if the 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ‘ŶƵĚŐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŵŝŶƚŚĂƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? 
 
Chapters five and six discuss the data gathered from the two separate CCGs and 
keeping with the iterative and inductive approach of the thesis, the conceptual 
framework was used to explore the data from the sites and then adjusted to reflect 
what the data illustrated between sites one and two. At the end of the sixth 
chapter, there is a discussion of the similarities and differences of commissioning by 
key decision makers. It then assesses the explanatory power of the conceptual 
framework created in chapter three.  
 
The final chapter is a discussion of the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
empirical evidence. Further, it relates the findings to previous literature on 
commissioning and how the Health and Social Care Act (2012) has changed the 
landscape. It discusses whether or not the Act has resulted in privatisation or 
marketisation as well as, the implication for theory and provides an agenda for 
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Chapter 2 - The Development of the Private health sector in the UK, a 
literature review 
Introduction 
This chapter offers a narrative literature review which will explore how the private 
provision of healthcare has grown alongside state provision of care. It focuses on 
England as the new NHS reforms only change the English NHS. In addition, this 
chapter will outline the definitions that this thesis will utilise when discussing 
privatisation and marketisation, before moving on to discuss what shape the 
private sector has taken since 1948, with a particular focus on later developments 
since the introduction of market-orientated policies. 
 
The NHS is one of the most popular and staunchly defended public institutions in 
the UK, with 65% of the British public stating that they were satisfied with the NHS 
in 2014, the second highest percentage recorded since such polling began in 1983 
 ?dŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?That high level of popularity has not prevented successive 
governments from attempting to reform the NHS. These reforms have been an 
almost continuous feature of the service. However, the core tenet of the service  W 
free and universal care at the point of use, remains unchanged. The high approval 
rating of the NHS has meant that politicians fear being seen as figures who would 
even bring into question this core principle of the health service. The reforms have 
been aimed at organising the NHS more effectively and have at times involved 
greater use of private providers in the delivery of care. However, the introduction 
of the Health and Social Care Act (2012) has led to allegations that privatisation and 
marketisation of the service would take place under the reforms (Davies 2013).  
 
The new reforms devolved responsibility for commissioning from large Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) to GP-led Clinical Commissioning Groups. It has been argued that 
the way in which CCGs select providers will dictate the level of involvement of 
private providers in the delivery of care in the NHS (Krachler and Greer 2015). This 
would have further implications for understanding the degree to which the NHS 
may have been privatised as a result of the reforms.  
 
This chapter will explore the broader context of privatisation in other public 
services. This should assist in understanding the background in which the NHS was 
also changed. The very concepts of privatisation and marketisation are contested 
and will be defined and discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. The 
definitions informed the empirical work and assisted in producing a matrix that 
helps to illustrate the manner in which privatisation could take place in practice.  
 
This will be followed by a brief history of private sector involvement in the NHS, 
starting with the system of provision which existed prior to the creation of the 
health service. It will explore the early NHS and how the private sector worked 
alongside it then explore the introduction of management reforms and the growing 
use of market mechanisms within the Health Service. It will also explore and discuss 
reforms prior to the Health and Social Care Act (2012). There will also be a 
  18 
discussion of how the private sector has become key in the delivery of certain areas 
of care within the NHS.  
 
Before the establishment of the NHS, private practitioners delivered the majority of 
healthcare with support by certain voluntary organisations and government 
elements. The introduction of the NHS limited and altered the role and importance 
of these groups, but did not eliminate them from the delivery of care. Private 
providers continued to deliver care but were restricted in the types of service they 
could and could not provide, and as such, they were pushed to the periphery of the 
system (Calnan et al., 1993).  Apart from that, doctors as individuals continued to 
generate additional income through private practice, maintaining their economic 
autonomy (Ibid 1993).  
Broader policy context: Commissioning and procurement within 
public services 
 
In order to be able to understand growing concerns about privatisation in the NHS, 
it needs to be situated in the context of broader public service reforms. The NHS 
has not been the only service that faced significant reform, and many of the 
principles introduced into the service had a history of use in other areas of welfare. 
This section will outline some of these approaches to provide a clearer 
understanding of these reforms, with a focus on the development of commissioning 
and procurement as used in public services.  
 
From the introduction of the welfare state, the provision of services was funded, 
carried out and administered by the government. There was debate about the 
scope and scale of funding but there was a steady continuation of its development 
(Glennerster 1998), which saw the welfare state extend to multiple areas, such as 
housing, health and education. The amount of money that was committed grew 
continuously from the end of the Second World War, representing 25% of GDP by 
the middle of the 1970s (Hills 2011). This general approach to welfare financing and 
provision continued until the 1970s when there was a global financial recession and 
the election of Conservative Government in 1979, which began to decidedly change 
the funding of these services (Ibid 2011). The objective of successive Conservative 
Governments was to reduce the role of the state in the delivery of services, as they 
were ideologically opposed to the Welfare State (Ibid 2011). In order to achieve 
these objectives, the government began to seek ways of reducing the role public 
provision and funding, encouraging greater use of the private sector by public 
bodies in a variety of different ways (Burchardt and Hills 1999).  
 
The Conservative administrations of the 1980s and early 1990s operated on a 
programme in which they were influenced by the ideas of New Public Management 
(NPM). The general aims of NPM was to make the public sector behave more like 
the private sector. This was achieved through several different targeted methods 
(Burchardt and Hills 1999). In specific areas such as defence, the budget was 
drastically reduced to diminish the financial responsibility of the state (Hills 2011). 
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Other public services were directly privatised. This included the utility and rail 
companies, with the process of selling these utilities to investors began with the 
election of Margaret Thatcher and continued under the Major Government 
(Burchardt and Hills 1999). The Conservatives were also successful in the 
privatisation of council housing which was achieved through the implementation of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ZŝŐŚƚƚŽƵǇ^ĐŚĞŵĞ ? ?dŚŝƐĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚĐŽƵŶĐŝůƚĞŶĂŶƚƐƚŽƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞƐĂƚ
a discount. The scheme proved popular and ensured that there was minimal 
opposition to the process (Burchardt and Hills 1999). 
 
In other public services, the Conservative governments were less successful and 
instead, they targeted certain elements of funding. This was typified by the 
reduction of capital spending, with it being reduced from 2.8% of GDP to 0.9% by 
the end of Conservative government in 1997 (Burchardt and Hills 1999). These 
moves were accompanied by an increasing role for the private sector to deliver 
public services. The mechanism for this was the introduction of quasi-markets to 
introduce competition and choice. Most notably, quasi-markets were introduced in 
both education (Glennerster 1991, Williams 1997) and health (Exworthy et al., 
1999). This introduced greater choice in public services (quasi-market) and also 
reduced the financial commitment of government to public services through the 
reduction of capital spending.  
 
These approaches to commissioning public services were developed further under 
New Labour (1997-2010). The objectives of the Labour Government remained 
remarkably similar to that of their predecessors (Hills 2011). There was further 
expansion of the use of private providers to deliver services funded by the 
government (Hills 2011).  
 
While these policies aimed to reduce the role of the state in funding public services, 
it was only partially effective. The popularity of public services ensured that the role 
of the state remained crucial and that public expenditure on services did not 
decrease in any significant way (Hills 2011). Activity and provision of services was 
still dominated by the public sector, but the type of providers varied in greater 
number. However, there has been further emphasis on the development of Private-
Public partnerships and greater mobilisation of private providers to deliver care on 
behalf of the state (Boivard 2005). This trend of greater use of non-public providers 
in the delivery of public services has continued and was a feature under the 
Coalition Government (McKnight et al., 2015).   
 
These reforms have not always gone smoothly, and procurement processes run by 
the public sector have not always been successful. Recent use of private 
contractors has raised issues about the way in which procurements have been run 
by recent governments. This has been highlighted recently with the Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs committee reporting on widespread 
government failures of public sector procurement (Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2018). The report suggests that there is a lack of 
experience, skills and knowledge within civil service departments with regards to 
procurement (Ibid 2018). All of these issues suggest that there has been an attempt 
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to reduce the role of the public sector in the delivery of public services and attempt 
to increase competition amongst providers while generating savings. These trends 
have been present in British public services for a long time, and the NHS has not 
been immune to this treatment. There have been associated fears of privatisation 
due to such policies, which appear to involve the private sector in the delivery of 
public services (Le Grand 2013). The subsequent section will explore the concepts 
of marketisation and privatisation, before exploring how the private sector 
developed in the UK.   
The concepts of privatisation and marketisation  
This section will explore the concepts of privatisation and marketisation and 
establish a definition of these two key concepts which inform the thesis. These 
concepts are viewed as crucial, as critics of the Act have argued that it could lead to 
privatisation of the NHS (Davies 2013). After the definition of privatisation and 
marketisation, the chapter will explore how these processes may take place in the 
health system.  
 
Privatisation is a process in which the role of the state is reduced and/or supplanted 
by private providers/companies, as outlined by Saltman (2003). In effect, according 
to this definition privatisation occurs only when assets pass directly from the public 
to the private sector (Ibid 2003). An asset is something which can be considered to 
be a utility or a public institution as per general law (Saltman 2003). In addition to 
this, Saltman developed a framework in which he provided definitions for what 
constitutes the private sector and the public sector. The public sphere comprises of 
the State or public sector, encompassing the largest actors (i.e., Ministry of Health). 
A second category of the public sphere is the public but non-state section, which, 
according to Saltman, includes regional bodies and organisations that fall under the 
auspices of local government (which should have a different remit from that of 
central government). He also includes public corporations in this section (Saltman 
2003). In this context, an asset is considered to be an element of a service and can 
take the shape of either a provider or funder of a health service (Ibid 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1  W ^ĂůƚŵĂŶ ?ƐWƵďůŝĐ ?WƌŝǀĂƚĞdĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ 
Source: Saltman (2003) 
 
In the private sphere, the first sub-category is Not-for-Profit organisations. They 
include charities and NGOs that focus on health and/or those that form part of the 
health service in a country (as is the case in Holland) (Saltman 2003). The second 
sub-category of the private sphere is the For-Profit one, which is comprised of 
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businesses with a profit motive. Some may be large corporations (as in the US) or 
smaller companies which provide specialised care and only form a minor part of a 
health care system (Saltman 2003).  
 
Saltman argues that privatisation occurs exclusively when assets transfer from the 
public to the private sector. Consequently, when assets move between different 
elements of the public sector, the process cannot be classed as privatisation. The 
key element to consider is the ownership of the assets. Here Saltman draws an 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ ?  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĂƚŽŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶŽŶĞŚĂŶĚĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?^ĂůƚŵĂŶ
2003). Saltman points to a confusion about the meaning of the terms and 
underlines that marketisation is a different process to privatisation. He states that 
they are two distinct concepts and separate processes that need to be approached 
differently despite how they can be closely related. Marketisation refers to the 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ-ƐƚǇůĞ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ? ŝŶƚŽ Ă ƉƵďůŝĐ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ  ?^ĂůƚŵĂŶ  ? ? ? ? ?
The maintaining of accountability to the public/local government is what makes the 
process different from that of privatisation. This is a very significant distinction, as it 
illustrates the difficulty in establishing a universally accepted definition of 
privatisation, as others argue that marketisation can eventually facilitate 
privatisation (Drakeford 2000). That approach assumes the creation of a situation in 
which market ideas/concepts are introduced into a public sector service (Ibid 2000). 
For this thesis, these two process will be considered as separate. 
 
Saltman provides a clear definition of privatisation, which, however, can further be 
modified in the context of analysing healthcare provision in England. He puts forth 
several examples that do not fit within his typology. One example is the NHS 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), created by the Labour government (1997-2010) in 2001. 
These were public sector bodies given the powers to commission private providers 
apart from their already established statutory obligations to commission public 
suppliers. In addition, PCTs were given the ability to generate additional resources 
by delivering health care to fee-paying patients, as well as re-investing any 
surpluses that they generated into new services. Thereby PCTs became the first 
hybrid organisations, sitting between the public and private, which could 
commission both public and private providers, while also utilising private sector 
practices, i.e., generating profits that they could re-invest. The surpluses were 
employed to cross subsidise other services that were provided by the Trusts and 
were themselves required by law to generate these surpluses (Paton 2007). PCTs 
and the way that they work in practice were an example of a type of organisation 
which did not clearly fit in any category in the context of public and private and as 
such blurred the distinction between the two sectors. 
 
Le Grand and Robinson (1984) argue definitions of privatisation need to be more 
nuanced to operationalise them. They distinguished three different forms of state 
involvement - provision, subsidy, and regulation. These three elements of provision 
are clearly visible in the NHS.  Whilst the NHS remains primarily publicly funded, 
with limited scope for patients to subsidise costs such as prescription medicine, 
private companies that do provide care under the umbrella of the NHS are still 
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subject to strict government regulations. For privatisation to occur according to Le 
Grand and Robinson (1984), the state has to lose control or have it severely 
diminished in one of the three elements which in turn would move under the 
control of either private for-profit companies or charitable/third sector non-profit 
organisations (Ibid 1984). Over the last 20 years the role of the voluntary sector has 
grown with many voluntary/third sector organisations deriving a large proportion 
of their income directly from government contracts (Bennett 2008) and as a result 
these organisations are becoming more vulnerable to market forces (McKay et al., 
2015). A key aspect of this model is that different elements of the service could be 
under the control of competing groups. The authors argue that therefore there is 
not a clear dichotomy between public and private as suggested by Saltman, 
although they do agree that there needs to be a change of state provision for 
privatisation to occur. The next section will explore various characterisations of 
how privatisation may take place.  
 
Tuohy et al., (2004) argue that privatisation in healthcare occurs ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ?
privatisation or it can be actively encouraged by governments. They identified four 
key types of healthcare systems - Parallel, Co-payment, Group-Based and Sectoral 
systems. The division between the public and the private sector is seen to be the 
most important factor in such the process of privatisation as opposed to the 
question of which sector provides which service. In that context, the dominant 
question is not about the providers but the maintenance of high quality of care.  
 
WƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŝƚƐĞůĨĂƐ ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
(Tuohy et al., 2004). In this scenario private providers do not directly challenge the 
role of the public sector, but utilise technological change to their advantage. 
Privatisation occurs when services, previously delivered in hospital settings, are 
transferred to private companies that deliver the care in outpatient or community 
settings. This is seen to be mostly a consequence of technological advance, which 
afforded the private sector the ability to represent itself as an attractive option to 
those who commission health services in any specific area of care provision. State 
provision is being replaced by a variety of providers rather than there being a clear 
dominance of any single group. This could represent a broader trend within health 
service delivery if and when the private sector achieves sufficient growth to 
additionally challenge the public sector in more and more areas of provision 
delivery (Saltman 2008). Another possible cause of this process could be the 
growing financial pressures on health systems and the related need for these 
limited resources to be allocated effectively and efficiently (i.e., the perception that 
the private sector is more efficient).  
 
A similar argument is presented by Klein (2010) who argues that the change in 
policy in the NHS is the result of gradual shifts in the approach to commissioning. 
He argues that rather than being ideologically driven, policies pursued by different 
governments were simply a response to the different issues they faced and under 
the banner of a desire to allocate resources effectively.  
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Tuohy et al., (2004) suggest that the process of  ‘passive privatisation ? does not 
address the role of active actors involved in the decision-making process. Some 
politicians may be more inclined to move health services out of the public sector 
while others may want to nationalise some services, depending on their ideological 
preferences. This process can, arguably, be traced back to various Conservative 
Governments under Margaret Thatcher, when there was a deliberate policy of 
privatisation and the private sector expanded faster than in many other European 
countries, and yet, support for the public system remained high (Calnan et al., 
1993). In more recent cases, this is also linked to other public services and spending 
ŝŶƚŝŵĞƐŽĨ  ‘ĂƵƐƚĞƌŝƚǇ ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƉƵƌƐƵĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ  ? ? ? ? ?-15) and 
Conservative Governments (2015-17) (Bach 2016). The claim that it is only 
technology driving privatisation seems to relegate the state to the role of a passive 
actor, incapable of driving or initiating policy changes. This is especially untrue in 
the UK context, where the government is a powerful actor. This can 
restrict/increase the autonomy of decision makers in health settings, affecting the 
decision-making process by enabling greater freedom in the selection of providers. 
To some extent it also overstates the role of the private sector, which would need 
to be very effective in identifying the service areas in which it will be able to provide 
a more efficient service.  
 
Another characterisation of privatisation is provided by Drakeford (2000) who 
observes two main models. Drakeford attempts to explain privatisation in more 
detail by placing a focus on previous healthcare policy and its development. The 
first model is that of private ownership in which he mirrors the ideas of Schumpeter 
ƚŽ Ă ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ĚĞŐƌĞĞ  ? “Private ownership, per se ?  ?ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŝŶ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ?  ?ƌĂŬĞĨŽƌĚ
2000)). This transformation is justified with an argument that services will benefit 
from the simple transfer of assets from the public to private sectors. Whether or 
not the transfer results in a monopoly or competitive market is of secondary 
importance. The justification goes on further by claiming that the development of 
private sector practices as a result of this method of privatisation will be a growth 
ŽĨ “enterprise, innovation and entrepreneurial zeal ? ?ƌĂŬĞĨŽƌĚ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? 
 
In his second model of privatisation, Drakeford put emphasis on the development 
of competition (i.e., marketisation), rather than the transfer of assets (market 
coordinating). In this scenario, while it may be more desirable for the service to be 
owned by a private provider, it is competition that will ensure the best service 
outcomes. In the extreme, this approach can even argue against private ownership 
(Veljanovski and Bentley 1987). This model presumes a difference between 
privatisation (the transfer of assets), and market replication (the development of 
market like incentives). Ownership is not the primary concern as even public 
corporations can enjoy similar advantages, providing they operate in a competitive 
market (Drakeford 2000). Drakeford states that this may be better described as 
marketisation rather than privatisation, demonstrating that these concepts can 
simultaneously be distinct and related. Thus, Drakeford supports the conclusion of 
Saltman by acknowledging the differences, although further discussing the 
association between marketisation and privatisation.  
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This highlights the differences between marketisation and privatisation as two 
distinct and separate processes. Scholars argue that marketisation and privatisation 
are very distinct concepts that need to be treated as such (Saltman 2003, Collyer 
and White 2011). Hence, for this thesis, these two concepts are considered 
separate. Marketisation does not necessitate a role for private provision; rather it 
seeks to replicate the market. Privatisation, on the other hand, requires there to be 
a transfer of assets. There is room for the presumption that a period of 
marketisation may lead to an increase of the privatisation of any public service. 
Hence, these two concepts are related even if they are separate and different.   
 
Relating specifically to privatisation, Drakeford uses certain practical methods to 
define and characterise the process. Utilising the work of Letwin (1988), he 
examines the processes of privatisation enacted by the Thatcher Government 
(1977-1990) and how certain public services became increasingly privatised in that 
period. Drakeford uses examples of other public services that were privatised with 
a focus on two characterisations  W market replication and private ownership. Both 
of these models were utilised by the government of the day to achieve their aims.  
 
ƌĂŬĞĨŽƌĚ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ŵĂƌŬĞƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ
significant. The first characterisation can aid in understanding how certain 
organisations, such as semi-autonomous Foundation Trusts in the NHS, were 
created, and then competed with one another and independent sector providers. 
The characterisation of the privatisation process refers to the manner in which 
healthcare fits within a broader public sector context, with other public utilities also 
increasingly working with the private sector in the delivery of care and services. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďŽƚŚŽĨƌĂŬĞĨŽƌĚ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƐŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ?ĂƐ
they do not explain why either marketisation/privatisation may take place. Hence, 
ƌĂŬĞĨŽƌĚ ?Ɛ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ƐĞĞŵƐ ŵŽƌĞ ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ĂƐ Ă ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ŽĨ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
consequences of policy decisions which affect the NHS.  
 
Klein (2010) argues from an incrementalist perspective that privatisation may take 
two forms. In the first form, the private sector simply replaces services that have 
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ďĞĞŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ĞĐŚŽŝŶŐ ^ĂůƚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ
and more relevant characterisation for this thesis is how the public sector begins to 
provide fewer resources (i.e., underfunding), primarily for the provision of services. 
In this case, the system remains predominantly publicly funded, but with a greater 
number of services being provided by the private or third sectors and charges being 
introduced into the remaining public services. An example of this is dentistry in the 
NHS.  Rather than the services being transferred to the private sector, public 
funding was decreased in combination with a simultaneous expansion of 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? dŚŝƐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŚĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ďĞĞŶ ƚĞƌŵĞĚ  ‘ďĂĐŬĚŽŽƌƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?ŝƌĐŚ
 ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŝƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽĂĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
In this case, it is not technological advances which dictate changes but rather the 
government. Another example of this process are the attempts of the Conservative 
Government (1987-1991) to reform resource allocation by introducing the internal 
market, despite the opposition of the Medical profession and the public (Le Grand 
et al., 1998). The introduction of the internal market resulted in a situation in which 
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hospital doctors, i.e., the medical profession, could be challenged by the 
commissioners, mostly through the ability to select any service providers they 
wished. The introduction of the internal market mandated the creation of 
regulators to enforce the new rules, which in turn became an additional source of 
pressure on the decision-making processes. The decisions reached by 
commissioners and the various internal contradictions were a major factor in 
commissioning services and ultimately the development of the private sector.  
 
Rondinelli et al., (1989) argue that privatisation can occur in parallel to the 
decentralisation of power from central government to local decision-making 
bodies. He argueƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĂŶ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ  “ŽǀĞƌďƵƌĚĞŶĞĚ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŽ ƐŚĞĚ ƐŽŵĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽŶƚŽ ůŽĐĂů ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making bodies. This 
does not only mean that privatisation can take place exclusively during a period of 
decentralisation as the transfer of powers to local bodies can also be an indicator of 
greater market activity. Through decentralisation, government increases the stake 
by the local decision makers and hence their share in the responsibility for the 
effects of those decisions. More specifically, Rondinelli refers to the concept of 
devolution in the UK.  
 
Health policy has been devolved to the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish 
ĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐ ŝŶƚŚĞh< ?dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŝŶ ůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚZŽŶĚŝŶĞůůŝ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐ
that political, not economic reasons drive privatisation. According to his theory, 
devolved institutions should utilise a greater number of private providers. However, 
the greatest increase in the use of independent sector providers in the NHS is in 
England. The NHS in England has been under the control of the Department of 
Health which is under the jurisdiction of the central government. In the devolved 
NHS systems, the dominant role of the public sector is protected (Greer 2004). In 
other words, the policy of the national devolved assemblies goes against the 
arguments of Rondinelli (Pollock and Godden 2008). This thesis will further explore 
the usage of private sector providers in the NHS.   
 
The significance of this characterisation of privatisation is that it introduces the idea 
of a potential comparison of the development of the health service in England and 
ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚ ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? KƚŚĞƌ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ ŽĨ ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ
possibility as being key determinants of privatisation. An advantage of this theory is 
that its application can be easily monitored when observing devolution in the UK as 
there have been measurable changes in commissioning services in the different 
constituent nations.  
 
The Rondinelli characterisation allows for the study of how changes may take place 
under existing constitutional arrangements in the UK. It allows for the analysis of 
each service individually so that judgements can be reached at to whether or not 
privatisation has occurred. However, Rondinelli does not take into account 
marketisation, reducing the effectiveness of this characterisation whilst exploring 
the current market based reforms of the NHS. 
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Developing a matrix 
Privatisation is a complex and contested concept. There is no universally accepted 
definition, and it is open to different interpretations. However, for the purpose of 
this thesis, privatisation will be defined as occurring when there is a direct transfer 
of assets from the public to the private sector in either the funding or the provision 
of a service. The nature of what constitutes an asset is primarily drawn from the 
work of Saltman (2003). Privatisation will also be considered as related but separate 
from marketisation. 
 
According to Le Grand and Robinson (1984), there are three key components of a 
healthcare system. Like Klein (1984) they claim that the key elements of 
determining whether privatisation and marketisation have occurred are changes in 
funding and provision which take place on the supply side of the NHS. Changes to 
funding and provision can occur for a variety of reasons as outlined in the previous 
section. Being able to track changes within these key areas will enable an 
exploration of whether or not privatisation has occurred. The first area is the issue 
of finance or funding; i.e., which actor finances any given service. In practice, this 
can be quickly and easily determined. There are, however, some circumstances in 
which there is a mixture of funding organisations. On those occasions, it is 
important to precisely determine which actor (public/private/third sector) provides 
the major part of the funding. 
 
The second area is provision, i.e., which group provides the services 
(private/public/third sector). If there is a mixture of providers, it is important to 
determine which is the most prominent i.e., it would be classed as the one 
delivering the service.  
 
The third and last area is organisation/governance structure. Here the emphasis is 
on how the service is administered and on what kind of management structure is 
applied in the organisation (i.e., the introduction of market orientated management 
principles). This would also include the directives that any regulator may have been 
given by central government. The role of the regulator may have an effect on the 
choices of decision makers and this thesis will also explore how this may take place.  
 
For the purposes of this work, marketisation will be defined as whether or not the 
management of any given service is dominated by private sector management 
practices, such as NPM, as introduced earlier in this chapter. An example of this 
would be the introduction of management practices, drawn from the private sector 
and implemented in a service that is wholly state-funded and provided. The service 
does not leave the public sector, but there is a move to replicate the effects of the 
market to improve efficiency.  
 
Privatisation is in this context defined as a change in the funding or provision of a 
service as opposed to a management/organisational change. Under this definition, 
privatisation occurs not only with a simple change from a public actor to a private 
organisation but also when the public provider loses its status as the dominant 
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group due to a diminishing role. A dominant role is one where the majority of 
services would no longer clearly be provided by one actor. This transfer can be to 
any non-public sector group, and it provides the basis of a matrix which can aid in 
visualising and tracking the changes.  
 
As previously stated, privatisation and marketisation are separate processes, but 
are also linked. This definition should ensure that these two processes are clearly 
distinguished to avoid any confusion and to determine whether one or both of 
them is detected in the data gained in the empirical study.  
 
The complexity and the multiple different elements of these concepts suggest that 
utilising an ideal type matrix to help delineate them and be able to track the change 
in the system would be beneficial. It allows observations of various elements of a 
system, and whether it is subject to processes of privatisation or marketisation.   
 
Ideal type Matrix 
 
 Types of 
Privatisation 




 Public Public Public (command and control) x Pure system, public 
control and command 
x Can be compared to 
early NHS 
 Marketisation Public Public Management  W competition 
through the internal market 
x Competition should 
drive quality and 
improve costs 
x Public sector uses 
competitions (Saltman 
2003) 
  ‘WĂƐƐŝǀĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
Private Public Regulatory x Private companies 
utilise technological 
developments to 
compete with public 
providers (Tuohy et al., 
2004) 




x State continues to 
regulate the system 
 Regulated 
Privatisation 
Private Public Strong State 
control/intervention 
x Transfer of assets 
through Government 
policy (Tuohy et al 2004) 
x Government Regulation 
still plays important role 
x For profit private 





for profit  
Public Strong regulation x System with a large 
number of third sector 
providers 
x Diminishing role of State 
provision, hence still 
effective privatisation 
(Le Grand & Robinson 
1984) 









Mixed governance/role of 
both public and private sector 
x Partnerships between 





Public Private Self-regulation/competition  x Private sources of 
funding (i.e. insurance) 
used to encourage 
private sector provision 
of services 
x Competition and 
regulation regulate costs 
and quality 
 Privatisation via 
decentralisation 
Private Public Local Government x Decentralisation of 
political power precedes 
privatisation 
x Local government 
tenders contracts to the 
private sector 






Private Private Government regulation x Private ownership of the 
healthcare system 
x Private ownership per 






 Private Private Private (self-regulation) x System in which market 
is dominant 
x No State 
intervention/regulation 
x Competition and choice 
regulate market place 
(Supply and demand) 
 
 *Bold denotes 
Ideal type 
    
Table 1  W Ideal type Matrix 
 
Using ideal type definitions, with a fully public system on one end of the matrix 
(provision, funding, and governance), and a fully privatised system on the other, 
would allow to explore how changes in one area would affect the system as a 
whole and whether it can be said to be undergoing a period of 
marketisation/privatisation. This would include an understanding of how the 
system could be changing from a public one to a private one. The matrix also allows 
for the visualisations of a fully mixed system. Thus, the matrix allows for tracking of 
shifts in privatisation/marketisation throughout the system over time. 
 
The template also helps by providing a methodology with which to track changes in 
the selection of providers and the overall effect on the NHS. Equally, we can follow 
any changes in commissioning of provision, i.e., the balance between public and 
private. Finally, the matrix helps in identifying the effects of the regulatory 
framework on any one of the three areas, i.e., how the regulatory framework may 
dictate/affect the behaviour of commissioners and how this may have an effect on 
the system as a whole.  
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Pre-NHS provision: A pluralistic healthcare system 
This second section of the chapter will examine how private provision existed 
before the creation of the NHS. The purpose of this section is to understand the 
role that the private sector has played in the delivery of healthcare in the UK 
historically and how it has developed and changed over time. Parts of this analysis 
will also explore the various factors that had a role in the development of policy. 
The section will follow a chronological order and expand on developments leading 
to the Health and Social Care Act (2012).  
 
Prior to the NHS, the health ĐĂƌĞ  ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ǁĂƐ Ă ŵŝǆƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ
providers, the majority of which were private sector and charity providers, 
regulated by the medical profession (Ham 2009). That system was based on 
Victorian concepts of poverty  W a distinction between thĞ  ‘ĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƵŶĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ? ƉŽŽƌ ? dŚŽƐĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ? ƉŽŽƌ ǁĞƌĞ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƐŽ
through no fault of their own and hence deserved assistance. In contrast, the 
 ‘ƵŶĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ƉŽŽƌ ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ
consequentially should be left to their own devices. The enactment of the 1848 
Public Health Act brought with it a shift to improving public health and enhanced 
the professionalization of medical practitioners which itself grew in importance as 
the dominant actor in the delivery of healthcare (Ham 2009).  
 
The voluntary sector provided the majority of health provision for those who were 
unable to directly pay for their own care. In the main, they were either associated 
with churches or charities dedicated to the benefit of those who were considered 
ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ? ƉŽŽƌ ? dŚĞƐĞ ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
donations, but also received government grants (Cherry 1997). The poor were 
provided with healthcare to enable them to participate in the workforce. Those 
with no other alternatives would seek to be admitted to a workhouse, where in 
return for their labour they would have their most basic needs met, including 
healthcare. Many of the first hospitals evolved from such arrangements (Ham 
2009). This was supplemented through an additional system of charitable voluntary 
organisations, workhouses and hospitals which were finally formalised and 
implemented through the Poor Law reform and administered by local government. 
The later Local Government Act 1929 shifted the responsibilities of delivery of 
healthcare to larger local authorities as they began to run hospitals and infirmaries, 
taking over from the Poor Law Unions. This was accompanied by increasing usage 
of public (i.e. state funds) to pay for and run medical services. By the 1940s this 
resulted in a well-established network of local authority hospitals and 
accompanying services which provided the majority of hospital care. 
 
In the same period, healthcare was available to those who could pay from an 
increasingly professionalised core of practitioners (i.e., doctors, pharmacists, and 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? ?tĞĂůƚŚǇƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŚĂŶŐĞǀĞƌǇ
much in its essence from the previous century when they also had access to doctors 
and other medical professionals through direct payment (Ham 2009). The most 
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dramatic changes and improvements to healthcare in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries actually occurred in relation to the poorer elements of society.  
 
Intervention and provision of health services grew in importance in the first 
decades of the 20th century. It was placed firmly on the legislative agenda due to 
the need for a healthy population; after widespread malnourishment during the 
Boer Wars the government was faced with a much smaller pool of potential military 
recruits (Webster 2002). After the Boer Wars the government became much more 
active in the provision of healthcare in response to a growing demand. This 
culminated in the Health Insurance Act of 1911 which is seen as a first step in the 
direction of a universal health system (Hacker 1988). Under this system employers, 
employees and the government contributed to the scheme which allowed insured 
individuals to see GPs at regulated prices. However, additional treatments and care 
would have to be paid for by the patient (Digby and Bosanquet 1988). This was 
followed by a pattern of general shifts, with many voluntary and poor hospitals 
being taken over gradually by government (Webster 2002). Responsibility for 
payment for healthcare services moved from the individual to the state. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the NHS, there was a mixed system of care. Those 
individuals who were wealthy enough would purchase their own care, while those 
who were unable to, relied on limited public services or on voluntary hospitals. As 
the role of the state grew, the burden of payment shifted from the individual 
towards the state, with the establishment of insurance schemes and of growing 
public bodies.   
The Creation of the NHS: A fully public system? 
The Second World War led to the formation of the Emergency Medical Service 
(EMS) and further public health policy developments (Webster 2002). This led to a 
wider use of health services and ensured its popularity, with it being the first time 
that may families were well fed and cared for (Timmins 2001). 
 
Before and during the Second World War there was no political consensus between 
the two major parties on the further development of healthcare. However, in 1942 
William Beveridge published what is considered a radical report in which he 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĨŝǀĞ ‘'ŝĂŶƚǀŝůƐ ?ƚŚĂƚƉůĂŐƵĞĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?dŝŵŵŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞĞǀŝůƐ
ǁĂƐ  ‘ŝƐĞĂƐĞ ? ? ƚŚĞ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶĨ Ă EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ
ƚŚĂƚƚƌĞĂƚĞĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŝůůŶĞƐƐĞƐ ?dŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚǁĂƐĞŵďƌĂĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
then became part of the so-called Welfare State in the post-war UK.  In relation to 
health services this meant the merging of the different disparate elements of 
existing provision into a single organisation. The reforms included the consolidation 
of the for profit private hospitals and clinics, voluntary sector hospitals, and the 
workhouse hospitals. Control of these institutions was given to the newly created 
National Health Service (NHS). Public health and community services were given to 
local government (Webster 2002). 
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The post-War Labour Government (1946-50) was faced with the challenge of 
combining these various elements into one functioning service. It had to negotiate 
and pacify the concerns of the medical profession which resisted the perceived loss 
of its autonomy, but whose cooperation was key to the success of the project. The 
medical professionals were particularly resistant to surrendering their economic 
autonomy to the state and negotiations with the Government at one point seemed 
likely to fail (Webster 2002). Final agreement was reached only when the medical 
profession was satisfied that their earning potential was protected. This included 
allowing General Practice to remain as private contractors working for the NHS, but 
who had the ability to undertake some private practice.  
 
The agreement with the medical profession was described by the then Health 
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ? ŶĞƵƌŝŶ ĞǀĂŶ ? ĂƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ P  ‘ƐƚƵĨĨĞĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵŽƵƚŚƐĨƵůů ŽĨ ŐŽůĚ ?  ?dŝŵŵŝŶƐ
2001), underlining the size of the financial compromise made to create the single 
unified health service. Existing facilities were appropriated by the government and 
a new building programme of hospitals was announced (Ibid 2001). The provision of 
healthcare would be carried out by government/public control with doctors earning 
the majority of their income while working for the state (either as private 
contractors or as salaried employees). Hence, medical professionals were allowed 
to simultaneously work in the public sector and draw a private income  W the use of 
NHS pay-beds and was a large source of income for consultants - which continued 
until the 1970s when this practice was gradually phased out (Richmond 1996). The 
majority of the high earners in the service were hospital doctors and the conditions 
and salary of GPs remained inferior until the late 1950s (The Kings Fund 2011). Even 
with much of the system being under direct government control after a form of 
nationalisation, private provision of health services continued to exist, though over 
time it became more focused on private insurance than on out of pocket payments 
(Doyle 2000).  
 
It has been argued that in its early stages, the shape of the NHS was significantly 
influenced by the conflict between the government and hospital doctors, who 
dominated and had a privileged position within the healthcare system at the time 
(Klein 1990). Hospital doctors succeeded in maintaining their clinical and also 
economic autonomy by retaining income from private pay beds and undertaking 
some limited activities in the private sector (Doyle 2000). The government of the 
day had no choice but to compromise with the profession through negotiation, to 
successfully create a universal service. The government accepted the role 
challenging the medical profession, formally allowed to dictate the actual delivery 
and organisation of care services. The service was wholly funded by the state, yet 
organised by the medical profession (working for the government) and so 
consequentially was to a large extent self-regulated. This formed the basis of the 
NHS for the early part of its existence. Disparate elements were combined under 
one umbrella, and the dominant role of the medical profession was confirmed 
(Klein 2010). It is important to reinforce the point that GPs at the time were 
relatively marginalised, as they had more limited earning potential compared to 
their hospital colleagues (Doyle 2000).  
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At this point the health care system can be viewed as consisting of three separate 
areas for the first time; provision, funding, and organisation. The post-War 
government took control of both funding and the majority of provision (with GPs 
being a notable exception) but allowed the medical profession to maintain 
responsibility for how treatment was carried out.  
 
While the majority of the population registered with the NHS in 1948, private 
practice continued alongside, primarily through private insurance and pay beds. 
The use of private insurance was initially limited to a small proportion of the 
population and reached its peak in the 1980s, with participation at just over 11% of 
the population (Propper 2000). Some medical professionals continued to work 
outside of the scope of the government; for example, dentists who were initially a 
part of the NHS but quickly became a fee-charging service soon after top-fees were 
introduced in 1948. Ophthalmology developed in a similar way. These heralded 
similar future disagreements between the government and public sector groups 
who were as a rule opposed to services being placed outside of the scope of the 
public service. Once such example was the controversy regarding the introduction 
of prescription charges in 1952 (Webster 2002).   
 
In the early years of the NHS, there was an assumption that the cost of the service 
would gradually decrease as the population became healthier with better care 
(Ham 2009). However, after this initial period of consensus, and contrary to 
expectations the costs of healthcare continued to increase.  As a result, the issue of 
resource allocation became one of the key political debates of the period, and the 
two major parties started to move away from the classic model (i.e., full public type 
system or command and control) of health care in the UK (Powell and Hewitt 1998). 
The very nature of commissioning deals with the allocation of resources and the 
most effective dispersal of funds. This was one of the major contributing factors to 
the decision to introduce prescription charges and allow dentistry to become a fee-
charging service. It was, however, an unpopular measure with the general public 
ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ƚŽ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ĚĞĨĞĂƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
election of 1951 (Webster 2002).  There were additional reforms of GP pay with 
incentives created to improve their working conditions and to maintain GPs as a 
gateway to the rest of the system (Ham 2009). But overall the post-War consensus 
between the two major political parties, regarding the funding of the NHS 
persevered until the late 1970s. The approach was colloquially known as 
 ‘ƵƚƐŬĞůůŝƐŵ ? ?ĂĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶĂŵĞƐŽĨĂŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ>ĂďŽƵƌŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ
(Powell and Hewitt 1998). The annual budget of the NHS in this period was 
gradually increased, with new facilities being built as and when they were needed 
(Ham 2009). As to the reasons for the consensus, some claim that it was not 
coordinated but rather the result of an accidental or coincidental policy agreement 
or consequence of political necessity (Powell and Hewitt 1998). Whatever the 
reason, this consensus allowed the NHS to develop and expand until the late 1970s 
with the model in which the medical profession kept its dominant role.  
 
In summary, in its early years the NHS was dominated by the medical profession to 
which the government was forced to give concessions on issues relating to clinical 
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and economic autonomy.  The independence and power of the medical profession 
was not challenged by the government. dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚůĂƌŐĞůǇ
as one of resource provision whilst trying to generate savings when and where it 
was thought possible. There was also a focus on hospital and medical services, 
enabling the privatisation of peripheral services, as seen with dental and 
ophthalmic services, which began to charge fees. This state of affairs prevailed until 
the election of the Conservative Government in 1979 when there was a change in 
policy (Klein 2010). 
 
The growth of management in the NHS post 1979 
 
The political values of post-War governments dictated their approach to health 
policy and both of the major parties were committed to the increased funding of 
the NHS and the dominant role of the medical profession. However, after victory in 
the election of 1979, the Conservative Party challenged the prevailing economic 
theories, adopted monetarism (the principle that inflation should be kept low, 
ǁŚŝůĞŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ ?ĂŶĚďĞŐƵŶĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƌŽůůŝŶŐďĂĐŬ
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ ?  ?tŝůĚŝŶŐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ǁĂƐ ŝŶ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶĚ
ƌĞƉƵĚŝĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? ŽŶ ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ  ?WŽǁĞůl and Hewitt 1998). 
Whilst determined to carry out the wider reform of the public sector the 
Conservatives were aware of the popularity of the NHS amongst the public and so 
wishing to maintain their electoral prospects were very cautious in their approach. 
The government avoided a direct and open disagreement with the medical 
profession but managed to carry out reforms, as they had with other public services 
(Harrison and McDonald 2008). The first of those reforms of the NHS was the 
commissioning of the 1983 Griffiths report, which argued that the NHS was too 
bureaucratic and poorly organised and that ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŵĂĚĞŵŽƌĞ ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ
market like (Wilding 1997, Greener 2001).   
 
The Griffiths Report is the first example of New Public Management (NPM) 
principles being introduced into the NHS. A basic tenet of NPM is that public 
services should attempt to be managed in a similar fashion to businesses. For the 
E,^ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŵĞĂŶƚ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ  ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĐŽƐƚ-ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?  Wtackling the 
 ‘ďŽƚƚŽŵůĞƐƐ Ɖŝƚ ?  ?&ĞƌůŝĞ ĂŶĚ WĞƚƚŝŐƌĞǁ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  Ɛ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ŶĞǁ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ
introduced into every level of the health service, with a brief to commission 
services and to reduce waste (Macfarlane et al., 2012). This was in direct contrast 
to the previous organisation of the NHS, in which the medical profession was 
dominant, self-regulating, and delivered and organised care independently from 
the government. That dominant position was now threatened by the introduction 
of full-time managerial staff. This led to conflicts between the clinicians and newly 
introduced managers, primarily in how resources should be allocated, with 
clinicians wanting to maintain control of how and where the NHS budget was to be 
spent. These reforms would lay the basis for future involvement of both clinicians 
as managers and of additional market based reforms (Ibid 2012). In addition to 
making the NHS more market like, the Conservative administration lessened the 
  34 
controls on the private sector in terms of healthcare to encourage a greater 
number of private providers to begin operating (Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996).  
 
There were other changes in health policy, some of which brought with them a 
greater emphasis on the private provision of healthcare. One such example was the 
Health Service Act (1980). Rather than directly expanding the private sector, the 
aim of the Act was to create more favourable conditions for its growth and 
expansion. This was primarily achieved through tax breaks for companies which 
provided private health insurance to their employees, as well as extending coverage 
to family members (Calnan et al., 1993). During this period there were the first 
attempts to entice private providers from the United States to start operating in the 
UK (Ham 2009). This was one of the first cases of external (i.e., foreign) private 
providers being invited to deliver care in the UK healthcare marketplace (Ibid 2009).  
 
tŚŝůƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
expansion of private providers had mixed success, as the growth of these providers 
remained limited, it did represent a significant departure from previous policy. 
Private companies started to bid and win tenders to provide services within the 
NHS, with a resulting expansion of the private sector (Klein 2005). However, the 
majority of these providers were based in the south-east of England, where they 
could meet a demand primarily from a more affluent population, with these 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ? ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ƌĞůǇŝŶŐ ŽŶ ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
insurance schemes (Propper 2000). So while it can be said that growing the private 
sector as an alternative to the NHS did not achieve as much success as was initially 
intended, it did create the groundwork for a future partnership between the public 
and private sector (Propper 2000).  
 
The early 1980s marked the beginning of outsourcing certain elements of hospital 
provision to private providers (Cousins 1988). This included catering and cleaning 
on hospital wards, and generally consisted of non-medical services (Greener et al., 
2014). This signified the beginning of a new approach - public funding but private 
delivery. This approach became further entrenched in the NHS over time. Private 
companies regularly competed for and were awarded contracts. The primary aim of 
the government was to reduce public expenditure, and the awarding of these first 
contracts to private contractors did not register in the public domain as services 
remained free at the point of use. However, this later became a topic of wider 
public debate with the spread of the MRSA virus in hospitals in which the cleaning 
contracts were carried out by private contractors (Ibid 1988). This also highlights a 
trend in which privatisation took place on the periphery of services, similar to the 
earlier changes to dentistry and ophthalmology (Greener 2001). 
 
These first years of Conservative Government can be described as a period in which 
health policy shifted towards the acceptance of a greater role for the private sector, 
i.e., a shift to marketisation rather than privatisation or, more precisely, introducing 
elements of marketisation but with limited privatisation. The transfer of assets 
from the public to the private was very limited in regard to medical services per se 
(with the exception of contracting out the aforementioned services), though there 
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was an increased focus on the use of market mechanisms in the management of 
the service. There was also a growth of the use of private funding, in the form of 
private insurance schemes. While neither were as far-reaching as originally 
intended, these processes did set the scene for future health policy reform by later 
governments. Popular discourse changed and moved towards the acceptance of 
certain narratives including that the NHS is an inefficient, over-bureaucratised 
organisation. In effect, this was the start of a critical view of the NHS, as opposed to 
the benevolence of the wider public towards the service previously.  However, it is 
important to say that this change of discourse was only possible in parallel with 
reassurances that the service would remain free at the point of use. 
 
Another significant marker of this period was the first open challenge to the 
dominance of the medical profession by the government. The government insisted 
and prevailed in the decision to introduce managers into the NHS under the guise 
of ensuring better use of financial resources. This also led to the inclusion of private 
sector management practices becoming the norm. The medical profession 
managed to retain some clinical autonomy and so remained self-regulating, but in 
turn was faced with much stricter control of resource spending than previously, and 
clinicians had to share in decision-making processes with non-medical professionals 
to ensure the continued delivery of care. While there were few direct 
confrontations between the competing interests in this period, this new 
arrangement would further develop under subsequent Conservative Governments, 
and this will be discussed in the next section.  
The rise of marketisation?  
After further election success in 1983, the Conservative Government became more 
active in its attempts to reform the NHS with the prevailing belief that that to 
improve the co-ordination of services and increase the efficiency of the health 
service, the NHS would need to behave more like a business (Greener et al., 2014). 
In addition, the late 1980s also represented a period of increasing financial 
pressures on the NHS, both from government policy and the weak state of the UK 
economy (Day and Klein 1991). This continuous reform resulted in a conflict 
between various groups over influence on the future direction of the NHS. The 
government's next step was the introduction of the internal market, which was 
implemented with the NHS and Community Care Act (1990). This represented a key 
moment in the history of the NHS. The stated aim of the Conservative Government 
was to further improve the management of the NHS by replicating the effects of a 
market in pursuit of more effective resource allocation (Le Grand et al., 1998). The 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ǁĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ďĞƚƚĞƌ  “ǀĂůƵĞ ĨŽƌ ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ
competition with the NHS (Allen 2013). These new reforms built upon previous 
changes such as the Griffiths Report, which had already introduced new 
management structures into the NHS and helped to facilitate the continued 
development of private insurance outside of the health service. This new internal 
market divided the NHS in an organisational context into two different groups  W 
providers and purchasers. The providers were organisations such as hospitals, 
which in this new structure offered their services to the purchaser organisations, 
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which in turn searched for the best possible financial package (Ibid 1998). This form 
of competition was explained as a replication of the perceived positive effects of 
the market. Therefore, this period can best be characterised as marketisation 
rather than privatisation. It is, however important to note that policy cannot be 
analysed in isolation, but rather needs to be viewed over time and as a gradual 
shift/evolution from previous policy, with many health reforms developing previous 
policy (Greener et al., 2014).  
 
The introduction of the internal market was met with widespread opposition, 
including the medical profession, political parties, and the public at large, with 
whom the reform was particularly unpopular (Baggott 1997). The medical 
profession entered into an open disagreement with the government, but they were 
unable to gain significant concessions. The reform was pushed forward by the then 
Health Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, who demonstrated that reform could continue 
even when faced with significant opposition (Greener et al., 2014). It appeared to 
be a success for the government in implementing its own legislative agenda.  
 
During this period there was a further increase in the involvement of private 
providers in the NHS including treating patients, albeit in a limited capacity (Klein 
2010). This was encouraged further by government policy which continued to 
deregulate the rules regarding the introduction of new private providers (Ibid 
2010). This was significant because this policy only had limited success, and it was 
the creation of a symbiotic relationship between the private and public sector, 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶE,^ƚŚĂƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĞŶƐƵƌĞĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ  ?/ďŝĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ
internal market ensured that some NHS resources would under specific 
circumstances be allocated to the private sector (Ibid 2010). So, it can be said that 
the most far-reaching consequence of the introduction of the internal market was 
the new relationship between the private sector and the NHS, which in effect 
ensured a market for private providers and which carries on to the present day 
(Mohan 1986).  
 
Another consequence of the introduction of the internal market was its weakening 
of the dominant role of the medical profession in the development of health policy. 
The medical profession, represented by the Royal Colleges and British Medical 
Association (BMA) amongst others, was strongly opposed (Lapsley 1994, Ham 2009, 
Greener et al., 2014). However, the government ignored their opposition and 
enacted the reforms. This set the tone for the future relationship between the 
government and medical professionals, as the authorities continued to enact 
reforms in the face of opposition from medical professionals, who were as a rule 
unable to alter the substance of the changes (Lapsley 1994, Ham 2009).  
 
Despite their desire to generate additional competition against the NHS, the 
Conservative Governments of this period were ultimately unsuccessful in that goal 
for a number of reasons. The public was still heavily in favour of a fully publicly 
ĨƵŶĚĞĚ E,^  ?dŚĞ <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ &ƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? /Ŷ ƚŚŽƐĞ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞ  ? ƚŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌ ůĞŐĂĐǇ ŽĨ
these governments was not the creation of a private alternative to the NHS, but 
rather the beginning of competition between NHS bodies and the growth of the 
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private sector participating in the delivery of services in cooperation with the NHS. 
The aims of the internal market were to increase value for money, and to further 
integrate and coordinate services (Ham 2009). The growth of private providers was 
primarily through gaining contracts from the NHS, and it became a source of 
revenue which ensured the survival of the private sector. Whilst there was little 
direct privatisation of the NHS, this period was marked by numerous reforms that 
replicated market behaviour particularly regarding efficiency. The government, on 
the whole, maintained its stance in regards to health policy, while still relying on 
the medical profession to implement the changes despite its opposition to them. 
From a wider perspective, a significant factor in this is that market replication 
policies were relatively popular in the public narrative, which strengthened the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚĂŶĚǁŚĞŶĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂŶǇŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ
and other actors (Greener et al., 2014). 
 
Health policy developed in a context of constant disagreement and negotiation 
between competing actors. The government was generally successful in pushing 
forth its legislative agenda, and the medical profession managed to retain some of 
its clinical autonomy, while further gaining economic autonomy. Despite being 
unable to enact all of its envisioned market-based reforms, mostly due to public 
opposition, the government did manage to introduce internal competition in the 
NHS, between purchasers and providers. They were also able to continue the use of 
private providers in a limited scale. The focus of this period was very much on 
attempting to address the financial issues facing the NHS by strengthening 
management and introducing more competition, arguing that a market-based 
system would more effectively allocate resources than the previous centrally 
planned system (Butler 1992).  
From purchasing to commissioning  
After the General Election victory in 1992, the Conservative Government took a 
more conciliatory approach in further reforms of the NHS. The key element of 
health policy of this government was the introduction of the General Practitioners 
fund-holding scheme (GPFH). First established in 1991, it was developed further as 
a plan to devolve funds and commissioning power to GPs who in turn would act as 
fundholders, purchasing services for their local communities (Croxson et al., 1998, 
Wainwright and Calnan 2012). In the context of the internal market, the GPFH 
represented a new form of local purchasers.  
 
The central drive behind the reforms was that the use of market mechanisms would 
be the most effective way in which to distribute resources (Wainwright 1998). GPs 
would be ideally suited to purchasing relevant services for their local populations, 
rather than central planners. The reforms enjoyed limited success (Glennester et 
al., 1994). They succeeded in generating savings in certain areas of secondary care, 
focussed on local needs, and better care (Glennerster et al., 1994, Wainwright and 
Calnan 2012). However, it was soon recognised that administering this new system 
was more expensive than the savings that were made (Le Grand 1998). As Le Grand 
ƐĂŝĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐ ƚŽ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽŽ
  38 
ǁĞĂŬĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐƚŽŽƐƚƌŽŶŐ ? ?>Ğ'ƌĂŶĚ1999). So while this scheme did not 
directly involve the private sector, it did represent further marketisation of the 
NHS. Competition as an organisational principle was embedded even deeper into 
the health service in an attempt to replicate the market. The GPFH scheme by its 
very nature was an attempt to utilise greater market tools through moving away 
from central planning and developing decision making (Wainwright and Calnan 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? dŚĞǇ ĂůƐŽ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ 'W ĂƐ Ă  “ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶ ? ?/ďŝĚ  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ  ? ? ? ?
which further helped to push the idea that this scheme represented the 
entrenching of marketisation.  
 
The Conservative Government continued the work of previous governments in its 
attempts to replicate private sector practices in the public sector. In effect, the goal 
of the government was to create a more market-based system rather than to 
privatise the service directly (Wainwright and Calnan 2012). In that context, the use 
of private providers did not markedly increase, although there were some tentative 
steps to expand their role further. The more significant policy development in this 
period was the introduction of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes. While 
this is not a form of direct privatisation, the assets are publically owned, it does 
represent a further move to merge the public and private sectors in the delivery of 
healthcare services. Private companies financed the building of new hospitals in 
return for the right to charge rents to the relevant body over a longer period of 
time (Exworthy et al., 2011).  
 
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŽƌǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
with the medical profession persisted. The majority of GPs were opposed to their 
involvement in commissioning though there was some disagreement amongst 
them. As stated by Hunter (1994), there were three groups of doctors, some who 
were opposed to managerialism, some who attempted to find ways around it and 
those who embraced the new principles. This is another example of the power of 
the government as this reform was enacted despite opposition from the medical 
profession.  
 
 ?ůƵƌƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ 
ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂƌŬĞƚ-
style reforms and private providers into the NHS, New Labour was elected on the 
promise to abolish the internal market and to reconcile the service (Greener et al., 
2014). However, in practice, Labour would only build on and entrench the principles 
of previous reforms (Ibid 2014). 
 
Initially, the Labour Party remained committed to matching the spending 
commitments of the outgoing Conservatives, and this included the NHS (Ham 2009, 
tĞďƐƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚŚĂƚƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚƉŽůŝĐǇdeveloped that which 
was introduced by their predecessor.  
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The first new policy of the Labour Government was The New NHS (1997). In line 
with the Comprehensive Spending Review (Webster 2002), New Labour announced 
an increase of the NHS budget of an additional £21 billion over three years (Ham 
2009). This was in contrast to other public services where the government had 
reduced public spending. This stood in contrast to previous administrations which 
looked predominantly at improving the way in which resources are allocated. There 
was however, a focus on improving economic efficiency with the increased funding 
(Harrison 2002).  
 
In this period the Labour Government also retained the internal market despite 
signalling differently in the past. In so doing, the Labour Government embraced the 
principles and language of private sector management practices (Cutler and Waine 
2000). One element of the internal market that was abolished was the GPFH 
scheme. The new administration eliminated it upon coming to power in 1997. It 
had been argued by the Labour Party that GP Fundholders had led to the creation 
of a two tier NHS (Dixon and Glennerster 1995, Ham 2009). However, the Labour 
Government decided to continue the concept of primary care led commissioning 
through creating new Primary Care Groups (PCGs) (Miller et al., 2012). These new 
groups were larger organisations than the GPFHs that preceded them (Miller et al., 
2012), but operated using similar principles, with the goal of moving commissioning 
further into primary care (Ham 2009). This change represented a set of new policies 
as well as, a continuation of reforms under previous governments. In effect, they 
highlighted the wider acceptance of the view that the NHS must continue to be 
cost-effective, operating in a similar fashion to a private company.   
 
New Labour also continued to use PFI schemes. These schemes became more 
common under the Labour Government than under previous administrations as 
they were primarily used to build new facilities. PFI schemes fit well with the 
broader Labour commitment to limiting spending and so were seen as a useful tool 
(Ham 2009). Whilst in the short term PFI schemes helped with the provision of 
hospitals, from a government standpoint lowering the cost of building, it left the 
NHS with long-term repayments (Greener et al., 2014). Significantly, this represents 
a ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ‘ďůƵƌƌŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶthe public and private sectors, with the 
private sector building the majority of hospitals in this period (Ibid 2014). The 
overarching need for investment into the NHS, combined with the notion that the 
private sector is inherently more efficient, resulted in an apparent acceptance of 
the PFI schemes by various actors.  
Growing usage of private providers  ? the PFI scheme  
PFI was initially proposed by the Conservative Government (1990-97). However, 
usage of the scheme became more widespread under the Labour Government 
(Grimsey and Graham 1997). The PFI is a method of financing investment in new 
facilities (capital investment) where the public and private sectors work together. 
The private sector delivers the construction of facilities and then charges annual 
fees to the NHS Trust, whilst also providing non-clinical services (Treasury Select 
Committee 2011). Initially, PFI was utilised as a mechanism to allow the Labour 
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party to fund the building of new hospitals whilst adhering to Conservative 
spending commitments (Webster 2002). Later, PFI would be argued to be a means 
of sharing the risk between the public and private sector (Shaoul et al., 2011). 
Clearly, the expansion of the PFI schemes meant a larger role for private providers 
who would ensure the necessary capital for the building of a hospital. In return, the 
private company would gradually recover its investments by leasing the newly built 
facility to the NHS for a period of 25-35 years for a fixed fee  W regardless of the use 
of these new facilities (Shaw 2003). 
 
PFI became one of the central elements of New Labour health policy, despite 
opposing their use during the Conservative government (Shaw 2003). The new 
administration used the PFI scheme as a way of keeping expenditure on the 
building of new schoŽůƐĂŶĚŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ  ‘ŽĨĨ ƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞƐŚĞĞƚ ? ?ďǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ
the capital for the projects came from the private sector and not public funds. In 
this way, the Government managed to match the spending targets it committed to 
in the 1997 election (Shaw 2003). In practice, the direct management of the 
hospital remained the remit of the public sector and rents were paid to the private 
investors. Additionally, those investors had the right to provide certain services as 
agreed to in the initial contract, such as cleaning and catering (Froud and Shaoul 
2002). This bore similarities with the contracting out of cleaning and catering 
services in the 1980s. However, in this instance there were multiple issues with the 
process. This included the price which NHS providers had to pay, which were 
prohibitive. It also remained the only method available to NHS Trusts to gain funds 
for capital expenditure and as the PFI schemes embedded the process of sub-
contracting in favour of the private sector, which remains one of the main expenses 
in PFI hospitals (Shaoul et al., 2011).  
 
One key argument used by the proponents of PFI was that of shared financial risk 
with the private sector, thereby a lessening of the financial burden on the state 
(even though the risk did ultimately remain with the public sector (Treasury Select 
Committee 2011, Froud and Shaoul 2002, Shaoul et al., 2011)). The same 
proponents argued that other perceived qualities of the private sector, such as the 
more efficient provision of services (cost-cutting and competition), would also 
simultaneously be introduced into the public sector. This did not occur, with PFI 
schemes pushing many NHS Trusts into deficit positions (Shaoul et al., 2011).  
 
The PFI scheme led to the signing of the Concordat between the Labour 
Government and the Independent Healthcare Association (IHA), a representative of 
private health companies (Maynard 2005). It allowed for the further growth of the 
private sector in the NHS and was the direct precursor of the Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres (ISTCs). The ISTCs were in effect a partnership between the 
public and private sectors in which non-public providers were contracted to ensure 
that government targets were met. These were different to earlier examples of 
private involvement in the NHS in that they were directly created through 
government policy (Naylor 2015). In addition, whilst privately owned, they 
exclusively treated NHS patients (Ibid 2015). This represents another example of 
  41 
the increasingly blurred lines between the public and the private sector which were 
now more difficult to delineate. 
 
Both PFI and the Concordat increased the role of the private sector in healthcare. 
Apart from the obvious enabling of the private sector which was now extracting 
rents from the NHS over an extended period, the Concordat additionally altered the 
nature of the relationship between the public and private sectors in this area. 
Private companies had started to work in the public sphere under contract to the 
governmenƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐ ‘ĐŽ- ƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
than competition between the public and private sectors (Exworthy et al., 2011). In 
the early 2000s, the number of surgeries carried out by the private sector on behalf 
of the NHS tripled (Powell 2002) as the government attempted to alleviate 
pressures on the NHS and meet its targets by utilising private providers. This 
arguably constitutes a form of privatisation as a service which was previously 
dominated by public providers changed ŝŶƚŽǁŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƐƚďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ŵŝǆĞĚ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ŽĨ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ůŝŶĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ďĞĐĂŵĞ
 ‘ďůƵƌƌĞĚ ? ?DŽŚĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƌƚĞĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞW&/ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐĚŝĚ
not materialise. The facilities which have resulted from the initiative have been 
smaller in capacity than those which have been funded directly by the government, 
as well as of a poorer standard (Dunnigan and Pollock 2003). The costs of the PFI 
schemes have continued to grow and combined with contracting methods made 
ƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŵŽƌĞƐĞǀĞƌĞ ? ‘WĂǇŵĞŶƚďǇZĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ?WďZ ? contracts were the method 
through which NHS Trusts would secure payment for their services through 
charging commissioners by the volume of cases treated with the aim of eventually 
reducing costs (Marini and Street 2007, Shaoul et al., 2011). From a more recent 
ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚďǇƚŚĞ,ĞĂůƚŚ^ĞůĞĐƚŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ P “Private finance is invariably 
ŵŽƌĞ ĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƚŚĂŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ ?(Treasury Select Committee 
2011, p15).  
 
The PFI and the Concordat can be characterised as forms of privatisation, with a 
growing acceptance of the use of private providers. For instance, the Concordat 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ E,^ ŝŶ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ŽǀĞƌƚ
ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?WŽůůŽĐŬet al., 2004). It has also been argued the opposite, that this 
ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ƚƌƵĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ Ă  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?ZƵƐƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? /Ŷ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ
case, it can be argued that this was a significant step, as it did result in moving 
public services in the direction of the markets and market orientated management.  
 
The introduction of the PFI and the Concordat can also be viewed from the 
standpoint that it represents a continuation and development of concepts such as 
competition into the healthcare system. For the first time in the history of the NHS, 
the private sector gained a direct role both in the delivery of care and facilities. In 
effect, private providers were now allowed to generate profits through the 
provision of NHS services and NHS activity. Parallel to this, NHS managers had the 
added responsibility to coordinate not only the work of public, but also private 
providers in the delivery and coordination of care.   
 
  42 
Partnership and marketisation 
In 2000, the pressures on the NHS became more acute with the perceived notion 
that the general public was demanding additional funding for the health service 
 ?,Ăŵ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽĂ ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚĐĞŶƚƌĞĚ ?
NHS, for which it agreed to provide additional resources (Ibid 2009). As a result, the 
next White Paper, The NHS Plan (2001), represented an expansion of previous 
policy but with a focus on increased investment in parallel with reforms. These had 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĂŝŵŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŵŽƌĞ ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ?
(Le Grand 2002).  
 
To deliver the organisational changes needed to enact the new NHS Plan, there was 
ĂŶ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘Shifting the Balance of Power' (2001). This new policy outlined 
the manner in which the Primary Care Groups (PCGs) would transform into Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) and what their goals would be (Stevens 2004). These PCTs would 
be commissioning bodies which would purchase the majority of NHS services (Ibid 
2004). The overall aim was to enable the PCTs to commission 75% of the NHS 
budget (Ibid 2004) ?dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƉůĂŶƐƚŽĂůůŽǁ ‘ŚŝŐŚ-performing' NHS Trusts to 
transform into NHS Foundation Trusts, a form of not-for-profit public corporation 
(Greener et al., 2014). The aim was to have all NHS Trusts gain Foundation status by 
2004. The benefit of gaining Foundation Trust states was increased fiscal and 
clinical autonomy from the Department of Health (Ibid 2014). 
 
The exact workings of the newly formed Foundation Trusts were set out in a 
publication called Building on the best. Choice, responsiveness and equity in the NHS 
(2003). The two key elements of the new proposal were patient choice and an 
increased plurality of providers in the healthcare market (Ham 2009). A key 
component of the new reforms would be a role for the private sector to help 
deliver waiting list targets (Ibid 2009). NHS Foundation Trusts would be allowed to 
send patients to private providers and use them to a greater extent than under 
previous policy. This growth of private providers took place through the usage of 
Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) (Pollock and Godden 2008). These 
ISTCs would treat patients that NHS Trusts could not see in the allotted time, thus 
the private sector was working as part of the public sector to treat patients.  
 
This change was further entrenched through the use of the national tariff which 
developed the PbR contracts (Ibid 2008). From a wider perspective and parallel to 
this process New Labour announced further NHS budget increases, with annual 
growth approaching 7% in real terms every year for the next five years (Ham 2009). 
The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stated that the purpose of this increase was to 
bring the funding of the NHS to a level equal to the majority of other European 
nations (Ibid 2009).  
 
Taken as a whole, these plans represented a shift from the early days of New 
Labour rule, openly encouraging more partnerships between the public and the 
private sector in the NHS. In this sense, this represented a clear intention to move 
the organisation of the NHS towards a market (Mays et al., 2011). As mentioned 
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previously, this even deeper acceptance of the private sector in the delivery of care 
additionally blurred the lines between the two sectors (Mohan 2009). This is 
typified by the Foundation Trusts (FTs), as they exist on the boundary between the 
public and private, in that they are a public body which can also generate income 
from private patients. Similarly, the plans further entrenched the concept of 
competition within the NHS. The creation of the Foundation Trusts represented a 
victory for the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĞƌƐ ?ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ  ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?  ?ŝďŝĚ   ? ? ? ? ?
Due mostly to the influence of the Treasury, performance targets were introduced 
which had led to direct effects on finances of NHS bodies (Greener et al., 2014). The 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŝŵǁĂƐƚŽĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĐŽ-operation between the public and private 
sectors, and the plans should also be viewed in this context. This approach 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĚĞƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EĞǁ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ƚŝŵĞ ŝŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? dŚĞƐĞ
new arrangements were encouraged and they reiterate the New Labour ideological 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ P ‘ǁŚĂƚǁŽƌŬƐŝƐǁŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƐ ? ?<ůĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
In a continuation of policy, New Labour introduced the NHS Improvement Plan in 
2004. Its purpose was to further expand the plurality of providers and competition 
within the health service. This plan also represented the first time that patients 
were explicitly given the right to choose where they would be treated in the system 
and by whom (Ham 2009). The policy was intended to help define how additional 
expenditures could best be deployed, with an emphasis on reducing waiting times 
for patients and providing them with an additional choice regarding providers (Ibid 
2009). In effect, the new policy was a confirmation that the Government had 
committed itself to the use of the private sector to support the NHS and illustrates 
of how new reforms had roots in previous policy. 
 
Another important aspect of the reforms was the additional role of PCTs to act as 
commissioners within the internal market rather than providers and to focus on 
 ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞďĂƐĞĚĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? ?ŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĞƉƌ ǀŝŽƵƐ'W&ƵŶĚŚŽůĚŝŶŐ
scheme (Klein 2010, Miller et al., 2012). Certain groups of medical professionals 
recognised these similarities and were vocal in their opposition of PCTs fearing they 
would lead to privatisation of parts of the NHS (Ibid 2010). 
 
Responding to criticisms that the reforms would increase the involvement of the 
private sector, the government did to some extent change and limit its plans. It did, 
however, continue with its aim to enlarge the PCTs to a similar size as healthcare 
providers (Ham 2009).  The government also gave further guidance regarding the 
mix of healthcare providers functioning in the NHS (Ibid 2009). They enacted policy 
ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ŚŽǁ  ‘ŵŽŶĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ
ĨŽůůŽǁƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ?<ůĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?^ŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĞǆĞƌĐŝ ŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƚŽ
choose their provider further increased the demands on the NHS and thereby 
indirectly the use of private providers. Whilst as a proportion of total NHS activity, 
these ISTCs only account for 1.79% of total elective surgical procedures by 2008, 
this was a rapid expansion compared to the 0.07% of electives in 2003 (Naylor 
2009). These policies can be categorised as a combination of marketisation and 
privatisation. Regarding the latter, there was continued growth of the private 
sector within the NHS, primarily through the ISTCs and their relationship with NHS 
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Foundation Trusts. Regarding marketisation, there was a continued emphasis on 
choice and competition under the reforms. The new concept of funds following 
successful providers increased internal competition which was seen as a positive in 
ensuring that the quality of services was high and the costs low.  
 
The New Labour objectives of increased patient choice and outsourcing of 
contracting can best be characterised by the growing funding of private providers 
for elective surgery. Private providers were contracted by the NHS to deal with 
excess demand in electives (Hutt et al., 2010). Between 2003 and 2008 the total 
number of electives carried out by the ISTCs increased from 3,633 to 105,604 
(Naylor 2009). It was envisioned to cut down the waiting lists and meet government 
targets.  The lasting achievement of New Labour was that it managed to shift the 
relationship between the NHS and the private sector, giving the latter a much more 
explicit role in the delivery of services. No longer would companies and Trusts work 
solely with the State, but there would be contracts between private companies and 
GPs/Trusts.   
 
 
Table 2 - ISTC Activity as a proportion of total NHS activity 
(Source: Naylor 2009) 
 
When Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair as Prime Minister in 2007, it was expected 
that there would be some form of retrenchment of the market-based NHS reforms 
(Mays et al., 2011). Brown had previously been a relatively vocal opponent of 
markets in health care. During his premiership, limits were placed on the activity of 
the ISTCs though there was an expansion of the public/private mix of providers 
within the primary care available to patients (Ham 2009). There were also further 
reviews of the NHS and how it would be able to cope with future challenges (Ham 
2009). It was clear that Brown did not take steps to further expand the 
marketplace, but rather consolidated existing reforms. In addition, the large annual 
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budget increases to the NHS also ceased during the years of the Brown premiership 
(Ham 2009).  
 
The major debate regarding the New Labour reforms was whether it was the 
increased funding or the structural changes that were the key factor in the 
recorded increase in performance and public satisfaction with the service (Ham 
2009). The private sector benefitted greatly during this period mostly as a result of 
the increased annual budgets and activity related to NHS policy of quickly reducing 
waiting times/lists. This enabled the private sector to gain patients. The number of 
private treatment centres also grew during this period. Parallel with these changes, 
there was an expansion of the use of market mechanisms in the management of 
ƚŚĞE,^ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ ?ƌŽǁŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨ  ‘ǁŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŝƐǁŚĂƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?  ?<ůĞŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ
NHS was further marketised with an emphasis on controlling expenditures whilst 
simultaneously increasing the number of available providers to commissioners. 
Private providers benefitted from the fundamental element of New Labour health 
policy which was dominated by the desire to meet waiting list targets.  
 
The New Labour administration continued to utilise the private sector and 
encouraged its usage. Its policy was built on those of the previous Conservative 
Governments and represented a continuing shift towards primary care-led 
commissioning. The Labour Party's ideological justification was the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘dŚŝƌĚ
tĂǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ǁŽƌŬĞĚ ? ŝŶ ĂŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ Ă ŵŝĚĚůĞ ƌŽĂĚ
between socialism and the free market (Klein 2010). This kind of overt approach to 
the use of private providers unsettled the medical profession and the general 
public, which was generally unfavourable towards it. However, with its emphasis on 
targets and its readiness to add resources to the NHS, Labour managed to enact 
their policy with only limited opposition. Linked to this is the growing acceptance of 
the concept of public/private partnership in the delivery of services, i.e., the 
 ‘ďůƵƌƌŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůŝŶĞƐ ?  ?DŽŚĂŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? dŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ǁĂƐ ŵĂƌŬĞĚ ďǇ Ă ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ
involvement of the private sector, and it can be said that privatisation did occur, 
though only in a limited fashion with most of the new actors working in both the 
public and private sectors. The ability of the private providers to offset waiting time 
was offset by the NHS being overcharged for treatments (Mays et al., 2011). It is at 
this juncture that a clear delineation between the ideological approaches of the 
ƚǁŽ ŵĂũŽƌ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ? EĞǁ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ
supporting the delivery of public care, building on policy of previous Conservative 
Government.  
 
The policy of New Labour resulted in the creation of additional competing interests 
within the NHS. The framework that developed in this period, which saw the 
introduction of PCTs and Foundation Trusts, was such that varying elements of the 
health service had separate aims and objectives (Checkland et al., 2009, Mannion et 
al., 2008). In the meantime, the Government pursued its own goals which were 
different from those of the various elements of the NHS. While there was not an 
overt conflict and opposition to the government's programme, this variance of 
interests could offer an explanation as to why the commissioning reforms may not 
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have developed as intended (Smith et al., 2004, Smith et al., 2010). In fact, many of 
the market mechanisms that the New Labour Government introduced were not 
fully brought into practice. There is an argument that the effects of competition 
were limited but that the financial uplifts were key in understanding the 
improvement in NHS services (Pollitt 2007).  
 
During the years of the New Labour Government, it became increasingly clear that 
the private sector in healthcare relied on the NHS, and in fact on government 
spending for its business (Mohan 2009). Essentially, the private sector not only 
secured its existence but even thrived throughout the 2000s. This was achieved 
primarily through the changing contractual relationships it had with the NHS. 
Accordingly, the acceptance of the principle of the private sector being a part of the 
NHS gained even wider acceptance and could even be described as the new 
normal. Much of the above policy was conducted under the umbrella of cost 
reduction despite increasing budgets, which amongst other things included an 
expansion of private sector management techniques and the introduction of new 
actors on both sides of the purchaser-provider split. The private sector became 
integral in the delivery of elective procedures, albeit it with a very small proportion 
of total activity. They became a key tool in the meeting of delivery targets.  
Unifying privatisation and marketisation? 
After the defeat of Labour in 2010, a Coalition Government (2010-15) was elected, 
with both of the participating parties, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, 
stating there would not be further reform of the NHS (Timmins 2012). However, the 
health service was, like other public services, ultimately subjected to a change in 
ƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ P ‘ŝŐ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?<ŝƐďǇ
2010). After years of increased funding, the NHS was to have its annual budget 
frozen, a significant change in circumstance compared to the preceding decade. 
 
dŚĞůĂƚĞƐƚƌĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞE,^ďĞŐĂŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚtŚŝƚĞƉĂƉĞƌƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘Equity 
ĂŶĚ ǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞ P >ŝďĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ E,^ ? (2011). This paper was shaped by the then 
Secretary of Health, Andrew Lansley, who had been shadow Health Secretary since 
2006. He spent his years in Opposition developing his vision of the NHS, which he 
saw as ultimately free of the control of central government building on previous 
policy (TimminƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ?>ĂŶƐůĞǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁĂƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ŝŶ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌ ?dŚŝƐŶĞǁƉŽůŝĐǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
ǁŽƵůĚƐƚŝůůďĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞE,^ǁŽƵůĚďĞƌƵŶĂƐĂŶĂƌŵ ?Ɛ ůĞŶŐƚŚďŽĚǇ ?
with the new NHS Commissioning Board overseeing the day to day running of the 
service (Ibid 2012). The White Paper also provided an outline in which the private 
sector could become much more involved in delivering care in the NHS (Ibid 2012).  
 
hŶĚĞƌ >ĂŶƐůĞǇ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ƚŚĞ E,^ ǁŽuld further work in partnership with the 
private sector, but there would be a signiĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?dŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞ ‘ŶǇtŝůůŝŶŐ
PƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ? ďĞŝŶŐ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ? /Ŷ ƉĂƌĂůůĞů ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂŶ
expansion of primary care-led commissioning with the introduction of new GP 
consortia, while the overall budget of the NHS would be frozen, fitting within the 
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ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐ  ?dŚĞ <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ &ƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ
development of commissioning policy has continued its focus on more effective 
resource allocation. These proposals were met with widespread opposition both 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
response to such opposition was to announce a temporary pause in the reforms 
and a so-called  ‘ůŝƐƚĞŶŝŶŐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ? P ƚŚĞ E,^ &ƵƚƵƌĞ &ŽƌƵŵ ? dŚĞ ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ Ɛŝǆ-
month consultation period ended with new proposals which were published as the 
Health and Social Care Act (2012). In it, the language and legislation were changed, 
with many of the controversial elements of the initial White Paper diluted. The NHS 
ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞŽƉĞŶƚŽ  ‘ŶǇtŝůůŝŶŐWƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŽ  ‘ŶǇYƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚWƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?
with increased minimum standards to alleviate public concerns (Speed and Gabe 
2013). The basic concept remained that any provider, whether public, private or 
third sector could compete for NHS contracts (Ibid 2013).  This concept was not 
new, having been brought in under the last year of New Labour government. 
However, it was expanded and shifted the NHS professionals into an "explicit 
market context" (Ibid, 2013, p4) with the overarching aim of reinforcing market-like 
competition. In addition, the new contracting arrangements were subject to 
European competition laws which had not been the case in the past (Ibid 2013). 
This meant that contracts over a certain value would have to be opened to 
providers. There were guarantees on the maximum total number of private 
providers the NHS would be allowed to generate funds from, with both CCGs and 
Trusts being limited to generating the majority of their funds from the public sector.  
 
When the Coalition came to power, satisfaction with the NHS was at an all-time 
high (British Social Attitudes Survey 2012). Such popularity could be a part of the 
explanation of why the Coalition Government met with such resistance to their 
reform programme and why the medical profession seemed to be once again able 
to exert its influence, the critical factor being the support of the general population. 
Possibly in the same context is the explanation of why the Coalition Government, 
unusually in recent British politics, was ultimately unable to secure the support of 
its MPs to pass its original plans through Parliament. The real possibility of the 
Coalition Government falling provided the impetus to agree to significant 
concessions and dilute the original plans of reform (Timmins 2012). This involved 
capping the amount of private income that NHS bodies could generate and stricter 
controls for the types of providers who could compete for NHS contracts.  
 
Critics of the proposals were concerned, and argued there was room for what they 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ďĂĐŬĚŽŽƌ ? ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĐŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐůĂƵƐĞ ƌĞůĂƚ Ě ƚŽ  ‘ŶǇ YƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚ
WƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ? ?dŚĞ ƚŚĞŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ,ĞĂůƚŚ ? :ĞƌĞŵǇ,ƵŶƚ ?ŽƉƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ
the issue of quality rather than the type of provider that would deliver services. In 
the context of commissioning care, the Health and Social Care Act (2012) created a 
framework in which commissioners were given the power to tender contracts to 
the private sector within a broadly more market-based system (Gabe and Speed 
2013). This was of particular significance as the service was to operate in an 
environment of reduced funding and in which private providers, promising to 
deliver care more cost-effectively, could prove a particularly attractive option to 
commissioners.  In other words, the new reforms created a significant space for the 
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expansion of privatisation in the context of limited public funds, i.e., austerity. 
Under the new arrangements commissioners were, as previously mentioned, given 
the ability to choose any service provider they thought best, while the NHS Trusts 
and other providers were now to compete not only amongst themselves but also 
potentially with new private sector providers. The concern was that commissioners 
working in circumstances of reduced resources might opt for particular types of 
provider over others (i.e., private over public). In contrast, others have argued for 
the likelihood of a more conciliatory approach arising from the new framework, i.e., 
that competition would be quite limited (Checkland et al., 2009).  
 
Another principle of the Health and Social Care Act (2012) was the stipulation that 
patients must have a choice of providers when being cared for. The sector 
regulator, Monitor, was mandated to protect this right of choice and was given the 
power to intervene in mergers of NHS Trusts and explicitly apply competition laws 
to the NHS (Monitor 2015). Monitor came to prominence when under the banner 
of protecting patient choice, it intervened in the proposed merger of Bournemouth 
and Poole NHS Trusts.  This resulted in a drawn-out process and a final decision 
which took nearly two years to reach (HSJ 2013). The merger was rejected by 
DŽŶŝƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚe perceived loss of choice would be 
ĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ  ?/ďŝĚ  ? ? ? ? ?  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? DŽŶŝƚŽƌ ĂůƐŽ
has a responsibility to promote cooperation, which makes its regulatory role 
difficult to clearly understand (Allen et al., 2017). The Poole and Bournemouth case 
was an example of how the new regulatory framework could prioritise patient 
choice ahead of the improvements in quality of care provision. Thus, it seems the 
priorities of the regulatory framework were in contradiction to those of the Trusts 
(delivery of the best possible clinical outcomes).  In practice, this meant that the 
Trusts had to alter their aims and priorities. There is some evidence that these 
priorities might change with the further maturation of the regulatory framework 
and as the political agenda changes (Collins 2015).  
ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŶŽƚĂďůĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ
increased use of private providers as the primary providers in specific services 
(Gabe and Speed 2013); for example, when the Government allowed Circle, a 
private company, to run Hinchingbrooke NHS Trust. In this instance the private 
sector in the form of Circle, took over the management of the Trust while the 
facilities and services themselves remained in public ownership. Hence, an 
organisational element of the NHS was overtly moved from the public to the private 
sector.  This is a further example of the private sector becoming more involved in 
the delivery of public services. The purpose of allowing Circle this kind of control 
was to establish if other such partnerships were viable in other parts of the country 
(Owen 2015). This kind of introduction of a private company into an NHS body 
would ultimately test the ability of the private sector to operate within public 
sector constraints (Ibid 2015). This is then another example of the Government 
entrenching private sector practices in the NHS. The contract with Circle was widely 
opposed (Scourfield 2016). However, its ultimate failure was not due to opposition 
but rather because Circle withdrew from the contract realising that they would not 
be able to fulfil its terms, i.e. to generate a pre-agreed level of savings (Owen 2015, 
Scourfield 2016). The goals that Circle had set were unprecedented in NHS history, 
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stating that £311m would be saved over the lifetime of the contract (Scourfield 
2016). Circle withdrew after three years of the ten year contract, being unable to 
deliver its aims of generating savings and eventually a profit (Ibid 2016). Despite 
this arrangement not being permanent, it represents evidence of expanding 
privatisation under the Coalition Government. 
 
The Coalition Government reforms still provided the GP-led CCGs power to select 
any providers they thought best (Timmins 2012). This opened the debate on 
whether or not that would lead to an expansion of private providers in the NHS 
(Davies 2013). The private sector was successful until then, and commissioners 
were now given a new tool by which they could even further expand their activity 
within the NHS (Allen et al., 2017). Similarly, it was not clear what effect other 
pressures such as smaller budgets and fiscal deficits would have on the 
commissioning process and thereby the eventual size of the private sector in the 
NHS. This concern was further heightened by other elements of the Health and 
Social Care Act (2012) which pointed to the possibility of increasing privatisation 
such as the clause which allowed Foundation Trusts an increase in the amount of 
money they could earn from providing private care. Another concern which 
emerged was that PbR contracts could prove to be unworkable or too costly for 
continued use in the context of decreasing public resources (Petsoulas et al., 2011). 
Commissioners would be unable to affect demand and yet under PbR would have 
to continue paying for treatments to ensure the stability of Trusts.  
 
The shape and size of the private sector has changed over the last 20 years. There 
has been continued growth of public spending on the NHS (The Nuffield Trust 
2015). The amount of money which has been spent on private, out of pocket 
payments, has also held steady since 2010, at just over £25 billion per year, 
compared to public spending which during the same period remained over £125 
billion per year (Ibid 2015). The introduction of market-based policies into the NHS 
has led to a considerable growth of private providers working on behalf of the NHS 
(Powell 2015). The Concordat, as previously mentioned, began this process with the 
development of ISTCs and other private providers (Sheaff and Allen 2016). This was 
combined with FTs needing to utilise a certain number of Any Qualified Provider 
(AQP) contracts and only having access to PFI schemes to finance new capital 
projects (Ibid 2016). By 2013/14 private providers held contracts with CCGs with a 
total value of £9.3 billion, which represented 16% of all CCG contracts (although not 
all of these contracts were for medical services) (Ibid 2016). It is worth noting that 
of these contracts over half were won by private for-profit companies (Ibid 2016). 
Private providers are also responsible for 20% of the knee and hip replacements 
carried out on the NHS (Ibid 2016).   
 
While these figures may represent a growth in the amount of activity that private 
providers are generating, the total amount of spent on private providers has been 
in steady decline since the early 1990s, triggered partly by the financial crisis in 
2008 (Arora et al., 2013). The amount spent in private hospitals has experienced a 
slight annual decrease, but increases of the use of private providers in both 
community care and mental health services of 12% (The Kings Fund 2014, Sheaff 
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and Allen 2016). The activity of private providers has increased with non-NHS 
providers carrying out 471,000 inpatient cases in 14/15, compared to 73,000 in 
06/7, representing an increase of over 600% (Sheaff et al., 2016). In total terms of 
cost, private hospital care accounts for just over £6 billion (representing over 7% of 
total spend in the NHS) of treatment spread across 250 facilities  W the majority of 
which come from private patients and some very limited NHS use (ibid 2014). 
 
At the same time as the number of private surgeries has increased, there has been 
a steady decline in the number of people who rely on private medical insurance 
(PMI). The population covered by PMI declined from 12.9% in 2006 to 10.9% in 
2012 (Arora et al., 2013). In addition, many private providers began to rely more on 
NHS patients and were treating fewer private patients (Ibid, 2013). This is thought 
to be related to the economic crisis of 2008, and has further bound the income of 
private providers to the NHS. This highlights the link between the private sector and 
the NHS, with private providers increasingly becoming embedded in the service.  
The variation in the levels of activity that private providers carry out on behalf of 
the NHS has changed with the Government of the day. While the Thatcher 
Governments encouraged PMI and the contracting out of non-medical services, and 
the later Conservative Governments would expand the internal market, it was 
under New Labour that there was an expansion of private providers working in the 
NHS (Sheaff and Allen 2016). The private sector now appears to be very reliant on 
the NHS to continue its existence (Arora et al., 2013).   
 
The framework which emerged after the enactment of the Health and Social Care 
Act (2012) could have a significant effect on the future shape of the NHS on many 
different levels, only one of which is the way it would affect the commissioning 
process. If commissioners were to opt for private providers to a greater degree, 
they could create a momentum of policy which future Health Secretaries may have 
no choice but to build upon even further. The Coalition Government displayed a 
willingness to involve the private sector even overtly in the management of the 
public sector (Hinchingbrooke) claiming that it was only building on previous policy. 
During the past decade, the level of PCT spending on private providers increased 
from £4.74 billion in 2006/7 to £8.33 billion in 2011/2, which represents a growth 
of 76% (The Nuffield Trust 2013). As a total of the NHS budget, this represented an 
increase from 3% of the total spend to just over 5% of total NHS expenditure (see 
Table 1). The vast bulk of this was spent on independent sector providers (ISPs). So 
overall, the private sector has continued to grow in this period of reforms with the 
potential for further growth in the future. 
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(Source: The BMA 2016) 
 
During the introduction of the Health and Social Care Act (2012), it is clear that 
there has been a marked increase in the usage of private providers. This represents 
both marketisation and privatisation. Concerning marketisation, there was a 
concerted effort to increase competition amongst both public and private 
providers. NHS providers were now operating in a very explicit market setting 
(Gabe and Speed 2013). They had to act much more like private businesses to 
succeed, and this was encouraged throughout the latter years of New Labour and 
the over the Coalition government.   
 
Privatisation has taken place in the NHS. Private organisations provided care on 
behalf of the NHS, rather than competing against it. This can be illustrated by the 
growing amount that the NHS spent on private providers (BMA 2016). Utilising the 
matrix provided above, it represents how the private sector increased its 
involvement in the provision of services, becoming a key provider in some areas of 
care (Shaeff and Allen 2016). The private sector also at times looked not only 
provide some aspects of care but to run whole services. Some cases, such as 
Hinchingbrooke, were unsuccessful, but other companies continue to explore how 
they may be able to succeed (Shaeff and Allen 2016). It is during this most recent 
ƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨƚŚĞE,^ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞbecome more integral in 
the delivery of health services, becoming a mainstay on the provider side of the 
market, integral to the NHS.   
Table 3 - Total amount spent by PCTs on independent providers 




In summary, the private health sector has always existed in some form or another 
alongside the NHS in England. It has been in a symbiotic relationship with the NHS, 
never managing to supplant it or even be a serious competitor, while at the same 
time becoming reliant on it for its continued survival. The size and growth of the 
private sector was very dependent on the policies of the Government of the day. In 
some periods the private sector supported the NHS in the delivery of services (i.e., 
reduction of waiting lists) while in others, its role was to provide an alternative to it. 
 
The manifestation of private provision has altered throughout this period, 
dependent on the policies and priorities of the government of the day: ranging 
from a provider of private insurance to the provision of services such as private 
hospitals and other facilities. Overall, the private sector represents a relatively small 
part of the mixed economy of care that has emerged over the years. The recent 
focus on the commissioning of services could represent a policy shift which results 
in an increased role of the private sector in the NHS.  
 
This chapter has also set out a matrix for tracking the degree of privatisation of any 
or all of the three components of a healthcare system. While privatisation can 
theoretically occur within any of the three categories, it is most likely to happen in 
the categories of either provision or funding of services. For Conservative 
Governments it can be said on the whole they thought it desirable that the NHS has 
at least some external competition and, to that end, it did introduce private 
providers who were able to compete with the service. In contrast, the Labour 
Governments generally saw the private sector as a complement to the health 
service and focused on its relationship to the public sector, i.e., contracts with 
private providers. However, there is some scope for privatisation to occur 
concerning regulation, as has been seen with the more recent example of 
Hinchingbrooke.  
 
The next chapter will explore how the Health and Social Care Act (2012) has 
changed the nature of commissioning in the NHS and the how the regulatory 
framework has been created. This will include a discussion of the tools available to 
commissioners and how the various regulatory bodies may work alongside 
commissioners. It will also explore the manner in which different pressures may 
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Chapter 3 ʹ Implementing commissioning in the NHS  
 
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) changed the manner in which healthcare 
commissioning took place in the English NHS. The majority of NHS services are now 
commissioned via the CCGs, meaning that primary care-led commissioning has once 
again become the chief method of commissioning within the NHS (Checkland et al., 
2013). Apart from introducing CCGs the Act has changed the legal framework of the 
NHS, granting new powers to existing regulatory bodies and creating new ones. The 
new framework is responsible for regulating providers and purchasers, for 
enforcing competition law and rules, and promoting the further integration of care 
(Health and Social Care Act 2012). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of the Health and 
Social Care Act (2012), with a particular focus on how the new commissioning 
groups shall reach decisions about the selection of providers, and the external 
regulatory framework that was developed alongside the new reforms. To further 
understand the new commissioning arrangements, this chapter will develop a 
conceptual framework that explores the broader socio-political context in which 
commissioners make decisions. The chapter will start with a definition of 
commissioning before exploring the shape commissioning and contracting has 
taken since it was first outlined in the White Paper, Working for Patients (UK 
Government et al., 1990). Commissioning was first developed in UK healthcare in 
parallel with the first market-based reforms of the Conservative government in the 
late 1980s and was developed by further governments. Contracting mechanisms, as 
a separate process, will also be looked at in this chapter. The legal regulatory 
framework that developed as a result of the Health and Social Care Act (2012) will 
be analysed in the latter part of the chapter. This will all feed into a conceptual 
framework, with the aim of identifying the factors that influence ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? 
decision-making, with a particular focus on the selection of providers (private, 
public and third sector). 
 
As detailed in the previous chapter, the Health and Social Care Act (2012) was 
enacted by the Coalition Government (2010-15) and was at once a significant and 
controversial piece of legislation (Timmins 2012, Greener et al., 2014). In the 
Coalition agreement there was no provision for NHS reform and there had been a 
lack of coverage of the NHS in the 2010 General election (Greener et al., 2014). 
However this quickly changed with the publication of the White Paper,  ‘Equity and 
Excellence: Liberating the NHS' (Timmins 2012). This White Paper proved to be very 
controversial, even amongst some members of the ruling coalition (Timmins 2012). 
The White Paper in its original form proposed replacing the existing PCTs with 
primary care-led CCGs and large efficiency savings (BMA 2010, Ham et al., 2015). 
The White Paper also allowed for competition based on price and the entry of  ‘ŶǇ 
Willing Provider' into the bidding process, which critics feared would open the NHS 
to private providers (Ham et al., 2015). Some of these clauses were altered after a 
prolonged and unprecedented listening exercise, the ultimate result of which was a 
softening of the role of the private sector, competition on price and the changing of 
the legislation to  ‘ŶǇ Qualified WƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ? (Ham 2013). The Health and Social Care 
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Act (2012) was thus passed in Parliament and in its final form retained some of the 
core elements of the White Paper, i.e. GP-led CCGs and the new regulatory 
framework - though as mentioned, it now included a diluted role of marketisation 
and a more limited role for private providers (Greener et al., 2014). On the whole, 
these reforms suggested a shift in commissioning policy, moving away from 
relatively large-scale commissioning and moving back towards primary care-led 
commissioning. Some have argued that the new CCGs resembled smaller versions 
of the PCTs that they were replacing, with other similarities to GPFH (Greener et al., 
2014). Primary care-led commissioning is not a new concept, having been 
introduced previously under the Conservative Government (1992-97), with the 
development of GPFH (Checkland et al., 2016). While New Labour abolished GPFH, 
they continued many of the principles of it in their reforms (Greener et al., 2014). 
The concept of primary care-led commissioning has been developed with all 
subsequent commissioning reforms involving primary care physicians.  
 
A brief history of commissioning in healthcare  
To understand the possible implications of the new Act on ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? decision-
making, it is important to define what commissioning is and examine how previous 
reforms have laid the basis for the Health and Social Care Act (2012).  
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ E,^ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ P  “an 
organisation, and/or a group of clinicians, acts on behalf of a population to decide 
which health services to buy, using tax funds allocated by the Department of Health 
according to a formula based on health needs. It entails decision-making about 
needs assessment, resource allocation, service purchasing, monitoring, and review ? ?
(Smith et al., 2010, 12).  At the very core of commissioning is the allocation of 
available resources.  
This section will focus on the literature concerning commissioning and contracting. 
While commissioning in the NHS is a relatively new phenomenon, elements of it 
have existed in some form since the inception of the service in 1948. It was only in 
the early 1980s, with the Conservative Government's market reforms, that 
commissioning and contracting came to prominence (Cairney 2002). Therefore, it 
can be said that the concept of commissioning is not new to clinicians but that 
more recent developments have shifted the onus of resource allocation onto a 
mixed group of managers and medical professionals (Health and Social Care Act 
2012). There will be an examination of the key policy developments in the NHS in 
the context of commissioning and a discussion of how they have shaped the 
delivery of care. 
 
Forms of commissioning 
As already stated, commissioning is the manner in which resources are allocated 
and includes the purchasing of services (Smith et al., 2010). In this section, the 
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different forms of commissioning will be explored, as well as the mechanisms that 
introduced contracting, the vehicle through which commissioning takes place.  
 
In the early years of the NHS, during the tripartite (Hospital services, community 
services and primary care) split, decisions as to the allocation of resources were 
made by the clinical staff, and the list of potential service providers included few 
private sector organisations (Powell and Hewitt 1998).  Commissioning was implicit 
in the allocation of financial resources and did not include large numbers of private 
for-profit providers (Turner and Powell, 2016). There was no formal divide between 
the providers and purchasers of health care and the NHS functioned in what has 
been termed a  ‘ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ and control' manner, wholly funded by the State and 
with the dominant role given to the medical profession, and supported by a post-
war public commitment of both major political parties (Webster 2002). Funds were 
allocated as and when they were needed, with little political oversight of central 
government. Over the period of Conservative government (1979-1997) the 
resource allocation process became more formalised, and this was reflected in a 
wide variety of reforms. This most notable of these early reforms was the 
introduction of NPM (new public management) principles in the Griffiths Report 
(Macfarlane et al., 2012) and the adoption of the quasi-market, which brought with 
it a formal division of purchasers and providers of health services in the NHS 
(Propper et al., 2008). These reforms also increased the importance of GPs who 
became the first primary care commissioners through the introduction of GPFH 
schemes, as purchasers within this new model. As such, this was the first piece of 
legislation to introduce commissioning as an explicit manner of resource allocation; 
and therefore the logical starting point for a detailed examination of the shaping of 
commissioning over time. 
Making commissioning explicit - the NHS Quasi-Market 
To understand the quasi-market and its significance in British health policy, it needs 
to be clearly defined. There are several competing definitions of what constitutes 
the quasi-market in the literature. In social policy during the 1990s, the quasi-
market was discussed alongside other similar forms of organisation, which sought 
to replicate the market within the public sector, attempting to incentivise 
improvements in efficiency (Mays et al., 2011). 
 
In the words of Le Grand:  “the intention is for the state to stop being both the 
funder and the provider of services. Instead, it is to become primarily a funder, 
purchasing services from a variety of private, voluntary and public providers, all 
operating in competition with one another ? ?(Le Grand 1991, p 10). The primary 
method by which this would occur would be contracting, allowing the NHS to 
purchase services and enter into arrangements with the providers which offered 
the best possible terms (Flynn et al., 1995). The primary goal is to replicate the 
efficiencies of the market to introduce competition between public sector providers 
and thus increase efficiency (Mays et al., 2011). One of its purposes was to alter 
service delivery in the NHS, from a hierarchical organisation to one dominated by 
market principles (Allen 2013).   
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At the initial stage of the introduction of the quasi-market, the Conservative 
Government was inspired by the work of Enthoven, who spoke of  ‘ƉĞƌǀĞƌƐĞ 
constraints' within the NHS that limited its efficiency (Enthoven 1985, Macfarlane et 
al., 2012). The suggested remedy for the public sector, in which there was little 
incentive to change, was mimicking the workings of a market which by itself was to 
reform and modernise the NHS. 
 
One of the earliest analyses of the quasi-market was carried out by Le Grand (1991) 
who also examined other public services (education and welfare). Consequently, Le 
Grand and Bartlett (1993) defined a quasi-market as a mechanism for breaking the 
monopoly of the state, by introducing competition through the adoption of new 
rules allowing existing providers to compete with one another; and therefore 
mimicking the incentives that can be found in a  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? market. Fundamentally, 
quasi-markets aim to replicate the market and competition without resorting to the 
introduction of private providers.  
 
A different definition is presented by Harden (1992). He argues that for a true 
quasi-market to exist it has to have three distinguishing characteristics. The first is 
that the quasi-market creates incentives that lead to greater efficiency within the 
service in question. The second is that the organisation has to decentralise by 
delegating authority. And lastly he argues that that the distribution of the financial 
resources must be led by demand as expressed by the needs of the patients/users 
of the service. 
 
Boyett and Finlay (1995) defined the quasi-market as one in which the state has a 
reduced role and no longer acted as the funder and provider. Similar to Le Grand, 
they agree that the quasi-market is one for public services only and not a truly open 
market. Boyett and Finlay (1995) however, do not envisage private providers having 
an integral role in this process. 
 
Walsh (1995) put forth another definition in which three key features confirm the 
existence of a quasi-market; separation between the  ‘ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƌ ? and the  ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ? ?
contracts that link these two distinct bodies; and finally the development of a 
system of accounting and charging. In such a system, once it matures, providers 
would generate their funds which they would be mandated to reinvest into the 
service. 
 
The Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) definition of a quasi-market is precise and is 
applicable in the context of the NHS as it refers to both of the essential elements: 
the provision of, and the funding of, services. A fundamental concept of quasi-
markets is that there must be a divide between the State and the public service 
whilst remaining the critical provider at least at the level of funding. Their only 
connection will be through contracts, which themselves are arranged in a system 
which becomes increasingly decentralised as it matures. This implies that 
competition is a key component of a quasi-market (Powell 2003).  
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Competition, as a motive and market mechanism, has been analysed in social 
policy, and its effectiveness has been questioned (Pollock et al., 2004, Greener et 
al., 2014). It has often been argued that the introduction of competition can herald 
the start of an actual privatisation process (Hunter 2005). However, the purported 
benefit of the market is to provide patients with greater choice in their treatments, 
as a result of the competition generated by a greater number of suppliers (Powell 
2003). In the case of the NHS, the quasi-market has increased the level of 
competition, i.e. the number of eligible providers. Such a process does not 
represent direct privatisation, but it can herald a change which would see the 
greater use of private providers within a health system.  
 
Whilst there may be the impression that the quasi-market is relatively new to the 
NHS and other public services (Le Grand 1991), its origins can be traced back to the 
interwar period (Powell 2003). The role of the quasi-market was weakest in the 
years of the classic NHS during the post-War consensus regarding the Health 
Service (Powell 2003). Its role was then strengthened, as Powell highlights, during 
New Labour's second term (2001-05) when it became "harder, direct and external" 
(Powell 2003, p737). Further moves to increase competition would take place 
during this period to entrench the system (Greener et al., 2014). This would suggest 
that competition and choice as concepts have been associated with markets for a 
longer period. Le Grand (2013) argues that this is a process which represents 
"evolution, not revolution" in which competition and choice have been expanding 
as concepts as a result of the policy of the New Labour Government (1997-2010) 
which the Coalition Government only built upon and expanded further. 
 
On the question of the effectiveness of a quasi-market as an organisational tool, 
literature seems to be divided and describes them as being only partially successful. 
Those that are critical of the introduction of quasi-markets, claiming they have an 
adverse effect point to research showing that the quality of care has not improved, 
indeed quite the opposite (Propper et al., 2008). Others argue that the link 
between competition and improved outcomes is weak (Greener et al., 2014). 
However, Le Grand (1999) is more favourable to the idea of quasi-markets and he 
argues that the problem is with their application. As one of the first to evaluate the 
effects of the market during the Conservative Administration (1987-1997), he 
argues that:  “The incentives were too weak and the constraints were too strong. Put 
another way, the motivations for change were relatively weak, especially when 
compared with the pressures for stability from the outside ? (Le Grand 1999). This 
implies that the quasi-market in the NHS in its early form was less effective than 
anticipated in the delivery of its stated aims, with competition not leading to an 
improvement in care.  
 
What the quasi-market managed to achieve was to involve primary-care 
commissioners in the allocation of resources. The role of GPs grew in importance as 
they became more involved through the GPFH scheme which gave them more 
power as local decision makers (Glennerster 1998, Wainwright and Calnan 2012). 
Effective GP commissioners also became relatively dynamic compared to many 
other colleagues, able to affect budgets and care outcomes (Wainwright and Calnan 
  58 
2012). The increased role of GPs fit neatly within the agenda of the quasi-market as 
it encouraged further competition amongst providers and delegated decision 
making to a more local level. This will be explored in the subsequent sections. 
 
There are still others who argue there has been a mixture of different governing 
structures, but that they did not occur in isolation. Instead, they state there is a 
 “changing mix between quasi-hierarchies, quasi-markets, and quasi-networks." 
(Exworthy et al., 1999, 15). Le Grand (1999) claims that whilst markets have only 
had limited effect on improving the core elements of the NHS, they have shifted the 
nature of discourse about the service, putting a greater emphasis on competition 
rather than the  ‘ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ and control' ethos that used to exist. So it can be said 
that competition and choice as concepts have a minor effect on the system. The 
more significant consequence of the introduction of quasi-markets, supported by 
all Governments since the 1990s, is the apparent growing acceptance of market 
approaches within public services, even though implementation has not been as 
widespread. The most significant change to the NHS with the introduction of the 
quasi-market is that it led to the introduction of contracting and with it a 
formalisation of the new divisions of the service, purchasers, and providers. 
 
Quasi-market as an organisational tool 
 
It can be argued that quasi-markets represent a step towards greater use of 
market-like initiatives in healthcare by developing the role of both choice and 
competition in British healthcare. While this is not true privatisation, it has resulted 
in more choice and thus it can be argued that the introduction of competition could 
be a stepping stone towards a more market-based or even a full market system. 
There is evidence that the quasi-markets have increased choice and competition in 
practice (Le Grand 1998), and that the role of the private sector is now greater than 
in any previous period in the history of the NHS (though not to the extent desired 
by those who originally proposed inserting the quasi-market into the NHS) (Biro and 
Hellowell 2016). This is an ongoing process which in its later incarnations increased 
the involvement of private and third sector providers in the NHS, primarily through 
the introduction of commissioning and contracting. 
 
The development of the internal market also managed to achieve a greater use of 
primary care-led commissioners. The primary form that this took was the 
involvement of GPs as commissioners. Primary care commissioning aimed to allow 
local doctors to purchase the services that best suited the needs of their local 
populations, while also developing an accountability framework where local people 
can scrutinise the decisions of these clinicians (Smith et al., 2004). Primary care 
doctors were seen as the ideal agents to challenge the dominance of the hospital 
doctors and to provide a voice for care in the community as an alternative to 
hospital settings (Ibid 2004). GPFH was the first such scheme to utilise these 
principles, and its effects will be explored in the following section. This form of 
commissioning further entrenched the ideas of competition, but also linked the 
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commissioning of services to geographical areas and started involving choice in 
decision making.  
 
Primary Care-Led Commissioning 
GP Fundholding and Total Purchasing Pilots 
One of the outcomes of the creation of the quasi-market was the increased 
importance of primary care-led commissioners (Miller et al., 2012). GPs became key 
purchasers, or commissioners, of healthcare within the internal market. The 
purpose of these was to allow local GPs to volunteer to purchase non-elective 
elective, and community care, with generated savings being made available to GPs 
to re-invest into local services (Mannion 2011). The local knowledge of GPs would 
allow for services to be somewhat tailored towards the local populations. The role 
of primary care-led commissioning would be a key element of health policy reforms 
over the subsequent 20 years, with all new forms of commissioning involving or 
being led by primary care physicians. The first manifestation of this was small scale 
GP fundholding (GPFH) in which GPs commissioned small contracts for the local 
community (Ibid 2012). In 1992, GP Fundholding schemes were further developed 
in order to begin commission services. The GPFH was voluntary and GPs did not 
have to take part. This increased role of GPs in the quasi-market was based on a 
belief, which is further embedded in practice; that local GPs were in the best 
position to select the providers to meet local demands and empower local patients 
(Harrison and McDonald 2008). This combination of an awareness of local needs 
and medical knowledge was seen as an effective solution to the perceived problem 
of resource allocation across the NHS.  
 
The purpose of the GPFH schemes was to improve the way in which resources were 
allocated for their local populations (Glennerster 1998). In addition to improving 
the quality of care, they were intended to assist in generating savings, as the GPs 
were meant to be able to purchase only those services which were necessary and 
reduce excess expenditure. Although they did fit in with the narrative and desire to 
devolve power from the central authority and involve local decision-makers in 
commissioning, the government did not commission any studies to measure the 
impact of the reforms (Coulter 1995).  
 
The GPFH scheme did achieve some success. Namely, the majority of GPFHs 
managed to generate yearly savings. Initially, GP Fundholding was a voluntary 
scheme and it proved popular, growing year on year as it gave GPs greater 
autonomy (Ham 2009). The government attempted to expand the scheme further 
to cover larger districts (further expanding primary care-led commissioning) in the 
belief that that would maximise savings as evidenced by the pilot (Jones 1993).  
 
As the GPFH schemes began to become more common, they managed to reduce 
the number of referrals to hospitals for particular kinds of procedures 
(predominantly electives), as well as reduce waiting times for some types of care 
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(Propper et al., 2002). Most evidence suggests that GPFHs were most successful in 
developing local services. They were effective in community and primary care, 
areas where traditionally GPs had the most expertise (Miller et al., 2012). Some of 
the services included dermatology, ophthalmology, and urology (Ibid 2012). There 
is also evidence to suggest that GPFHs  ‘ůĞĂƌŶĞĚ while ĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? utilising their new 
powers to ensure that they gained adequate data from local providers through the 
use of contractual mechanisms (Ibid 2012). In short, the ability of GPs to 
commission led to increased development of provision on a micro-level, in areas 
where the commissioners had experience. Further improvement of services was 
thwarted by local Health Authorities (Ibid 2012).  
 
The fact that GPFH was voluntary meant that not all GPs engaged with the process. 
Amongst those who did engage, the scheme was very popular (Coulter 1995, Miller 
et al., 2012). Under the GPFH arrangements, GPs had a high level of autonomy due 
having control over their budgets. This enabled them to develop services they had 
the most experience of, and this in turn ensured that there was engagement from 
GPs (Coulter 1995).  
 
While the scheme managed to achieve some successes compared to its initial 
objectives there were also issues with the GPFH schemes (Petchey 1995). One was 
the accusation that the schemes were creating a two-tier NHS, in which better care 
was afforded to populations in areas where GPs were a member of a scheme (Dixon 
and Glennerster 1995). In many cases the schemes did manage to generate savings, 
but these were offset by increases in administration costs (Dixon and Glennerster 
1995, Le Grand 1998). The GPFHs also focused on the areas of care which they 
knew best, and only moved on to commission other areas of care after they had 
gained additional knowledge of the commissioning process (Miller et al., 2012). The 
use of GPFH helped to highlight how GPs could affect the development of services, 
but at this point it was unclear whether or not the benefits locally could be 
transferred to a larger population.  
 
The Conservative Government (1992-1997) were keen to further develop primary 
care-led commissioning. This took place with the development of the Total 
Purchasing Pilots (TPPs) which began operating in 1994. These schemes aimed to 
allow, indeed relied upon, any GPFH to volunteer in order to purchase all 
community and hospital services in their area (Miller et al., 2012). Some GPs were 
very willing to participate in the programme. While the TPPs had the power to 
purchase all services, very few exercised this right. Rather, they worked in areas 
where they had experience (Miller et al., 2012). This extension of the GPFH has 
been argued to be  “ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐ ? (Miller et al., 2012, p 4), as GPs restricted 
themselves to those areas they were comfortable in, giving back commissioning 
responsibilities for areas in which they lacked experience. These programmes 
represent the first full attempt at delegating all commissioning responsibility to 
GPs. The TPP scheme was successful in some areas, with some evidence of the TPPs 
being able to reduce hospital admissions (Smith et al., 2004). While most TPPs did 
struggle to affect changes in secondary care, they were successful in developing 
primary care services (Smith et al., 2004).  These successes were achieved in areas 
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such as mental health, maternity services and community care (Miller et al., 2012). 
This was achieved through the commissioning of additional local services and 
changing the services of providers, which fit within their stated objectives (Ibid 
2012). 
 
The GPFH system was not without some flaws. There was a lack of coordination 
with other purchasers in the system. GPFHs were able to generate their savings due 
to their relatively small size. This allowed them to change providers without any risk 
of destabilising large local providers (Le Grand 1999). There was no change in the 
number of elective procedures that GPFHs referred compared to non-Fundholding 
colleagues, which again underlined the limited effectiveness of the scheme (Ibid 
1999). The reforms also incurred additional costs of the holding and management 
of new contracts, and the greater time that commissioners had to dedicate to them 
(Greener and Mannion 2006).  
 
The TPPs also demonstrated that even if a commissioning organisation is scaled up, 
it does not always represent an increase in efficiency. As the TPPs were larger 
organisations than the GPFHs, they encountered costs when attempting to engage 
GPs (Howie et al., 1998). Additional resources were spent on attempting to 
encourage local GPs to become involved in the commissioning process. These 
doctors were not always easily convinced of the advantages of becoming involved 
in commissioning (Howie et al., 1998). There is a lack of evidence to suggest that 
the additional GPs were  ‘ǁŽƌƚŚ ? the investment, but most evidence highlights that 
the greater the involvement from GPs there were greater service improvements 
(Miller et al., 2012).  
 
In the context of the balance between privatisation and marketisation, the GP 
Fundholding scheme proved to be closer to the latter. It assisted in the promotion 
of competition in the NHS, primarily through the devolution of budgets from large 
centrally controlled institutions to smaller local organisations. Similarly, it brought 
with it elements of private sector-type management, with its focus on achieving 
savings. This, it is claimed, is not typical of the public sector in general.  
 
The GPFH ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?Ɛ significant impact on commissioning was that of involving 
clinicians in the resource allocation process (primarily to meet local demands). It 
demonstrated their ability to affect elements of primary care provision, especially 
areas such as minor surgery, dermatology, ophthalmology and urology. 
Commissioners further demonstrated that they could affect services if they are 
engaged with the system and given the autonomy to do so. The scheme advanced 
competition in the NHS as it was accompanied by greater use of private and third 
sector providers (which led to accusations of a two-tier NHS). Under the GP 
Fundholding scheme,  ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? was also advanced as one of the leading principles of 
reform of the NHS. However, on the available evidence it only resulted in modest 
improvement in its primary aim of shortening the waiting times for patients 
(Williams et al., 1997). On the other hand, the scheme laid the basis for primary 
care commissioning processes to cover larger geographical areas in future 
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incarnations, as well as involving greater numbers of commissioners (Smith et al., 
2004). 
 
During the brief period of its existence, GPFH and TPPs did not introduce any new 
actors to the NHS involved GPs in the commissioning process. It also further 
developed the role of competition in the delivery of care. The schemes were 
partially successful as they linked clinical decision-making to purchasing of services 
with the aim of meeting local demand. Commissioners did use their local expertise 
to deliver improved services in their areas. However, their ability to affect care 
outside of these relatively small areas was limited. In conclusion, some evidence 
that the GPFHs brought benefits to some areas of commissioning, there was no 
rigorous Government sponsored evaluation of the scheme (Dixon and Glennerster 
1995, Klein 1999, Le Grand et al., 1998, Petchey 1995, Propper et al., 2002).  It is 
important to note that participating GPs were faced with a number of limitations 
which restricted the use of the tools at their disposal. There were supply side issues 
with a limited number of non-state providers, and their ability to affect other local 
hospitals was limited so the GPs focused only on services with which they had prior 
experience, hesitant to get involved in services with which they were not 
comfortable (Dixon and Glennerster 1995). Importantly though, it was the first 
policy development which gave GPs a key role in the selection of providers, a 
process they would be involved in over the course of the next 20 years.  
 
Primary Care Groups and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
 
After its election victory in 1997, Labour discontinued the GPFH scheme, arguing 
that it was creating a two-tier health system (Le Grand et al., 1998). However, in its 
reform programme Labour introduced Primary Care Groups (PCGs), which were 
similar but they commissioned services over larger geographical areas than the 
GPFH schemes. This allowed the new government to claim that they had discarded 
previous reforms while introducing their own, however it has been argued that the 
new PCGs allowed Labour to: "universalise Fundholding while repudiating the 
concept" (Klein 1999). Within the new PCGs, the lead role of GPs remained. But 
these new bodies were larger, had more responsibility, even if the budget was held 
on behalf of the local Health Authority. Labour claimed to have removed the two-
tier NHS whilst at the same time increasing the responsibility of primary care-led 
commissioners, who became an integral element of the new reforms. Vital 
elements of the internal market, such as the purchaser/provider distinction were 
retained, and arguably the PCGs built on previous policy (Klein 1991, Bevan and 
Skellern 2011). The new organisations retained elements of primary care-led 
commissioning, with clinicians maintaining an important role in the selection of 
providers, and they even drew on the lessons of the GPFH and TPP schemes (Miller 
et al., 2012). By 2001 the PCGs had been merged and transformed into PCTs. The 
distinction between GPFH and the PCTs were the size and scale of the 
commissioning arrangements, and the role of clinicians within the groups, with 
PCTs being viewed as a scaled up version of GPFH (Klein 2010). 
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The PCGs were established by the first New Labour Government (1997-2001) in an 
attempt to prevent the development of a two-tier NHS. The Primary Care Groups 
were given responsibility for larger geographical areas than the GPFH schemes 
were, whilst maintaining the crucial role of GPs, ensuring that primary care doctors 
still shaped the selection of providers (Le Grand 1999). One key difference between 
PCGs and, previous arrangements was that all GPs were members of PCGs, rather 
than being able to opt-in (Ibid 1999). At the same time, the new PCGs were 
intended to address the weaknesses of the GPFH scheme; being too small to tackle 
prescribing and elective procedures; possessing modest budgets, which allowed 
Trusts to see them as peripheral commissioners; and not being universal across the 
country (Le Grand 1999). PCGs created a universalised commissioning system in 
which all patients were now covered and services were commissioned by primary 
care physicians (Turner and Powell 2016). The PCGs were structured in such a way 
that the commissioning decisions were taken by the Boards in which the majority of 
the membership were GPs, with the Chair always being a GP (Harrison and Ahmad 
2000). On the other hand, there was concern that the PCGs were, in reality, less 
autonomous than their predecessors, as there was a much more formal 
accountability structure where they were directly accountable to local Health 
Authorities (Ibid 2000). While many GPs were happy to be involved in 
commissioning, they viewed the development of PCGs as encroaching on their 
autonomy and ability to reach decisions, especially when compared to the 
autonomy that they possessed under GPFH (Miller et al., 2012).  
 
Initially, the fact that the PCGs had a GP Chair meant that there was a high level of 
clinician involvement in decision-making processes. Similarly, to the TPPs the PCGs 
focused on their local areas, mostly working on primary care services (Miller et al., 
2012). They were also able to affect prescribing costs (Ibid 2012). However, many 
PCGs were restricted by their Health Authorities which did not always want to 
devolve power and their budgets (Smith et al., 2000). While GPs were the key 
decision makers within PCGs, from this point there was a general decrease in the 
involvement of commissioners within PCGs.  
 
After an initial implementation of PCGs, there were discussions in Government to 
increase further the size of commissioning bodies, as the average size of 100,000 
patients was not viewed as optimal (Bojke et al., 2001). PCGs were rapidly grouped 
and merged into 303 larger PCTs which were to become the cornerstone of the 
New Labour reforms of the NHS. The average patient size nearly tripled to 284,000 
(Naylor 2012). The PCTs were to be given the responsibility of over 80% of the 
commissioning budget to secure the provision of primary and secondary care 
(Robinson 2004). PCTs were also given their own budgets, and were not subject to 
oversight from Health Authorities, having full control over their budgets. Finally, 
they were to interact directly with providers, and they would have the 
responsibility of managing contracts. 
 
Crucially, the move from the PCGs to PCTs also represented a low point in the 
engagement of GPs in commissioning (Miller et al., 2012). Under PCGs the Chair of 
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the key board of each body was a GP. This allowed them to exert influence over 
commissioning, even if this represented the power of individual commissioners 
rather than a group. PCT leadership structures limited the power of GPs by 
involving nurses and a greater number of managers in the executive boards. There 
were direct steps to curb the power of GPs, and to reduce their role in the 
commissioning process (Bate et al., 2007).  In part this came from the view that 
PCGs had been dominated by GP commissioners (Smith et al., 2000). As a result, 
the commissioning process during this period became controlled by the managers 
within these organisations and, the decision making ability of the GP commissioners 
decreased (Ibid 2007).   
 
The overall aim of these PCTs was to:  “be powerful agents for change in a more 
devolved, clinically driven, and locally responsive E,^ ? (Smith et al., 2004). As the 
core element of New Labour's reforms throughout the early 2000s, the PCTs were 
given full control over their budgets and the power to commission primary and 
secondary care for their local areas, meaning that there was not oversight from 
local Health Authorities (Smith et al., 2004). However, their autonomy remained 
somewhat limited as overall control of commissioning remained with the 
Department of Health. This highlights the contradictory push and pull of health 
policy, with moves to increase the autonomy of commissioners while also ensuring 
that central control remained strong (Mohan 2009). There was a crucial difference 
with the PCTs compared to earlier primary care-led commissioning, that 
commissioners now had the power to commission private providers, as well as 
public and third sector providers (Harrison and McDonald 2008). These new rules 
led to an expansion of private provision in the NHS, encouraged by government 
policy, as typified by the usage of private providers to assist in lowering waiting 
times. In 2004 the number of PCTs was halved, as a number of the new 
commissioning bodies failed to achieve their aims with mergers taking place as a 
result (Robinson 2004). Being in size similar to the Health Authorities they indirectly 
replaced, PCTs did not possess the flexibility to respond directly to the needs of 
their populations. This occurred primarily because the PCTs had to be large enough 
to consolidate risk, reducing the liability of the organisation in cases where there 
were financial issues, but as a result their size meant that they could not react as 
well to local needs and pressures, something that effective GPFHs had achieved 
(Ibid 2004).  Despite this perceived flaw of the PCTs, there was insufficient evidence 
to support changing their size (Goodwin 2007). An outline of the various essential 
elements of legislation can be seen in the text box below.  
.  
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The PCTs were introduced and operated during a period in which the NHS budget 
was being increased continuously at a greater rate (4%) than at any other point in 
its history (Bevan and Skellern 2011, Darzi 2007, Mohan 2009, Stevens 2004). Thus, 
it is not straightforward to assess whether the increase in funding or the 
organisational changes were responsible for the relative success of the NHS during 
the late 2000s - waiting times were cut, patient satisfaction remained high but 
significantly the service had a greater number of private providers(Klein 2010, 
Smith et al., 2010). PCTs continued to work in areas in which previous primary care-
led commissioning had achieved success, such as community care (Smith et al., 
2010). There is some consensus that the increase of non-public providers helped 
the NHS reach its targets and attain specific improvements despite already being in 
a state of constant reform. This expansion of private providers was possible due to 
Key Legislation under New Labour (1997-2010) 
 
x 1997 - The New NHS: Modern, Dependable: The White Paper maintained the internal market, but 
abolished the GP Fundholding Scheme and planned to established new Primary Care Groups 
(PCGs) 
x 1999  W Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation: The White Paper established the PCGs and outlined 
how they would become Primary Care Trusts (1999). This included the responsibility for public 
health to be given to these new bodies.  
x 2000 -  The NHS Plan: The Act was a ten-year plan for the NHS. It included commitments to 
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚďƵĚŐĞƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ?ƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞŶĞǁŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ƵƐŝŶŐW&/ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶĐŽƌĚĂƚ ?
between the NHS and private providers was also signed, where excess patients would be treated 
in private hospitals. It also laid out plans for the creation of Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres (ISTCs).  
x 2001  W The Health and Social Care Act: Formalises The NHS Plan. 
x 2002  W Shifting the balance of power within the NHS: Securing delivery: Secured the evolution of 
PCGs into PCTs and the abolition of Health Authorities, which are replaced by Strategic Health 
Authorities.  
x 2002  W The NHS Reform and Health Care Professionals Act: This confirmed and enacted the 
recommendations of the Shifting the balance of power White Paper. It also involved the rating of 
hospitals. 
x 2003  W The Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act: This Act created NHS 
Foundation Trusts, semi-autonomous organisations with the freedom to work with the private 
sector in the delivery of care. 
x 2004  W Practice-based commissioning: Engaging practices in commissioning: The Government 
provides GPs and other primary care practitioners the ability to purchase services for their local 
areas, working in tandem with PCTs, this is named Practice Based Commissioning (PBC).  
x 2005  W Commissioning a patient-led NHS: The rollout of PBC is accelerated, with all PCTs told to 
have PBC by the end of 2006. PCTs and SHAs were also given instructions to support PBC and 
contract management. 
x 2006  W ŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽWƌŝŵĂƌǇĂƌĞdƌƵƐƚƐ P'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ,ĞĂůƚŚŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ
on changes to PCTs: The total number of PCTs declines as many merge to generate additional 
savings, reducing the link between local areas and the PCTs.  
x 2009  W Care Quality Commission: The Care Quality Commission (CQC) is established to act as the 
regulator for all health and social care organisations.  
 
Figure 2 - Key legislation under New Labour (1997-2010) 
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the ability of the PCTs to engage private providers through new legislation (Miller et 
aI., 2012).  
 
These developments in commissioning arrangements encouraged the further use of 
private providers in the NHS. The key driver for this expansion was the 
development of the Concordat, as metioned in the previous chapter. Under this 
arrangement, the NHS and the private sector would focus on cooperating rather 
than on competing against one another (Turner and Powell 2016). In the political 
arena, this was explained as a creation of a partnership between public and private 
sectors, rather than privatisation of the service (Perkins et al., 2010). The onus of 
this new policy was placed on the PCTs as the bodies responsible for the 
commissioning of services. The PCTs relied on clinical commissioning, further 
entrenching the usage of primary care-led commissioning as part of the internal 
market.  
 
In a bid to develop what were perceived of the advantages of GPFH, and the lack of 
GP engagement in PCTs, the New Labour government developed Practice Based 
Commissioning (PBC). Introduced in 2004, PBC represented a further evolution of 
primary care-led commissioning, with clinicians holding indicative budgets for the 
commissioning of services (Miller et al., 2012). Similar to the GPFH arrangement, 
GP ?s engagement was voluntary, and the commissioners had freedom with 
developing their own internal decision making structures (Checkland et al., 2009). 
While technically operating as a subcommittee of the PCTs, the PBC scheme aimed 
to enable GPs to continue to purchase local services but with additional oversight, 
and administrative support (Checkland et al., 2009). It represented the continued 
development of the usage of local GPs as commissioners in the belief that they 
were best suited in selecting providers and understanding the needs of patients 
(Miller et al., 2012). While PBC commissioning represented a small percentage of 
total commissioning, as the scheme was initially voluntary, it further enabled 
commissioners to refer patients to a private sector service provider (ibid 2012). Any 
savings which were generated would be kept in the local area and reinvested into 
new services (Checkland et al., 2009).  These new commissioning arrangements 
were successful in holding local providers to account over the amount they charged 
and, in the providing impetus for other developments in their local health 
economies (Coleman et al., 2009) 
 
The ability of PBC commissioners to affect larger change was limited. The ability of 
PBC arrangements to be successful depended on the relationship between the 
commissioning group and the PCT that they belonged too (Miller et al., 2012).  In 
cases in which there was a good relationship, in which the PCT leadership trusted 
the PBC group, there was evidence of success, with clinical commissioners being 
able to affect activity levels (Ibid 2012).  However, in some cases the poor working 
relationships meant that clinical commissioners did not feel that they were able to 
work to their fullest abilities.  
 
In summary, the primary care-led commissioning arrangements in the NHS have 
been subject to near constant reform since the introduction of the quasi-market by 
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the Conservative Government (1987-91). In its early years, the quasi-market 
introduced the split between purchasers and providers, which further developed 
primary care-led commissioning in the form of GPFH schemes. This established the 
principle of clinicians being responsible for commissioning to meet local demands, 
in which it was thought best that they had a level of autonomy. The GPFH scheme 
enabled GPs to change the commissioning of many primary care services, being 
able to focus on those services which were not the sole responsibility of hospitals 
(Miller et al., 2012). This was further compounded by GPFHs being unable to shape 
other elements of care due to the oversight of Health Authorities and the 
Department of Health. The ability of the GPs to affect local services was partial due 
to not having full control of their budgets and the ability to engage other GPs in the 
work. One clear drawback of the process was the inability of commissioners to 
affect certain providers and their limited scope. They were limited by the scale of 
their ability to commission and by other commissioning bodies within the broader 
framework (Health Authorities). Under subsequent arrangements, including both 
PCGs and PCTs, the ability of GPs to affect commissioning continued to be limited. 
While GP Commissioners did achieve some changes in the provisioning of services. 
Under PBC arrangements there were further developments as GPs became more 
involved in the commissioning process.  
 
The effectiveness of commissioners to change the provision of services depended 
on the autonomy that they had from strict oversight. Under GPFH, commissioners 
were able to exercise a large amount of autonomy within a limited space. As their 
budgets were limited, GPs focused primarily on the areas of care they knew best. In 
this sense, when free to develop services with little oversight, many commissioners 
were more engaged, learnt more, and were more effective at changing services 
(Miller et al., 2012).  Under subsequent reforms, the autonomy of GPs to act 
decreased, and with that their effectiveness. With the development of the PCGs 
and PCTs, the power of GP commissioners was deliberately curbed by managers. It 
is under these arrangements that primary care led-commissioning was least 
effective on a local level. GPs could not really affect primary care as they were not 
as powerful as the PCT boards. This was remedied under PBC arrangements to 
some degree, with GPs again being given the power to commission, however the 
ability of those consortia to function was severely limited by the relationship with 
the PCT. The evidence from previous primary care-led commissioning suggests that 
GPs are at their most effective when they are given autonomy, a clear mandate 
and, the ability to influence secondary care (Miller et al., 2012). They can be 
affected by a variety of different pressures or other actors who may impinge on 
them as has been the case under previous arrangements.  
 
Primary care-led commissioning has been one key vehicle for the selection of 
services in the NHS since 1992. The Health and Social Care Act (2012) theoretically 
provides GP commissioners with more freedom to select providers, compared to 
previous commissioning arraignments. To be able to understand how these 
commissioners may be affected, there needs to be a clear delineation of the 
structures which may affect the autonomy of commissioners to use their new 
powers. Thus, the next section of this chapter will explore the new policy 
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framework which has been developed. The Act did not create an entirely new 
framework, but instead developed many existing bodies, giving them more 
considerable oversight over the NHS and new powers to enforce rules. There was 
also the development of some key new regulators, such as NHS England, which 
have their agendas and power to act differently to some other regulators. This will 
be explored in the following section.  
 
Health and Social Care Act (2012): The development of a new 
external regulatory framework 
This section explores the regulatory framework that has been developed by the 
Health and Social Care Act (2012). It will further explore the potential impact of the 
regulatory framework on the decision-making of clinical commissioners and will 
outline a conceptual framework for analysing the influences which may affect 
clinical commissioners. The aim is to understand how commissioners select 
providers and if they will be able to utilise the powers given to them by the Health 
and Social Care Act (2012). The question put forth is whether the commissioners 
will have the freedom to utilise all the tools the new Act granted them and what 
influences may restrict their ability to select providers. 
 
The Act has not radically altered the bodies that regulate commissioning in the 
NHS. Instead, the Act has empowered existing regulatory bodies whilst removing 
direct control of the NHS from the Department of Health (Timmins 2012). The 
regulatory framework has the potential to have more influence on the choices of 
commissioners in the selection of providers, and the way in which they can achieve 
this will be explored in this section.  
 
This chapter will discuss the role of key organisations that comprise the external 
policy framework, such as, Monitor (now part of NHS Improvement), the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC), Office of Fair Trading, Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA), NHS England (NHSE), as well as, the relationship of the new 
reforms with previous policy. 
Monitor 
The first part of the external policy framework that will be examined is the sector 
regulator for health, Monitor. With the introduction of the Act (2012), DŽŶŝƚŽƌ ?Ɛ 
role was expanded to oversee the commissioning process and the restrictions 
placed on CCGs. Previously the role of Monitor was to operate as a watchdog, 
maintaining the marketplace in health (Paton 2007). 
 
Monitor, which has recently been incorporated into NHS Improvement (NHS 
Improvement 2017), has the following responsibilities as outlined in the Health and 
Social Care Act:  
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 “1) The main duty of Monitor in exercising its functions is to protect and promote the 
interests of people who use health care services by promoting the provision of health care 
services which ?  (a) is economic, efficient and effective, and (b) maintains or improves the 
quality of the services." (Health and Social Care Act 2012). 
 
Monitor ensures that health service providers are adequately licenced under the 
terms of the Care Quality Commission (CQC), as well as to regulating NHS mergers 
and finally determine what constitutes  ‘ǀĂůƵĞ for money' (Health and Social Care 
Act 2012). The objective of Monitor ensures that there is competition and choice 
within the healthcare market. There is very little interference from the Secretary of 
State for Health, who only issues guidance to Monitor on specific issues and can 
only override it in the event of a critical failure (Ibid 2012).  
 
 
The original intention of the Act was to promote competition and thereby increase 
patient choice, and the possibility of NHS Trusts merging was seen as a 
contradiction of that same goal. Hence the Act gave Monitor the power to restrict 
the conditions under which mergers were possible (Poole NHS 2013). The actions of 
Monitor in preventing mergers was supported by the OFT and the then Health 
Secretary, Jeremy Hunt (Ibid 2013). As the ultimate arbiter of whether mergers are 
allowed or not, Monitor can significantly influence the number of providers in any 
particular area, which would also affect the commissioners. The actions of the 
external framework could also affect the way in which commissioners interact with 
their local NHS providers, as has already been discovered under previous NHS 
reforms (Harrison and Lim 2000).  
 
Monitor also oversees the work of the new CCGs. Section 75 of the Health and 
Social Care Act (2012) stipulates that Monitor has the power to investigate 
decisions made by CCG commissioners in the case of complaints made by a 
provider that any process has not been handled according to the new guidelines 
Monitor and choice and competition in the health service 
 
x Monitor has a duty to enforce the Competition Act (1998), this entails overseeing mergers between NHS 
organisations and operating as the arbiter in NHS cases rather than the CMA. 
x It also has a duty to ensure that NHS organisations abide by the Enterprise Act (2002). 
x The NHS is now subject to EU procurement law, meaning any contract of over £100,000 needs to go 
through a legal process (Baeten and Hervey et al., 2010) 
x This has manifested itself through the blocking of mergers in the name of patient choice (Health Services 
Journal 2013) 
x These decisions are made alongside the Competitions and Markets Authority and the Office for Fair 
Trading  W which further reflects the opening of the health service to competitions laws, which has not 
been the case previously.  
Figure 3 - Monitor and choice and competition in the health service 
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(Health and Social Care Act 2012). This arrangement provides a formal process by 
which a provider (i.e., private companies that may have unsuccessfully competed 
for a contract) can challenge the outcomes of any procurement process through a 
lengthy and costly legal process. This is the first instance in which private providers 
have directly gained the right to challenge decisions reached by the purchasers. 
Most evidence would suggest that legal challenges have taken place, but that they 
are still the exception rather than the rule (Ham et al., 2015,). However, these new 
provider abilities could affect the behaviour of commissioners as they seek to avoid 
situations in which they may face legal challenges. 
 
There already is evidence that they have blocked mergers (Poole NHS 2013), but 
Monitor has also allowed for other mergers as it has gained experience in the 
healthcare sector (HSJ 2015). This may lead to commissioners opting to avoid some 
commissioning processes to reduce this risk. It could further encourage cooperation 
between NHS providers and commissioners rather than encouraging working with 
the private sector. 
 
Monitor and privatisation/marketisation 
When exploring how Monitor may affect privatisation or marketisation, it is 
important to briefly examine how each of its responsibilities plays out in everyday 
practice. In its role of ensuring competition, Monitor is, in practice, promoting the 
marketisation (market principles) of the health service, by prioritising competition 
and choice over the interests of the existing health care providers (i.e. Trusts), while 
also having a duty to improve patient care. Monitor does not overtly support 
privatisation as there is no apparent shift of assets from the public sector to the 
private/third sector. 
 
A more significant manifestation is Monitor's encouragement of the NHS to 
function as a market, which should theoretically result in efficient allocation of 
resources. While the system itself is not being overtly opened to external 
companies, it is being subjected to a legal framework, the Competition Act (1998) 
and the Enterprise Act (2002), which therefore may open the system to further 
privatisation/marketisation. Another way in which Monitor could facilitate the 
privatisation of the NHS is through its inherited role from the Department of 
Health, as a sector regulator. Utilising Rondinelli's (1984) characterisation of 
privatisation, this form of decentralisation, from the DoH to Monitor, consequently 
increases the possibility of the selection of a broader range of service providers. 
 
A more explicit relationship of Monitor with the commissioners is through its power 
to provide guidance to the new CCGs as stipulated by the Health and Social Care Act 
(2012). Apart from helping to shape the market, Monitor defines the information 
which commissioners can expect from potential providers. As mentioned 
previously, it is also at this point, the adjudicator of complaints. Using Tuohy et 
al.'s., (2004) characterisation, Monitor here acts as a regulator as a manifestation of 
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the state that increases regulation but is simultaneously liberalising access to the 
quasi-market, reflecting the aims of the new Act.   
 
In summary, Monitor has become much more powerful as a regulator of the health 
care sector under the reforms. In effect, Monitor has kept the provider landscape 
similar to what it was before 2012 (Ham et al., 2015). It does, however, enforce 
competition law and the fear of legal challenge is a serious one amongst NHS 
commissioners (Ibid 2015). The role of Monitor could facilitate further 
marketisation over privatisation, as the management of NHS has been reformed 
while the provision of funding remains within the public sector, which is reflected in 
the relatively small size of the private sector (Ham et al., 2015). 
Office of Fair Trading, Competition Commission, and the 
Competition and Markets Authority 
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (now part of the Competition and Markets 
Authority) was another part of the external regulatory framework, with a focus on 
enforcing competition laws. Its primary concern was the protection of ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ? 
rights by ensuring the maintenance of choice. In the context of the NHS, the OFT 
had a significant role in judging whether proposed mergers between Foundation 
Trusts could go ahead in the context of protecting choice, working alongside 
Monitor. It was expected that the OFT would decide in favour of any such move 
even at the expense of the interests of patients, focusing on the legal enforcement 
of the rules (Monitor 2013), however, its role has been relatively limited (Ham et 
al., 2015).  
 
The OFT relied on recommendations from Monitor to reach its own conclusions and 
would not come to any final decision without its advice (Monitor 2013, Ham et al., 
2015). As mentioned above, there were some high-profile cases of Trusts 
(Foundation and NHS Trusts), not being allowed to merge their management 
structures. In one, the OFT rejected the final appeal to allow the Poole and 
Bournemouth Trusts to merge in 2013 after a long and drawn out process which 
lasted nearly two years (HSJ 2013). The merger was rejected because the resulting 
loss of choice would be detrimental to the  ‘ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ? (Ibid 2013).  However, after 
the dissolution of the OFT and the establishment of the Competition and Market 
Authority (CMA), this approach seems to have been changed, and certain mergers 
have been allowed, due to a greater understanding of the resource pressures on 
the NHS (Health and Social Care Act 2012, NHS Improvement 2016). These new 
mergers have taken place with approval from the DoH and additional funding put in 
place in order to make them work (Collins 2015).  
 
In addition to Monitor and the OFT, the Competition Commission (CC) also has a 
limited role in a decision relating to the formation of mergers on the provider side. 
The CC contributed to the shaping of the provider landscape and as such had an 
indirect influence on decisions made by commissioners. The  ?Ɛ involvement was, 
as implied, limited only to the few cases in which it was asked to provide guidance. 
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The CC had a potentially much more significant role as a regulator of the private 
healthcare market, which encompasses companies that worked both in and outside 
of the NHS. The CC, in its report in April 2014 about the functioning of the private 
healthcare market regarding competition, noted that private providers are highly 
 ‘ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚ ? and dominated by individual companies (Competition Commission 
2014). The report was also significant as it outlined how private providers look to 
target specific areas of provision in which they already have experience. 
Furthermore, the report referred to how NHS England has become more reliant on 
the private sector. At that time this primarily referred to the perceived potential 
further expansion of NHS Private Patient Units (PPUs) (Competition Commission 
2014). The CC believed that the reforms would lead to future growth of private 
companies in the NHS as the result of a decision to remove the private patient 
income cap in NHS Trusts (Competition Commission 2014). However, the removal 
of the patient cap and role of PPUs did not have the influence imagined, even if 
they represent a system similar to the old NHS pay beds (Bayliss 2016). 
 
The role of the Competition Commission in the context of marketisation and 
privatisation can best be explained by using the same set of theories as with the 
OFT. The CC furthered marketisation through its support for an organisational 
change of publically funded and provided services. Utilising Tuohy et al.,'s (2004) 
characterisation, the CC's activities can be viewed as contributing to the creation of 
additional levels of regulation. 
 
In 2014 the OFT and CC were merged into a new body, the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA). The new organisation was tasked with a goal to further 
 ‘ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶ competition' in the UK (Government 2014). There seems to be room for 
the behaviour of the framework to change as the new body reconsidered the 
merger between Poole and Bournemouth Trusts, three years after being blocked by 
the CC (Hazell 2016). This was interpreted as the beginning of a new approach to 
the application of competition rules as regards the NHS (Ham et al., 2015). This is 
also a reflection of the government understanding the financial pressures that the 
service is under, as this is often cited as a reason that mergers which had been 
blocked were now allowed to take place (Ibid 2015).  
NHS England  ? the day-to-day regulator of the NHS 
NHS England (NHSE) is the non-departmental public body (NDPB) that administers 
the NHS in England (other constituent nations of the UK administer their own NHS 
groupings). NHS England is mandated to lead work on commissioning within the 
NHS. This includes: ensuring that performance targets are met; that performance of 
the NHS in England is kept to a specified standard (clinical and financial); and the 
management of resource distribution to different CCGs (NHS England 2017). It has 
an explicit role in monitoring and maintaining the commissioning element of the 
internal market with a responsibility for £105.9 billion (The Kings Fund 2016). NHS 
ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ primary responsibility is administering the CCGs, and works directly with 
the CCGs to assist in commissioning of services. This allows NHS England significant 
influence over the providers that commissioners may select (NHS England 2017). 
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This further illustrates the influence of the external policy framework on 
commissioners and has a number of implications on their autonomy. For instance, 
NHS England has the power to place  ‘ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ? CCGs under special financial 
measures which it has already done in several cases, under the NHS England area 
teams (NHS England 2016). These powers of NHS England apply to other parts of 
the system, and as such it has been described as  ‘&ŝƌƐƚ Amongst Equals' (Ham 2013). 
 
The ability of NHSE to regulate CCGs is the most influential tool that it has to affect 
the behaviour of clinical commissioners. If a CCG is facing a significant financial 
deficit, the local NHSE team can place that group under special measures (NHS 
England 2016) meaning local commissioners would lose their autonomy in the 
selection of providers (Ibid 2016). Under special measures, the commissioners 
would agree to a formal plan to reduce the deficit (Vize 2016). As a result of these 
types of plans, there is potential to limit the number of new providers that the CCG 
may work with, as new contracts or money for new services would be limited. NHSE 
also acts as an arbiter between the Trusts (i.e., providers) and the commissioners in 
disputes. In its role as arbiter of disputes, 25% of all local NHSE teams have been 
active (HSJl 2015). Many of these disputes have been related to the NHS tariff and 
issues associated with finances (HSJ 2015, Sheaff et al., 2015).  
 
NHSE has also taken a more active role in the development of NHS targets since the 
introduction of the reforms. In 2014, NHSE released the Five Year Forward View 
(NHS England 2014). The purpose of the document was to suggest how the NHS can 
move forward and develop new models of care (The Kings' Fund 2017). It also 
outlined new responsibilities for the NHS, such as public health and greater access 
to services which commissioners would need to take an active role in (Ibid 2017). 
This further increased the type of providers that commissioners would need to 
engage. In this sense, NHSE also sets out additional forms of providers which need 
to be commissioned and dictate the future direction of the NHS/clinical 
commissioning.   
 
NHSE is also responsible for commissioning additional primary care and some 
specialist services (NHS England 2016). This highlights that commissioning 
responsibilities under the new NHS reforms are given to three key actors, NHSE, 
CCGs and local authorities (Ham et al., 2015). During the course of the study, some 
of these additional commissioning responsibilities for primary care have also been 
devolved from NHSE to CCGs (Ibid 2015). This places additional responsibility on 
commissioners and as such can affect other areas of commissioning. In addition, 
many commissioners are also unclear about procurement rules and regulations 
which could affect commissioning decisions (Ham et al., 2015, Holder et al., 2015). 
This demonstrates the complex nature of the commissioning changes, with 
commissioners facing an environment where commissioning roles and rules are not 
clear.   
 
Regarding this thesis, the creation of NHSE represents a form of marketisation of 
the NHS, according to the definitions presented in the previous chapter. It 
represents another level of regulation as classified by Tuohy et al., (2004), with the 
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 ‘ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ? delegating more power to other regulatory bodies rather than exerting 
direct control. It can also be viewed as an illustration of how decentralisation is one 
of the leading principles in this area of the NHS as there is now formally less direct 
oversight from the Secretary of State for Health. Specifically referring to the CCGs, 
NHS England has the responsibility to allocate annual funding to CCGs, ensuring 
fiscal responsibility and acts as the day to day regulator for CCGs, dealing with a 
variety of requests (Shaeff et al., 2015). Senior leadership positions in CCGs also 
require ratification from NHS England, even if those individuals are elected to those 
roles (Checkland et al., 2016). NHS England still has a duty to ensure fiscal 
responsibility and enforce the use of procurement in relevant cases, it could 
indirectly, alongside other parts of the external framework lead to the use of 
additional private providers, even if they do not directly encourage the growth of 
private provision (Ham et al., 2015). The work of the regulatory framework appears 
to favour competition rather than collaboration and the ability of the framework to 
affect the behaviour of commissioners (Hudson 2013).  
 
In summary, NHSE represents the most influential body in the external regulatory 
framework, with regards to commissioning. Under these new arrangements, 
several organisations that form part of the external framework (i.e., commissioning 
bodies external to CCGs) have the potential to significantly influence whether and 
to what degree, private providers are selected by commissioners. They can affect 
the decisions of commissioners either directly, through the application of rules, 
such as placing a CCG in special measures and affecting commissioning choices, or 
indirectly, by shaping the provider landscape. Most evidence seems to indicate that 
there is a light touch approach to regulation in the NHS, outside of financial special 
measures (Ham et al., 2015), although some commissioners believe that they are 
being given contradictory guidance, especially to do with procurement (Allen et al., 
2017).  
 
The new NHS reforms have continued previous policy of primary care-led 
commissioning, turning to local clinicians with the belief that they are best situated 
to commissioning care. However, the new regulatory framework continues to 
utilise competition. There is concern that the emphasis of the regulatory bodies on 
expanding competition and choice could take priority over the quality of care in the 
process of selecting providers. There is some evidence of this, with the framework 
blocking the mergers of NHS bodies immediately after the introduction of the 
reforms (NHS Poole 2013). Additionally, the ability that providers now have to 
challenge the results of procurement processes also could influence the selection of 
providers. Moreover, procurements have to take with certain contract values and 
not adhering to these results could lead to punishment (Allen et al., 2017). These 
competing pressures will influence the commissioners in some way, especially 
considering the broader context of a lack of resources for the provision of 
healthcare (Robertson et al., 2017).  Commissioners will need to balance the 
requirements of their populations and their decreasing financial funds and explore 
new ways of commissioning (Ham et al., 2015). However, as the regulatory 
framework has matured, there is evidence that many of the behaviours of the 
regulatory framework have been relaxed (Allen et al., 2017, Ham et al., 2015, 
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Sanderson et al., 2017). There is now more discretion in the workings of the system 
and some suggestions that the commissioners may now be able to exercise their 
decisions with less interference than was initially believed.  
 
In these circumstances, there is a concern as to the priorities of commissioners and 
whether they will be led by pressures from the external regulatory framework or 
will give preference to local clinical needs. The most obvious implications of this are 
the way in which providers will be selected. The commissioners are bound by the 
guidelines laid out by the external regulatory framework whilst simultaneously, 
attempting to meet demands within their commissioning areas.  
 
This thesis will explore how commissioners select providers, i.e. the new 
commissioning arrangements. It is one of the first studies to explore this 
relationship in detail. To do so, it will utilise a conceptual framework, from the work 
of Pettigrew et al., (1992) to understand and explore the pressures on 
commissioners and how this affects their selection of providers. There will be an 
exploration of various internal (i.e. local) factors, as well as those which stem from 
external sources, to understand how limited the commissioners are when choosing 
a new provider for a service; and whether or not commissioners are more or less 
likely to select a private over a public provider.   
 
 
Figure 4 - The NHS: how the money flows 
Source: The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ Fund (2016) 
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Developing a conceptual framework: exploring CCG decision 
making 
CCGs are responsible for commissioning over 60% of the total NHS budget (The 
<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ Fund 2016). They have the most control over the selection of a provider and 
thereby the participation of the private sector in the health service. The CCGs do 
not make their decisions in a vacuum defined by their statutory obligations and 
rights but in a much broader context in which they are exposed to different and 
often contradictory pressures. This section of the thesis will outline a conceptual 
framework to better understand the environment in which commissioners' work 
and reach decisions.  
 
The new Act stipulated a new commissioning process by establishing CCGs and a 
new regulatory framework to support the system and ensure compliance. These 
radical reforms to which the NHS has been exposed have provided commissioners 
with the challenge of operating in an unfamiliar system that is simultaneously 
exposed to an increased scarcity of resources. The commissioners were formally 
given greater levels of autonomy in the selection of providers than their colleagues 
in previous incarnations of primary care-led commissioning. However, this 
autonomy could, in practice, be severely restricted by the confluence of a variety of 
different influences, bringing into question their ability to select the provider they 
genuinely think is most suited as the new Act allows. It is reasonable to presume 
that the commissioners could have their choices affected by the behaviour of the 
external framework which could create an atmosphere in which private providers 
may be the most likely to be selected, or vice versa. Separately commissioners are 
obliged to consider the local context and demands when commissioning services, as 
utilising local decision-makers is one of the core purposes of the Act (Health and 
Social Care Act 2012). These local concerns include the needs of their populations 
as well as how their own prior experiences of commissioning could affect their 
choices. As of yet, it is unclear how this combination of various pressures could 
affect the real autonomy of commissioners. 
 
To gain a better understanding of the ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? autonomy in the new 
arrangements, this work utilises an approach that focuses on the managerial 
autonomy of the commissioners (Harrison and Ahmad 2000). In this context, 
managerial autonomy is taken to represent the ability of commissioners to make 
decisions based on their assessment of strategic needs and available financial 
resources. This ability is the overtly expressed goal of the new reform. However, 
because there are concerns that the commissioners will be exposed to various 
pressures, which they may find difficult to resist, there is a need to explore how 
both the external regulatory framework and the internal issues within the CCGs, 
will likely affect the commissioner's decisions in regards to selecting any new 
provider. In other words, both internal and external pressures could, in practice, 
limit the real autonomy of the commissioners. This is significant as the 
commissioners are purportedly autonomous in coming to their decisions. They 
should be independent from oversight of regulatory bodies whilst utilising their 
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knowledge of their local market to select the best-suited provider to meet the 
needs of their populations (Bossert and Mitchell 2011). 
 
When constructing the conceptual framework to examine the decision-making 
process, there is a focus on the external and internal pressures that resulted from 
the new organisational set-up of the NHS as stipulated by the Act. The principle 
approach taken in this thesis when conceptualising the CCG environment is an 
adapted version of Pettigrew et al.,'s (1988) framework of the dimensions of 
strategic change. Written during a similar period of upheaval in the NHS, with the 
introduction of the market reforms of the 1980s, it provides a good starting point 
for exploring the effects of new reforms. The work of Pettigrew et al. (1992) 
developed as a response to what they termed the need for more research in the 
field, which was  “ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƵĂů ?comparative, pluralist and ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ? (Ibid 1992, 
p268). As a result, there was a focus on the effects of change in a context which 
considered three areas, Context, Content and Process (Ibid 1992). The starting 
point for studying change is that any reform involves managing both an internal and 
outer context (Ibid 1992). This is situated within the element of context, which has 








Figure 5 - Pettigrew et al.,'s Context, Content and Process 
Source: Pettigrew et al., (1988) 
 
Content in this refers to the area under study, in this case the development of the 
commissioning introduced by the new Health and Social Care Act (2012). The 
context of the reform can further be explored through an outer and inner lens. The 
outer context  “ƌĞĨĞƌƐ to the national economic, political, and social context for 
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district as well as the perception, action, and interpretation of policies and events 
at national and regional levels in the E,^ ? (Pettigrew et al., 1988, p 301). A key 
weakness of previous research was that there was little attention paid to the 
context in which reforms took place (Pettigrew et al., 1992, Locock and Dopson 
2012). This research will therefore explore the effects of this  “outer context ? on the 
decision-making of commissioners and how restricted they may in their selection of 
providers. The inner context is the ongoing strategy, structure, culture, 
management and political process of the area which help shape the processes 
through which ideas for change proceed. Also important to consider is the process 
of change, which refers to:  “ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?reactions, and the interactions of the various 
interested parties as they seek to move the district from its present to its future 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?(Pettigrew et al., 1988, p 301, Pettigrew et al., 1992, Locock and Dopson 
2012). Through the conceptual framework utilised here, there will be an 
exploration of the various local concerns of commissioners, the structure of the 
CCG and other concerns which may emerge from the local health economy. Thus 
the model should be able to explore the decision-making process within CCGs, 
understanding how various factors may together affect the decisions of 
commissioners and what the outcomes of these processes are. 
 
Similar frameworks have been applied in several empirical-related studies which 
have explored both the provider and purchaser side of the NHS; hence providing a 
tested guide for the understanding structural change (Locock and Dopson 2012, 
Robert and Fulop 2014, Hunter et al., 2015). 
 
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) marked a significant change from previous 
arrangements in the commissioning process. It empowered clinical commissioners 
to a much greater degree than under any previous commissioning arrangement. To 
understand the internal and external pressures on the CCGs, this thesis, through 
empirical work, will explore these new pressures that could affect the breadth on 
the ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? autonomy in the empirical work. Earlier research into the 
accountability structures of CCGs utilised a similar model which explored the 
relationship between CCGs and the new structures (Checkland et al., 2013, 
Checkland et al., 2016). 
 
The external pressures relate primarily to the regulatory policy framework 
created by the Act, as well as the environment which the organisation is 
operating in (Pettigrew et al., 1992). The internal pressures are ones which arise 
from the local communities (i.e. geographically local) and the structure, culture 
and context of the CCGs themselves. In the new regulatory framework, the HSCA 
has created new bodies and also expanded the responsibilities of some 
previously existing regulators. As a newly formed body, NHS England has, among 
other things, been tasked with ensuring that targets on competition, efficiency 
and fiscal responsibility are met. This is accomplished through its control of the 
CCG budgets, its power of placing any underperforming CCG under special 
financial measures and also being able to ratify senior appointments within CCGs 
(Checkland et al., 2016, NHS England 2016). Under previous elements of primary 
care-led commissioning, budgetary pressures were a significant influence in the 
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work of commissioners, restricting their ability to operate freely (Majeed et al., 
2012). Alongside a changing commissioning system, under the HSCA, there is a 
duty to generate £20 billion of efficiency savings which the regulatory bodies 
were tasked with enforcing (Health and Social Care Act 2012). These pressures 
are further exacerbated by additional financial stresses on the provider side of 
the NHS which reported a deficit of £1.85 billion deficit (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ Fund 2016). It 
is highly likely that this deficit will exert an effect on commissioning, as it will 
inevitably result in providers altering their behaviour; and therefore will directly 
influence the options available to the commissioners.  This set of circumstances 
is not wholly unfamiliar, and there is evidence that previous commissioners 
struggled to solve some of the issues they were faced with, particularly 
concerning decommissioning services and responding to local demand (Robinson 
et al., 2011). 
 
Another external element that would affect the decisions of commissioners is the 
provider marketplace. New providers are entering the marketplace and competing 
with existing providers at an increasing rate, winning over a third of new contracts 
tendered out (Iacobucci 2015). There is evidence that primary care-led 
commissioning did in the past improve certain aspects of care (Miller et al., 2016), 
although there remain questions about its potential for overall positive effects 
(Smith and Mays 2012). Possibly the most significant issue with which 
commissioners could be faced regarding the provider marketplace is the behaviour 
of large NHS Trusts which dominate by their sheer size (i.e., budget, number of 
patients). The major part of the overall NHS budget is spent and committed to the 
NHS Trusts, which provides the majority of beds in the system. This is still viewed as 
a key descriptor of the overall performance of the NHS (Smith et al., 2014). 
However, this dominance of the Trusts, due to their size and scope of services 
makes them vulnerable to financial pressures which characterise the present 
environment (Ibid 2014). In response, the Trusts are exploring various solutions and 
methods. There is also the question about the size of the private and third sector 
markets and how the new reforms may stimulate their growth (Matchaya et al., 
2015). Commissioners, on the other hand, may have little alternative but to 
continue to purchase services from the Trusts even if they cannot affect their 
behaviour in any significant way. In addition, commissioners are also exposed to the 
threat of losing their financial autonomy (i.e., be placed under special measures by 
NHSE). At the core of their work, the commissioners are faced with the challenge of 
finding a balance between available resources and the selection of providers, some 
of which they cannot effectively influence. 
 
Other elements of the external pressures that may influence the CCGs come from 
NHS Improvement, the health regulator that has gained more power in the new 
reforms, and the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). NHS Improvement can 
shape the provider marketplace by blocking mergers of NHS organisations (i.e., 
Trusts  W which dominate the provider marketplace) to ensure compliance with 
choice and competition legislation, just like Monitor did (West 2014). The logic here 
is that patients must have a choice of where and by whom they are treated in the 
NHS (Ham 2012). Thus the fate of these organisations, especially if they are Trusts, 
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can have a significant effect on the provider landscape. Previously, mergers of NHS 
organisations were a method of pooling resources to achieve savings and other 
efficiencies (economies of scale), but with the exposure of the NHS to competition 
law, those options have become much more limited (Davies 2013). An example of 
this is how Monitor and the CMA blocked a merger between Foundation Trusts in 
Bournemouth and Poole (The Health Foundation 2014). That decision affected the 
local CCGs, as they had no choice but to deal with Trusts that were subject to 
considerable changes because of the necessity to achieve further savings.  In 
essence, the CCGs were suddenly faced with a change in the services available in 
their area.  
 
CCGs are also exposed to internal pressures, which can arise from a variety of 
sources. One is how the commissioners perceive their role and their autonomy 
(Checkland et al., 2013). The reasons that the commissioners become involved in 
CCGs can be numerous, but the predominant one appears to be a desire to affect 
positive change. There are also those commissioners who had previous 
involvement in primary care-led commissioning and have continued this role in the 
new structure (Checkland et al., 2015). Moreover, there are differences in opinion 
between GPs, as believe that GPs are best suited to deliver local savings while 
others have a desire to preserve their autonomy as a body (Iacobucci 2016). There 
is evidence that in previous primary care-led arrangements, commissioners 
disregarded external pressures and pursued their own commissioning 
arrangements which favoured local providers (Smith et al., 2004). Often this took 
the form of working alongside local providers over other arrangements (Flynn et al., 
1996). Some commissioners may refuse to invite bids from companies, instead 
preferring to keep things  ‘ŝŶ-house' with providers they have cooperated with over 
an extended period (which would most likely be public rather than private) or 
through circumventing rules as best they can (Hunter et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
commissioners may choose to ignore regulations regarding choice and opt to 
control the care pathways rather than deferring to patients/regulatory framework, 
seeking new ways in which to improve services. In addition, the internal pressures 
can also result from the internal structure of a CCG. There are no fixed rules in how 
a CCG would need to structure and operate, outside of its Governing Body 
(Checkland et al., 2015). This variation could lead to internal conflicts or methods of 
working amongst the CCG staff and could shape the selection of providers.  
 
Another internal pressure on commissioners is the structure and relations within 
the CCG. According to Pettigrew et Ăů ? ? ?Ɛ (1992) model, the internal aspect relates to 
the structures and relationships within the organisation. In this context, this could 
refer to the power dynamics between key members and how decision making is 
structured. This is made more acute as many CCGs do not have similar structures 
outside of the mandated Governing Body (McDermott et al., 2017).  The priorities 
of commissioners and how this may play out is key in understanding how the 
internal dynamics may affect decision-making and the selection of providers. This 
can be explained by exploring the power relations which exist between actors.  
 
This thesis also explores the way in which actors used power within the CCGs. In 
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sociological contexts, power has been viewed as a means of influencing the 
behaviour of others to do something they may not have otherwise done, usually 
with some form of punishment (Dahl 1976). This study borrowed from the work of 
other scholars in the field, when adopting this approach (Harrison et al., 1992). In 
their conceptualisation of power, they argued that there were three  ‘ĨĂĐĞƐ ? of 
power, which they used in their empirical work. The first face of power is used 
when there is direct conflict between two actors. One of these actors acquiesces to 
the demands of the other, usually due to them believing that they may be deprived 
of something if they do not agree (Ibid 1992). This definition of the first face of 
power has been defined and used by Bachrach and Baratz (1970).  
 
The second face of power was developed in response to the perceived inability of 
the first face of power to capture the use of power in an entire organisation 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970). This second face of power related to agenda-setting, 
where one actor devotes their energies to ensuring that the only elements 
considered on any agenda are ones which they view as being in their interests and 
avoiding threats to their own interests (Harrison et al., 1992). This is not always 
explicit, and rather it can take place in a context in which a subordinate may choose 
not to create conflict with a manager or senior member of staff (Ibid 1992). In the 
words of Harrison et al.,  “dŚĞ powerful remain powerful without having to ĂĐƚ ? ?
(1992, p6). However, this face of power has been argued to be insufficient in 
analysing macro-level distributions of power. There is, therefore another face of 
power to consider.   
 
The third face of power argues that power is exercised when one actor influence 
another so that their  ‘ĚĞƐŝƌĞƐ ? are made to align (Harrison et al., 1992). In this 
instance, one actor is attempting to enhance their authority to make their views 
more legitimate and to have other actors behave in such a way that their agendas 
are aligned. There is concern that as there is no overt conflict, it is difficult to track 
when this face of power is being used. However, it has been argued that a 
researcher can make judgements about when one actors manipulates another, 
concluding what may or may not be in the interests of involved actors (Ibid 1992).  
 
In addition to the faces of power, Harrison et al., (1992) also post that there are 
two other elements that need to be taken into consideration when studying power. 
These are  ‘ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? and  ‘ůƵĐŬ ? (Ibid 1992). Collective action refers to a 
situation in which resistance appears to be lacking, due to a lack of organised 
opposition. Multiple actors may oppose a dominant party, but these actors may 
each have slightly different aims and cannot coordinate effectively, thus meaning 
that dominant groups do not have to exert the first or second faces of power (Ibid 
1992). The power dynamics may also be affected by luck more than other factors. 
Harrison et al., (1992) argue that power relationships have been affected by crises 
such as epidemics, and other long term trends, which place some groups in more or 
less powerful positions (Ibid 1992).  
 
Figure 3 illustrates how these pressures might be combined or interact to influence 
the commissioners.  




The external regulatory pressures relate to the framework that was outlined above, 
with NHS England, Monitor and other enforcement bodies forming the Policy 
Framework. The organisations which comprise the regulatory framework ensure 
compliance with the Health and Social Care Act (2012) and with the competition 
and choice laws that now apply to the NHS. 
 
Both external and internal pressures could have the effect of restricting the choices 
available to commissioners when selecting providers. Theoretically, commissioners 
have the power to select public, private or third sector providers either through 
utilising procurement processes or through expanding the scope of existing 
contracts. As previously mentioned, in old primary care-led arrangements, GPs 
favoured local health service providers (Flynn et al., 1996) and the early evidence 
from the exploration of clinical commissioners suggests that this may be the case 
again (Checkland et al., 2012). From early CCG research, there is a great deal of 
variation in the structure of CCGs which may also affect their commissioning 
processes (Ibid, 2012). The third sector providers do not possess the same 
understanding of the area as public i.e., NHS providers or private providers, both of 
which have delivered services over a more extended period of time. Consequently, 
did not have developed relationships with them to the same extent as they did with 
other providers (Baines et al., 2010).  
 
The empirical work will explore if the autonomy of the commissioners in the 
selection of providers is affected by the external and internal pressures and how 






Figure 6  WInternal/External Conceptual Framework 
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Shaping Strategic Change: Further analysis 
 
In addition to adopting and exploring change from the perspective of context, 
content and process, from their empirical work Pettigrew et al., (1992) devised a 
model with eight interrelated factors which can assist in understanding what may 
lead some organisations to successfully adapt to change (see figure 4). This model 
assists in understanding how change occurs, the role of top-down or bottom-
factors which can account for the pace of change within organisations. These 
factors according to Pettigrew et al., (1992) assist in creating a receptive context for 
change. The authors explicitly state that these eight factors are not a "shopping list" 
(Pettigrew et al., 1992, p 31).  Rather, these eight elements represent factors which 
may constrain or enable policy change (Ibid, 1992). They argue that in their work, 
NHS bodies (district health authorities) which exhibited these factors were more 
likely to be successful in implementing change.  
 
These factors highlight that policy change does not simply occur when policy 
makers institute it, but that a variety of local factors and national policy elements 
can combine to affect the likelihood that change takes place. The eight factors that 
form the model demonstrate this. The model highlights the characteristics that are 
internal to an organisation in order for it to be able to adapt to change and  ‘ŵŽǀĞ 
ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? (Pettigrew et al., 1992, p 267). Within these characteristics, emphasis is 
placed on key actors within the organisation, the role of policy and how individuals 
working alongside others to affect change. Therefore, the culture of the relevant 
organisations plays a large role in whether or not reforms will be successful. The 
way in which commissioners operate will dictate to what extent the reforms are 
successful in the research sites. It also illustrates the important role that the culture 
of the organisation may be important in understanding the actions of individuals. 
These factors will be explored in the discussion chapter in light of the empirical 
evidence from the study.  
 
In addition to the considerations of internal elements, the external policy context is 
also important, as highlighted by the conceptual model presented earlier in the 
chapter. The policy context can limit the ability of actors to shape policy change. It 
is the combination of the internal cultural and relational elements which interact 
with the external policy context to allow actors to affect policy change, or limit their 
ability to do so.  
 
To be able to understand whether or not the Health and Social Care Act (2012) has 
been successful in its aims, the empirical data was analysed with regards to these 
eight contexts. All of the eight characteristics were at least somewhat relevant to 
the study. However, some bore more relevance to the findings of this work. These 
factors help to shape the discussion in the final chapter, which also includes a full 
discussion of the power of the explanatory framework.  
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Figure 7 - Pettigrew et al.,'s eight contexts for receptive change 




As outlined in the previous chapter, privatisation in its most basic form can be 
described as the transfer of assets from the public into the private sector (Saltman 
2003). In ^ĂůŵĂŶ ?Ɛ taxonomy (2003) there are several elements of both the private 
and public sectors (two subsections of the public and two of the private). 
Privatisation only occurs when there is a transfer of assets from the public to the 
private, and not if it just moves from one element of the public to another. Saltman 
(2003) also argues that there is a distinction between privatisation and 
marketisation, despite not providing a precise definition of the differences. 
Drakeford (2000) however, is more explicit in that regard and argues that 
marketisation is the insertion of market ideas and principles into a public sector 
service. Clearly, this is different from privatisation. However, the two concepts are 
linked, and it has been argued that marketisation can lead to privatisation.  
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As discussed in chapter two, privatisation in this thesis will be characterised by a 
transfer of assets in the funding or provision of a service. If a service was to move 
from being funded or provided by the NHS to the hands of a private provider, that 
would represent direct privatisation. This would remain the case if any particular 
service were to be provided by the private sector but funded by the public sector, 
or if the third sector replaced the role of the public sector. In most instances in the 
NHS, organisational changes have been accompanied by changes in the 
management structure in an attempt to replicate the private sector as much as 
possible, to reduce inefficiencies and enhance the positive elements of 
competitions (Propper et al., 2004, Greener et al., 2014).  
 
Marketisation is the process by which there are attempts to change behaviour 
within existing systems to replicate the free market. In this context, this would 
mean developing private sector management practices and/or having public 
providers compete with one another for contracts and work.   
 
Using this approach, it will be possible to identify and define both processes 
(marketisation/privatisation) and the degree to which they occur within the new 
NHS. This distinction is important to allow for more detailed analysis of the two 
processes, and of whether the boundaries between the two have become blurred 
(Mohan 2009). 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to outline the commissioning processes that have 
taken place in the NHS since the election of the first Conservative Government 
(1979-83), which introduced the first batch of market-orientated reforms into the 
NHS. The introduction of the quasi-market in 1990 introduced the 
purchaser/provider split into the NHS, inserting competition as an operating 
principle into the health service for the first time. The introduction of competition 
did not initially involve the private sector, instead it aimed to create competition 
amongst public providers only. Therefore, it was a  ‘ĐůŽƐĞĚ system'. This was 
followed by the development of GPFH and other primary care-led commissioning, 
with a mixture of clinicians and managers commissioning services (Miller et al., 
2016). The contracting of private providers became more common during the 
2000s to meet waiting list targets. While this was met with limited success, these 
changes, both primary care-led commissioning and the usage of private providers, 
were only adopted on a relatively small scale.   
 
The development of PCGs and PCTs further entrenched the combination of 
managers and clinicians working together to commission services and to ensure the 
most effective allocation of resources. There was a further growth of private 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ? participation in the system and the utilisation of choice and competition 
within the NHS, but also a  ‘ďůƵƌƌŝŶŐ ? of the boundaries between the two sectors as 
Mohan (2009) stated. The PCTs marked a period in which managers were given 
greater powers than those of the clinicians.  
  86 
 
The Health and Social Care Act (2012), represents the culmination of previous 
health policy relating to commissioning. Responsibility for the commissioning 
process entrusted to primary physicians who were also given greater scope in their 
choice of the selection of providers than in previous reforms. However, a question 
remains as to whether the commissioners can genuinely affect all of these new 
powers in the context of pressures from the external regulatory framework in 
combination with their accountability to local populations while the service overall 
is facing unprecedented financial pressures and decreasing funds. The conceptual 
framework developed in this chapter will assist in a detailed exploration of the 
actual ability of commissioners to select providers, as opposed to the latitude they 
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Chapter 4  W Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter will outline the methodology of this study. It will begin with an outline 
of the research questions, before discussing the epistemological approach and 
research methodology adopted.  
 
This thesis aims to explore how the CCG's make decisions concerning the selection 
of providers. The previous chapter laid out a loose conceptual framework for 
explaining the influences on the decision-making processes, built up from the 
previous theoretical and empirical literature. This chapter will outline the research 
methods used in the study to address this aim and how the different elements of 
the framework were explored in the empirical research. It will firstly state the 
research questions, then elaborate upon the research design and the criteria for 
the selection of two sites (CCGs). The description of the epistemological approach 
used will be outlined, and this chapter will be concluded with a discussion of 
practical and ethical considerations.  
Research Questions  
The implementation of the new reforms and the selection of certain types of 
provider was the focus of the study. While the reforms have changed a significant 
element of the service, they continue to evolve and capturing this process will be 
critical to this thesis. This was an exploratory study and focused on examining and 
explaining the decision-making processes adopted by clinical commissioners. The 
research questions focused on the NHS in England because the Scottish and to a 
lesser degree, the Welsh system, have not been subject to the same reforms due to 
devolution. The definitions of privatisation and marketisation that have been used 
in this thesis are outlined in the previous chapter. The research questions are as 
follows: 
1. What influences the decisions of commissioners in/during the 
commissioning process? 
2. Why do commissioners select certain providers over others? 
3. How has this affected the private/public balance in the NHS? 
 
These questions cover many of the critical elements of the new reforms while 
retaining a focus on the commissioning process and the associated inputs and 
outcomes. This includes the CCGs and the regulatory framework. In this sense, the 
first question is related to the initial contact made at the both of the research sites, 
which explored the decision making structures and understanding how the CCGs 
reach decisions about service selection. By exploring the structures of the CCGs, it 
further allowed the researcher to gain a rich understanding of where the power 
within these organisations was concentrated. It also allowed the researcher to 
explore the power and scope of the various committees and boards which form the 
decision making sections of the two CCGs. The subsequent question then explored 
  88 
the interactions between different actors and the boards which comprised the 
CCGs. The third question explored the data analysis stage. The focus was on the key 
themes to develop an understanding of how commissioning takes places over the 
two sites, as well as the effect of those decisions on the number of private 
providers in the NHS.  
 
The questions were designed to allow the examination of the role of the regulatory 
framework and the impact of those bodies, including NHS England, in parallel to an 
exploration of privatisation and marketisation. The Commissioning Support Units 
(CSUs) were planned subject to research as their role in the reforms was unclear. 
However, it was apparent that the CSUs were not in use by either of the two 
selected sites and that their role, in general, was somewhat limited (NHS England 
2017).  
 
This study adopted a broad interpretivist underpinning to the empirical work. It 
draws on the long history of phenomenology and hermeneutics (Crabtree and 
Miller 1999, Schwandt 1998). The researcher believes that reality is largely socially 
constructed. The ontological position of this research paradigm can best be 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐŽŶĞƚŚĂƚ P “recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation 
ŽĨ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ďƵƚ ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ ƌĞũĞĐƚ ŽƵƚƌŝŐŚƚ ƐŽŵĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? WůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ŶŽƚ
relativism, is stressed with focus on the circular dynamic tension of subject and 
object ?  ?ƌĂďƚƌĞĞ ĂŶĚ DŝůůĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ? ? ? ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ǁŽƌŬ ? ŝƚ ƐĞĞŬƐ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ Ă ďĂůĂŶĐĞ
between social realism and true constructivism, understanding that there is some 
objective reality (Hammersley 1992). From this perspective, the relationship 
between the researcher and the reach subjects is one in which the subjects 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŝƚ P  “assumes that we cannot 
separate ourselves from what we know. The investigator and the object of 
investigation are linked such that who we are and how we understand the world is a 
central part of how we understand ourselves, others and the world ?  ?>ŝŶĐŽůŶ ?
Lynham and Guba 2011, p104). The purpose here is to understand the approach of 
the researcher when they designed their research methods. This may be best 
termed moderate constructivism (Järveensivu and Törnroos 2010). This ontological 
and epistemological position led to the adoption of a symbolic interactionism 
framework, which helped to further inform the research design and analysis.  
 
This research sought to gain a fuller understanding of the decision-making process 
in the newly created CCGs. The research approach was based on a loose form of 
symbolic interactionism with a focus on the social interaction between key decision 
makers. This theoretical frame has a rich history in sociology, drawing on the work 
of George Mead and first developed in the middle of the 20th Century (Blumer 
1969). The approach emerged as a response to the dominance of research that was 
focused on the macro-level institutions and the view that society was organised 
from the top-down (Carter and Fueller 2015). The basic premise of the approach is 
ƚŚĂƚ P “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things 
have for them; (2) the meaning of things is derived from, or arises out of, the social 
interaction that one has with others; (3) meanings are handled in, and modified 
through, an interpretive process used by a person in dealing with the things they 
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encounter ? (Blumer 1969, p2). The aim of symbolic interactionism is an immersive 
understanding of the world from the perspective of the individual. In the context of 
this study, the researcher wanted to gain a deeper understanding of the 
commissioning environment from the perspective of the commissioners to 
understand how they view their roles and work within the new CCGs. This 
complemented the internal context of the conceptual framework as it explored the 
culture of the decision making spaces in the CCGs which were studied. It also 
allowed the researcher to explore how the commissioners developed their views of 
their spaces, i.e., areas of responsibility, and roles. 
 
/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ P  “ ?/Ŷ ?ůƵŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ĂŶ
understanding of social life requires an understanding of the processes individuals 
use to interpret situations and experiences, and how they construct their actions 
ĂŵŽŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ŝŶ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?(Carter and Fueller 2015, p3). Using this 
perspective when observing a social phenomenon, the focus is on the interaction 
amongst individuals which for this study allows for an examination from the 
perspective of commissioners. This entailed close observation of the day-to-day 
working of the CCGs and especially the boards which were responsible for final 
decisions. Although this approach is predominantly a micro-level analysis, it was 
also influenced by the context in which these meanings were created, and as such 
structural factors were also taken into account (Stryker 2008).  
 
The ultimate aim of this epistemological approach is to understand the social 
interactions at the micro level of the decision making process within the CCGs that 
were studied. In addition, it also sought to understand how the decision-making 
process was shaped by the broader social-political process within the organisation, 
again fitting in with the internal contexts which are focused on by the conceptual 
framework. TŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ P  “see the 
situation as it is seen by the actor, observing what the actor takes into account, 
observing how he interprets what is taken into account ?  ?ůƵŵĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ56). This 
process assisted in developing a fuller understanding of the CCGs as commissioning 
organisations and of the participants and how they understand their roles.  
 
The majority of other research in the field utilises symbolic interactionism in order 
to explore illness and the relationship between doctors and patients with regards to 
sickness and understanding the perception of illness or within nursing studies (see 
Brown 1995, Charmaz 1983, Lewis 2006, Kelly and Field 1996). This approach can 
also be adapted to exploring clinical commissioning. There is no existing research 
which uses a symbolic interactionist approach when exploring the work of health 
service commissioners; however, it complements the conceptual framework.  
 
There are however some weaknesses of adopting this approach. The primary issue 
is that the symbolic interactionist approach is viewed as being one which is 
restricted to exploring micro aspects of social organisation, even if some disagree 
with this analysis (Dennis and Martin 2005). Thus, this approach would be 
unsuitable to exploring the broader context of the reforms and how they may affect 
the decisions of commissioners.  In order to be able to utilise it, the researcher 
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combined the loose symbolic interactionist framework with the Pettigrew et al., 
(1992) conceptual framework. Combining these two approaches allowed the 
researcher to delve in-depth into the internal context of decision making, i.e., the 
structures and spaces of the CCG, while the Pettigrew et al., (1992) framework 
allowed for exploring how the external policy context would affect the subject 
CCGs.  
 
This chapter outlines how the researcher explored the motivations of the 
commissioners, in parallel to understanding the decision making process and what 
drove it. Another aspect of the observations was to understand the interactions 
between various actors. This assisted in generating a deeper understanding of the 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĚĞĐŝĚĞƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŵ ? 
Research Design and methods of data collection  
Ethnographic Design: The thesis aimed to study the decision-making process of 
CCGs and to do so it employed a qualitative ethnography which aims to explore the 
ƌƵůĞƐĂŶĚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐƵƐĞĚďǇĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐĂƐƐƚĂƚĞĚďǇƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ P  “its 
role being to illuminate, understand and ultimately interpret and present a range of 
perspectives  W ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ? ĐĂƌĞƌƐ ? ? ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?  ?^ŚĂƌŬĞǇ ĂŶĚ
Larsen, p 186). 
 
A qualitative ethnography approach enabled the researcher to gain a detailed 
insight into the rationale behind decision making and the context in which those 
decisions are made, hence it was considered an appropriate approach to answer 
the research questions. This method includes a variety of techniques including 
documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and observation. The key element is 
ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ƚŽ  “ ?non]-participant observation, to explore 
complex clinical and organisational issues." (Savage 2006). Commissioning in the 
NHS is a complex organisational issue. Ethnography is a method which allowed the 
researcher to be flexible and to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances and to 
utilise a broad range of data collection methods.  
 
An ethnographic approach also suited the approach of the researcher. It allowed 
them to explore, in depth, the nature of the CCGs and the relationships between 
key actors. It also allowed for the researcher to explore the effects of the broader 
policy context on these CCGs. 
 
Methods of data collection: The core data collection method employed was a non-
participant observation of decision-making meetings of key boards at two CCGs. 
dŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌǁĂƐ ‘ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚ ?ŝŶďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ'Ɛ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚĚĂƚĂĐŽƵůĚďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ƌŝĐŚ ? ?>ĞǁŝƐĂŶĚZƵƐƐĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ZŝĐŚ ?ĚĂƚĂ
refers to data which goes beyond simply describing phenomenon but to 
interpretation and illustrating patterns to demonstrate a deeper understanding 
(Nowell et al., 2017). While the focus was on clinical decision making, there was 
also tracking of non-clinical commissioners and meetings (who did affect the 
commissioning process). When examining the CCGs, which had variation in their 
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internal governance structures, ethnography proved to be useful as it allowed for 
the in-depth study of two decision-making systems within broadly similar contexts. 
It highlighted the differences in how decisions were reached and provided a basis 
for interview questions throughout the ethnography to further enhance the 
understanding of the commissioning process. 
 
The data from the observations was collected in field notes. Each meeting which 
was observed had its own set of notes which were kept and analysed throughout 
the data collection period. The purpose of the field notes was to provide 
information about the way in which the CCG decision making processes worked. 
Observation allowed the researcher to note discussions of participants, their 
interactions and make notes about the CCG papers which were available. These 
were organised around a topic guide (see Appendix).  The topic guide was 
constructed to be able to collect multiple forms of data, addressing the three 
fundamental considerations of field notes, what, how and when (Crabtree and 
Miller 1998). Initially the topic guide was written to be able to record descriptions 
of what occurred in key CCG meetings. This was done in order to be able 
understand the dynamics of the CCG and the key actors involved. This encouraged 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  “ƌŝĐŚ ĨŝĞůĚ ŶŽƚĞƐ ?  ?ŽŐĚĂŶ ĂŶĚ ŝŬůĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƚĂ ǁŚich was 
collected included descriptive data of the meetings, quotes and discussions 
between commissioners and also information from the CCG papers present. The 
field notes were collected in situ, as researcher did not affect the behaviour of any 
participants by doing so. Along the descriptive notes, the researcher recorded 
impressions and their own understanding of the events which occurred. Having 
completed an observation, the researcher reflected on their notes. This reflection 
was used to plan focuses of future observations as well as, to plan the questions for 
the interviews. In addition, there was a further period of reflection before 
beginning research at site two.  
 
By the end of the data collection period, there had been over 150 hours of 
observation across the two separate sites. This included different meetings which 
had been identified by the researcher through initial contact with gatekeepers and 
further meetings identified through interviews.  
 
The other key data collection approach employed as part of the ethnography was 
that of semi-structured qualitative interviews with key decision makers within the 
CCGs. This covered their roles and perception of the commissioning process, and 
aided the researcher by providing an additional data source with which to 
triangulate conclusions. It also assisted in eliminating confusion, meaning that 
incorrect assumptions of the researcher were corrected. The flexibility of the 
approach allowed for new avenues of inquiry to be explored as new information 
became available to the researcher. It also assisted the researcher to gain a better 
understanding of other important meetings in the CCG, and whether exploring 
those would prove a useful source of additional information. Some of this 
information only became available as the research progressed. The interviews, 
combined with the interview data, also assisted in providing the researcher with 
information about the commissioning process that could be fed back to the 
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participant CCGs. The topic guide for these can also be found in the appendix 
section. It allowed the researcher the ability to retain flexibility and explore key 
areas as the participant opened up.  
 
While ethnographies can vary and the methodology itself does not signify a unified 
research method, it does represent an approach for the study of everyday social 
settings, such as CCGs (Atkinson and Pugsley 2005). The very nature of what 
constitutes an ethnography can be contested (Hammersley 2006) despite 
characteristics which are common to most ethnographies. These common 
characteristics include (non-)participant observation and lengthy embedding within 
a chosen organisation/group (Hammersley 2006, Pope 2005). In addition, 
ethnographies usually involve a high degree of reflexivity  W a critical analysis of 
observed relationships and power balances  W which will be expanded on in greater 
depth later in this chapter. There is agreement about the role of interviews, 
document analysis and non-participant observation and how it assists in the 
triangulation of data streams (Hammersley 2006).  
 
Ethnographies have proved to be a popular method with health policy researchers 
and have often been used to study commissioning organisations in the NHS, 
including CCGs (Checkland et al., 2013a and Checkland et al., 2013b). From the 
perspective of symbolic interactionism, it enables the researcher to embed 
themselves in the setting in which the participants work. This would enable the 
researcher to explore the CCG from the perspective of the commissioners and 
understand how they view themselves and their ability to make decisions 
concerning service selection. The process can be explained as:   
 
"Through the nature and range of methods it can adapt, ethnography can 
provide a nuanced understanding of an organisation and allow comparison 
between what people say and what they do. It can, for instance, help to 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌŵĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?ŝƚƐ ƌƵůĞƐ ĂŶĚ
decision-making hierarchies) are influenced by an informal system created 
by individuals or groups within the organisation or indicate how professional 
knowledge is locally produced in particular settings" (Savage, 2000a, p1402) 
 
Ethnographic research is a popular research methodology amongst those who 
study primary care-led commissioning. There are examples of prior ethnographic 
approaches being carried out on CCGs to gain a better understanding of their 
accountability structures (Checkland et al., 2013), the way in which they utilise 
evidence, (Swan et al., 2017) and their commissioning support arrangements 
(Petsoulas et al., 2014). These have been successful, and the general approach 
undertaken here has sought to replicate elements from these prior pieces of 
research. The essential elements which have been borrowed by this work include 
the use of multiple sites/data streams and utilisation of a qualitative approach. 
None of these studies did utilise a symbolic interactionist approach.  
 
The methodology emphasises the role of the researcher as an active participant 
(Savage 2000b, Atkinson and Puglsey 2005). However, in the case of the CCGs, due 
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to their size and complexity, the researcher for this thesis will adopt a more passive 
role or non-participator role, while still being in a position to observe the workings 
of the CCG as it occurs. Being a passive participant mimics the approaches of other 
researchers in the field and might allow the researcher to be accepted by the 
participants.  
 
The design also adopted a multiple site approach. The quality of the research 
methodology was tested by the criteria set by Hammersley (1990). The foremost of 
these criteria are; the claims made by the researcher will be based on the empirical 
data; that care will be paid to maintain the credibility of the findings; the 
transferability of the data will be examined; and the influence of the researcher will 
be limited.  
 
The approach that was adopted can be summarised as a: "small-scale social 
research that is carried out in everyday settings; uses several methods; evolves in 
design throughout the study; and focuses on the meanings of individuals' actions 
and explanations, rather than their quantification" (Savage 2000a, p1400). The 
ability to be adaptable and reflexive was vital in this approach (Pope 2005). It 
provided a framework for exploring the question while permitting follow-up 
empirical work as new information emerged from the early stages of data 
collection, i.e., it enabled an iterative approach to data collection and analysis. 
 
The research design used was a case study method. It was a single case study across 
multiple (two) sites tracking how commissioners selected specific types of provider. 
The units of analysis, as defined by Miles et al., (2014), were the decisions that 
were reached by the CCGs about the type of provider that they selected as a result 
of their commissioning processes.  A combination of research methods allowed the 
researcher to explore the effects of the internal and external pressures on the 
commissioners. The observations allowed the researcher to observe the 
commissioning process and make basic deductions of what affected them. It was 
vital in helping the researcher develop an understanding of the internal dynamics of 
the CCGs, as well as the key actors, the way in which they worked, and provided an 
overview of the commissioning process. The observational data was key in 
developing a full understanding of the internal context and how the CCG operated, 
as well as highlighting some the external issues which may affect the decision 
making of commissioners. The interviews were key in developing the understanding 
of the process, being more effective at eliciting details of the decision making 
processes, and allowing the researcher to gain an understanding of the internal and 
external pressures on decision making. Combining the two processes, and 
complementing the findings with limited documentary analysis, allowed the 
researcher to explore whether internal or external factors influenced the 
commissioners.  
 
The research was exploratory, and it aimed to understand the rationale and other 
influences that shaped the commissioner's decisions. This also provided data on the 
potential effects on the public/private mix in the NHS as a consequence of the 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ decisions. Case study research is believed to be useful in this 
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context as it can: "uncover the complex influences that impinge on public bodies and 
the context-bound, event-driven nature of policy decisions ? (Marinetto 2012, p21). 
Utilising a case study method allowed for the in-depth study of one phenomenon. 
As decision-making is an identifiable process, with discernible outcomes (which 
services are commissioned), it was able to be studied using this method. In theory, 
this method allowed for the comparison of a single phenomenon across more than 
one site. In practice and for this thesis, it allowed for the comparison of decision 
making across two sites.  
One of the strengths of this approach was that it was conducted at two sites, this 
would mean that there would be multiple sources of evidence to more easily 
enable transferability (Guba and Lincoln 1985). The commissioning process was 
reviewed at each of the two sites, for a compelling examination of separate 
commissioning processes. The focus of the study which included interviews with 
key stakeholders and some limited documentary analysis was on the motivations 
and broader influences of decision makers. The observations were also used to gain 
an understanding of the process and functioning of the CCG. The interviews were 
used to triangulate and provide additional context to the decisions of the identified 
decision makers. Further but limited documentary analysis of papers at the board 
meetings was used to complement the interviews and observations. These papers 
consisted of CCG board papers that were issued to members of the respective 
committees. They were related to the topics and subjects which were being 
discussed by the commissioners. The researcher utilised them to complement the 
field notes, by providing a context to the discussions that were taking place. Due to 
the confidentiality agreements that the researcher signed, these papers were not 
taken from the meetings but returned to the participants. This provided an 
additional data stream to help triangulation and ensured the research came to 
credible conclusions (Hammersley 1990).   
Criteria for site selection 
The underlying rationale for selecting the two sites was that they were similar as to 
allow for credible comparisons, as commissioners would be functioning in similar 
environments, i.e., the comparison of sites will be  ‘ůŝŬĞ for ůŝŬĞ ? ? In the context of 
qualitative data, rather than focusing on reliability, the researcher focused on the 
dependability of data (Golafshani 2003, Guba and Lincoln 1994). Researching two 
sites should, therefore, increase the level of dependability of the gathered data and 
suggest that it could be replicated. Significantly, no two CCGs are identical, and they 
seem to have a considerable degree of discretion in arranging their internal 
governance (McDermott et al., 2017).   
One of the aims of the research was to ensure that all the collected data at the two 
separate sites was relevant to the decision making process. Initially, it was 
important that any differences that emerged in the data from the two sites could 
be explained primarily by the workings of the CCGs and not from the context in 
which they operated. The collected data enabled the direct examination/analysis of 
the new commissioning arrangements and how they affected which services were 
selected (i.e., the data should not have been skewed by differing needs of CCGs but 
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rather by the nature of the new arrangements). This allowed for the conclusions to 
be transferred to similar sites  W  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? as termed by Guba and Lincoln 
(1985). Rather than merely focusing on commissioning in general at both sites, 
there was a focus on the commissioning processes in two different specific services, 
all of which have a history of being delivered by more than one provider.   
 
The first criterion for site selection related to the number of service providers at 
each site. Commissioners at both sites had access to multiple types of provider (i.e., 
private/public/third sector) thus attempting to keep the supply side as similar as 
possible. The services that were examined were all provided by the new CCGs. This 
was informed through preliminary research about the CCGs and their locations. The 
sites had similar access to providers, having been selected as comparable areas. 
Both sites that were selected were of similar sizes which ensured that the contracts 
that they dealt with were of similar economic values when targeting these 
providers.  
The second criterion addresses the socio-demographic profile of the sites which is 
related to the demand for services at both sites. The sites that were selected 
covered areas of similar geographic size. This helped to ensure that the populations 
of the different sites would use services at a similar level and would have 
comparable budgets, thus allowing commissioners to target similarly sized 
providers. They were both in concentrated urban areas, and as previously 
mentioned had access to multiple providers. While it was impossible to account for 
all needs in this way, keeping critical aspects as similar as possible helped to ensure 
that there was consistency across the CCGs and that data could be transferable and 
accurate comparisons made. Having the population at roughly the same size also 
allowed for the CCGs to be in the market for providers of a similar capacity. 
Evidence suggested that there are a limited number of private providers and that 
they operate in similar environments (Allen 2009). If the CCGs were unable to 
compete for similar types of ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ? comparisons and conclusions would have 
been more difficult. 
The third criterion for selection of the CCG sites was the size of their catchment 
area (i.e., the population that they covered). In part, population levels needed to be 
similar so that commissioners at both sites were choosing amongst providers with 
similar capacity to provide services in respect of numbers, needs, and available 
resources. These similarities, once established, helped ensure that any differences 
are a consequence of the commissioning process itself, and not of any other 
context. It is important to note that the selected CCGs served a population that was 
very close to the average population that CCGs across the country serve (circa 
250,000) (NHS Clinical Commissioners 2014).  
The purpose of using two different CCGs, while keeping characteristics as similar as 
possible, is that commissioners were faced with other challenges regarding the 
services they select. The reasons why they are chosen can be very different, yet the 
comparisons drawn by this research were based on elements which were held 
constant, to allow the transferability of results.   
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The research also examined the extent to which private providers operated in their 
local areas (supply). Insights gained were used to shed on light on commissioning 
from the perspective of the providers including their treatment during the 
procurement process, what is expected of them, as well as their perception of the 
actions and decisions of the CCG. This also provided an understanding of the future 
direction private providers might take based on their first experience of working 
within the new commissioning framework. 
Selection of specialist services and the private/public mix 
In order to be able to fully understand the commissioning process, the researcher 
selected specialist services to track at the two CCGs. This allowed the researcher to 
focus the study, limiting the scope from all services and also to be able to compare 
the findings from the two sites. Further, this allowed the researcher the ability to 
utilise multiple data sources, exploring the specialist services (Baxter and Jack 
2008). The way in which these were selected is expanded on in this section. 
 
Both of the services that were selected fall under the remit of CCG commissioners 
and not of NHS England. They are secondary care services that specialise in care 
which require a referral from a GP. The services must have had some private sector 
involvement in the past so that commissioners have the option to choose between 
private or third sector providers with a proven track record and the public sector. 
At site one, the first service which was examined were elective procedures. The 
monthly average of elective procedures in the NHS is 700,000 (NHS England 2017). 
Such a high frequency of use illustrates the demand for electives and their resulting 
importance in the commissioning landscape. There is a mixture of both public and 
private providers in this area of service provision, and at the beginning of the 
empirical study over 340,000 elective procedures were being carried out by private 
providers in the NHS. This would suggest the existence of a relatively mature 
marketplace of competing providers (NHS Digital 2012). This may represent a small 
percentage of total NHS activity, around 4.3% (Hawkes 2012). This was partly due 
to previous Government policy of encouraging the use of private providers to 
reduce waiting times in the NHS. The number of elective procedures being carried 
out by private providers paid for by the NHS has continued to grow. However, the 
majority of the procedures are still carried out by the public sector, so 
commissioners have the option of pursuing either form of provider, or even a 
mixture of providers to deliver the service.  
The second service examined across both sites was mental health. This included 
both general mental health services and more specific ones (i.e. Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health Services). While the use of mental health services was 
not as frequent as elective procedures, they have grown in importance in recent 
years. There is a mixture of providers available to commissioners, and there may be 
a slightly more significant number of non-state/third sector providers of mental 
health services than private providers (Peck and Hills 2000). This has allowed for the 
examination of a slightly less developed service (as evidenced by the low levels of 
spending on them at the outset of the research (Campbell 2014)) in the NHS, which 
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commissioners may have approached differently and with a different set of 
incentives than when dealing with elective procedures. The introduction of the NHS 
Parity of Esteem guidelines brought with it a higher priority being given to mental 
health (McShane 2013). Under the guidelines, commissioners were obliged to 
match spending on new mental health and physical health services (Ibid 2013). 
During the data collection, there was an onus on commissioners to secure 
additional mental health services. 
As the researcher is utilising an iterative approach, there was a period that allowed 
for the data to be analysed before moving from site one to site two. The benefit of 
this approach is that it allowed the researcher to explore new avenues of inquiry as 
data became more available. It also provided time and space for the researcher to 
analyse data from site one before beginning work on site two. One key result of this 
approach was the change of service which was explored between sites one and 
two. 
At site two, mental health was retained as a service because of the rich data it 
generated at site one. However, at site two elective procedures were not explored 
but was replaced with musculoskeletal services (MSK) with a particular focus on 
physiotherapy services (which fall under this stream). This was partly because of 
the difficulties in obtaining data about elective procedures and its quality in 
comparison to data from mental health. At site one, the electives were provided by 
the local NHS Trusts and were part of large contracts, with these services being 
provided by one provider and as such did offer any greater detail in the data. This 
was further compounded by the fact that at site one, the CCG was not the lead 
contractor for electives so much of the commissioning for them took place 
elsewhere.  
MSK services have a history of a mixture of provision (Walumbe et al., 2016) and 
were as such recommended by key decision makers at site one as a potentially rich 
field of inquiry. Since CCGs have begun operating, there have been reports of 
commissioners carrying out MSK procurements which have been awarded to the 
private sector (Allen et al., 2017). The value of contracts which CCGs have given to 
non-NHS providers has previously exceeded £120 million (Ibid 2017), which may 
represent a value significant lower than that which is spend on elective procedures, 
but one which would provide more information to the researcher. There are 
mixtures of providers in both areas and thus, commissioners do have the option of 
utilising public, private or third sector providers. In this sense, changing the 
specialist service which was being explored was key in exploring the decision-
making of commissioners in a service area where they have multiple choice of 
providers.  
ǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ 
To supplement the primary study data, additional interviews were carried out with 
a third sector and private provider. This further strengthened the study as it 
provided an additional source of data. It allowed for the researcher to further 
triangulate some of the findings from the commissioners and to ensure that there 
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was data convergence and to fully understand the case (Baxter and Jack 2008). 
They were carried out at both sites, with providers that had existing contracts with 
the CCGs. At site one this included and an interview with the Chair of a 3rd sector 
mental health provider. At site two, there was an interview with the directors of a 
provider of MSK services. This yielded information about the procurement process 
and the challenges were faced by the providers under the new commissioning 
framework. The gathered data provided a complete picture of the commissioning 
process at both of the sites. GP commissioners facilitated access at the two CCGs. 
These additional interviews allowed the researcher to gain further perspective on 
the process and helped to improve the credibility of the data as it meant that it no 
longer relied solely on the data generated from the CCGs alone. It helped to 
triangulate the conclusions drawn from the supply side.  
Feasibility: The selected sites were both in the South East of England and were 
chosen by criteria listed earlier in the chapter. The two sites were similar as they 
were both in urban areas and had access to similar types and sizes of providers. 
Both of the CCGs served similar populations in size and budgets. As mentioned 
before, this was to allow for a comparative analysis of the data. From a practical 
perspective, it also allowed the researcher to attend meetings and interviews 
frequently and helped in securing a large number of observations.  
Gaining access to the two sites 
The sampling method that was used was typical case purposive sampling. This 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞǁĂƐƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚĂƐŝƚĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇŽĨ P “particular settings, persons, 
or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide 
that cannot be gotten as well from other choices ? ?DĂǆǁĞůů ? ? ? ?, p87). The samples 
were to be kept as similar as possible to examine the commissioning processes. 
Initially, access was difficult to arrange and how it was negotiated is outlined below.  
Prior to beginning research, ethical approval was sought from the Research Ethics 
Committee (REC). This process involved outlining the aims, objectives and, methods 
that the researcher intended to utilise. Approval was granted at which point the 
researcher began to seek sites which matched the criteria.  
Site one was identified as meeting the requirements of the researcher. Contact 
details were secured through the supervisory team. This assisted the researcher to 
establish contact and begin to establish a rapport with participants. This process 
took place over several weeks and there were meetings with the CCG Chair and the 
Head of Governance. After their consent was given, the researcher was granted 
access and began to attend commissioning meetings. Over the course of the data 
collection, the researcher was present in the CCG for over twelve months. 
Gaining access to a suitable second site presented some difficulties, the second 
identified site initially identified withdrew from the process due to concerns about 
their ability to commit to time to the research. With the assistance of key decision 
makers at site one, the researcher contacted other similar CCGs to negotiate access 
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to that given at site one. This resulted in the selection of a similar CCG. As at site 
one, the researcher was present over the next twelve months. As the new CCG 
matched the required characteristics for a comparison with data gathered at site 
two, the sample remained a purposive sample.  
The meetings and information needed for this research were not accessible publicly 
and as such the researcher had to access private commissioning meetings, including 
having access to sensitive documents. For this to be achieved, governance approval 
from each of the CCGs that were selected was obtained. This included signing 
confidentiality agreements with both CCGs and providing them with evidence of 
the completed University REC forms (more on this is available in the appendix). 
There was no direct need to pursue NHS ethical approval as the research did not 
encounter patients/use them as research subjects outside of comments that may 
have been sent in by the public at open meetings. Governance approval is different 
from  ?standard ? NHS ethical approval. The individuals in charge of governance 
requested a range of documentation in order to verify the ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ credentials. 
This explains why the researcher had to agree access to the CCGs separately. Heads 
of Governance at both CCGs only gave their agreement when they were confident 
that the research was to be conducted properly. 
Data collection: Site One 
The study involved three stages of data collection. The first stage was the initial 
conversations, or informal interviews, with key stakeholder members of the CCG. At 
site one, the Chair was provided with information about the research before a 
meeting, including an information sheet (see Appendix). This was followed by the 
researcher attending a Governing Body meeting and gaining agreement from the 
key decision makers, as well as the Head of Governance. The relationship with the 
Chair and the Head of Governance proved vital as they enabled continued access to 
the workings of the CCG. Both of these actors also set expectations regarding 
interviews and time that members of staff could dedicate to the research. 
These initial meetings also assisted in gaining a fuller understanding of the 
governance structures of the CCG (i.e., understanding the formal decision-making 
process). This identified key informants to be interviewed and the key 
commissioning meetings to be observed. At this point the researcher began to 
collect field notes of the observations which took place. These would help to inform 
the questions asked at the interviews at this site. Through these early meetings and 
observations, the researcher began to develop an understanding of the decision-
making process at the site. Finally, these early contacts assisted in building a 
rapport with the key informants. During this period, the topic guides were refined 
after the early insights about the structure and interaction between principal actors 
at the CCG. These were then used during the observations and a separate topic 
guide for interviews was developed.    
The second phase of data collection was an observation of the decision-making 
process. Observing the key actors, the researcher then identified key board 
meetings which included the Clinical board; the Finance and Performance meeting 
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and the Governing Body. It was through non-participant observation of these 
meetings that the researcher became familiarised with the processes at site one 
and how decision making took place. Data was collected in the form of field notes 
in situ. This early data collection process lasted approximately six months, at a rate 
of two meetings attended each month. The benefit of attending these additional 
meetings was identifying other key decision makers in the CCG, as well as, the 
services that were to be tracked.  
 
The first interviews took place after six months of observation. Having identified 
the key decision makers, the researcher formally requested interviews with them. 
The interviews took place over the following eight months during which the 
researcher continued attending CCG meetings, so to further inform their topic 
guide for the interviews. The topic guide ensured that basic questions were asked 
of all of the participants. It allowed the researcher to be flexible in exploring new 
themes identified during observation and other interviews. Amongst those 
interviewed, were lead commissioners and other members of the CCG. The 
interviews were recorded and then transcribed. Once transcribed, they were coded 
and analysed and used to inform subsequent interviews and observations.   
 
Throughout this process, the researcher continued to analyse data from the 
observations and interviews using it to inform subsequent rounds of data 
collection. The researcher used the observations to explore the decision making 
process and then clarified and explored other avenues of inquiry in the interviews. 
This iterative approach provided the flexibility to continue to explore new data 
streams while ensuring that the researcher remained mindful of the original 
questions. This analysis allowed the researcher to explore these new themes/data 
streams, and thoroughly explore other emerging data regarding the original 
questions. 
 
At the conclusion of all data collection at site one, there had been thirteen 
interviews (n=13). This included the Chair, Vice-Chair, Managing Director, Lead 
Clinical Commissioners, Deputy Managing Director, Assistant Directors of 
Commissioning, as well as other key managers and clinicians. This comprised the 
majority of the membership of the clinical board, where decisions about which 
provider to select were taken, and also shared membership with the governing 
body, the decision-making body which made all formal decisions of the CCG. These 
actors were identified as key in determining the commissioning strategy of the CCG. 
Apart from the interviews, there were 100 hours of observational data gathered 
across three key decision making meetings, including the Governing Body and 
Clinical Board.  
 
The observation at site one was conducted to the point of data saturation at which 
new interactions/processes no longer contributed to new streams of data and 
triangulation. This took place as many of the same discussions started taking place 
and no new interactions were being found by the observations. As both interview 
and observational data was being collected, it was continually being analysed, with 
key themes identified and explored with the assistance of Nvivo. The emerging 
  101 
themes were explored in subsequent meetings and raised in interviews with 
relevant individuals. This was complemented by documentary analysis of 
commissioning texts during the meetings, with key information being recorded in 
the field notes. 
During the observation, it was clear to both participants and the researcher that the 
relationship would remain non-participatory. The researcher could not contribute 
to the workings of such a highly specialised professional organisation, and did not 
wish to influence the decision-making process of the CCG. The presence of the 
researcher was limited to ensure that they did not influence the discussions at the 
meetings. The task of the researcher was complicated by the sensitive nature of the 
information being discussed, including financial information, and meant that some 
information was withheld/and documents were not disclosed to the researcher. 
This also raised specific ethical implications about the introduction of the 
researcher to outside groups who may have been making their presentations to the 
CCG. As was the case in other research, the researcher was introduced to the 
relevant groups to attempt to minimise this issue (Pope 2005).  
The third and final phase was the follow-up stage. Its purpose was to collect data to 
allow further triangulation of earlier collected data. The aim of this was to minimise 
the possibility of misinterpreting the motivations of the commissioners and 
minimise the possibility of incorrect interpretations by the researcher. This helped 
to make the data more reliable. It also allowed the researcher to refine the data 
with the regards to the third question, the public/private balance. These concluding 
observations and interviews with the key informants were generally conducted face 
to face, while a few were conducted over the telephone. Figure 5 illustrates the 
data collection stages at site one. The researcher attempted to replicate the 
process at site two, although there were some differences in the exploration of the 




One of the aims of the data collection was to identify the principal actors of the 
commissioning process in the CCG. This data was collected both from members of 
Figure 8 - Data collection stages 
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the CCG and the providers, with the ultimate aim of comparing the commissioning 
process before the Act and at the completion of data collection. 
Iterative approach  ? an analysis of data from site one 
The research utilised a method of inductive thematic analysis using constant 
comparison (Guest et al., 2011). Site one yielded rich information about how the 
CCG reaches its decisions regarding which new providers may be selected. It 
provided the researcher with information about the structure of the CCG and which 
meetings are essential in the process. By identifying and attending the key 
meetings, the researcher gained the trust of key informants. This included non-
clinical commissioners who also influenced the decision-making process, a greater 
number than expected at the onset of the study. The following are the key 
elements that emerged from the pause in data collection between sites one and 
two.  
 
The selection of new services followed a consistent pattern. By attending meetings, 
the researcher identified this pattern and gained agreement to attend further 
meetings, building a rapport with the staff of the CCG.  
 
The field notes which were taken proved to be invaluable in gaining an 
understanding of the CCG, the dynamics between key actors and following the 
commissioning process as it took place. The interviews complemented that and 
provided data which would support/correct the assumptions of the researchers and 
provide additional areas of study.  
 
The collected data from site one provide to be an excellent context in which to test 
the explanatory power of the conceptual framework. It allowed the researcher to 
update the topic guide for the interviews and more significantly it further helped to 
improve the understanding of the role of external bodies. 
 
The data from site one also provided some insights and understanding of the 
interaction of the commissioners with other bodies in the regulatory framework, as 
well as those from within the local health economy. It further underlined the 
influential role of the regulatory framework as manifested by its regulation of 
funding and financial incentives.  
 
Observation of site one gave an insight into the full commissioning process of a new 
provider, from its initial stages through to completion. This highlighted the complex 
organisation of a CCG and the multitude of dynamics that can exist when various 
CCG boards interact when reaching decisions about the type of provider they want 
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Data collection: Site Two 
Observation at site two was influenced by the experiences at site one. One 
difference was the way in which access was gained to the CCG. After initially being 
refused by several CCGs that matched the necessary criteria, access was obtained 
to a chosen CCG with assistance and support from commissioners at site one. The 
selected CCG was in keeping with the criteria of size, finance and ability to contract 
similarly sized providers. 
 
After meetings with the Chair of site two, the researcher presented a paper at the 
Governing Body  W as at site one. The Head of Governance acted as the key 
gatekeeper, and after ensuring the signing of a confidentiality agreement, provided 
additional guidance to the researcher. A fundamental difference at this point of 
data collection was that the governance structure of site two was different than at 
site one; for example, some decisions about the selection of providers could be 
made in one board at site one. At site two, a similar decision would be spread 
across several boards. As at site one, field notes were kept of the meetings and 
these were analysed and themes drawn out. At both sites, the conceptual 
framework was useful in examining the manner in which internal/external 
pressures affected the motivations of commissioners when selecting providers. 
There were also relationships which were unexpected, and these will be outlined in 
the subsequent chapters which present the findings from the study. 
 
Mental health commissioning provided data at both sites one and two. There was a 
lack of data about electives at site one, so this was not explored at site two. 
Instead, on the recommendation of practitioners at site one, the observations 
focused on MSK services, as they had a history of private and third sector 
involvement (Propper 2000).  
 
Despite the two sites being similar and in line with the selection criteria, there were 
some differences. These differences related to the financial pressures and the role 
of the regulatory framework at the two sites. How this affected the commissioning 
process will be explored in later chapters. Both CCGs had access to a multitude of 
different public, private and third sector providers for both of the selected services.  
 
Over the course of data collection at site two, the researcher had regular access to 
key commissioning meetings, including the Finance and Performance committee, 
Transformation and Redesign group, and the Governing Body and associated 
seminars. At the end of the data collection period, this totalled over 65 hours of 
observation across the different meetings. The observational data was also 
collected via field notes in situ. At site two, the same topic guide was used as it had 
proved to be valuable at site one. The committees only met once a month, with the 
Governing Body meeting once every two months. The Governing Body also had a 
seminar every other month. Similar to site one the Governing Body was the official 
decision-making body. These observations and interviews were conducted over a 
12-month period.  
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The number of complete interviews that took place at site two was eight (n=8) 
attempting to mirror the number of interviews at site one. However, due to the 
smaller number of committee members at site two, and some non-responses, 
which included two commissioners who declined to be interviewed, the overall 
number of interviews at site two was smaller. The key decision makers, such as the 
Chair, Vice-Chair, the lead commissioners, Head of Finance, Head of the 
Transformation Group and the Deputy Managing Director were interviewed at site 
two. All of the interviewees were members of the Governing Body as well as some 
of the other Boards which comprised part of the decision making structure at site 
two. This was important to draw comparisons across the two sites.  
Relationship with providers 
The commissioning processes at the two sites also shed further light on the manner 
in which contracts are monitored. From the research, it was clear that the majority 
of the budget was spent on the local providers and large contracts, both fixed term 
annual contracts and Payment by Result contracts. This helped to highlight how 
data collection needed to take place - by focusing on the work of the lead 
commissioners and the commissioning managers (key decision makers for the 
selected services).  
 
Regarding mental health, the data was rich and provided insights into the 
commissioning process as a whole. Throughout the time the researcher was 
present a new service was commissioned allowing service provision to be tracked 
from start to finish. 
 
                      
 
  
 Site One Site Two 
Interviews 12 Interviews  
(Chair, Vice-Chair, Deputy 
Managing Director, Lead 
Service Commissioners, 
GP commissioners, 
Assistant Directors of 
Commissioning) 
8 Interviews 
(Chair, Vice-Chair, Deputy 
Managing Director, GP 
Commissioners and 
managers) 
Observations 150 hours 
(Clinical Board, Governing 
Body and Finance and 
Performance Committee) 
65 hours 




Table 4 - Decision makers interviewed and meetings observed 
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Data analysis- Analytical frame  ? sites one and two 
The research utilised the same method of analysis as at site one. Nvivo was used to 
help identify themes within the data and to inform other parts of data collection, 
approaching this process by exploring the interactions of various actors. It drew on 
both the observational and interview data. These themes were compared against 
the conceptual framework that was created in the previous chapter. This analysis 
was used to create a narrative with which to understand how commissioning 
decisions were reached and whether or not commissioners preferred to use 
public/private/third sector providers. As at site one, the observational data was 
useful in understanding the internal CCG dynamics and the interview data clarified 
issues, as well as providing additional data about the commissioning process. Once 
themes were identified, they were explored in more depth at the sites through 
further observation and interviews. This process was repeated with the data from 
site two. The differences and similarities between these two sites were then 
contrasted before answering the overarching questions of this thesis. The purpose 
of using this approach was to strengthen the ability to compare results from more 
than one site and/or one source (Guba and Lincoln 1985).   
The field notes assisted in generating a more complete picture of the 
commissioning process. They were used to record the impressions and 
understanding of the researcher. The interviews were deployed to test these 
assumptions and to explore new avenues of inquiry. This contributed to the data 
that was collected being the ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ impressions, but ones which were tested 
against other research subjects.  
Assessing the quality of the research  
To assess the quality of the research and to ensure that the methodology did 
address the research questions, its trustworthiness as defined by Guba and Lincoln 
(1985) was established. This is relevant as the research adopts a similar ontological 
and epistemological position as Guba and Lincoln (1985).  
 
The first indicator is thĞ ĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƵĚǇ ? dŚŝƐ ƌĞůĂƚĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ŽĨƚŚĞ
study, or how accurate the findings are (Guba and Lincoln 1985). To establish 
credibility there are multiple techniques which are recommended (ibid 1985). The 
ĨŝƌƐƚ ŝƐ  ‘ƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ǁhere Guba and Lincoln (1985) argue that a 
researcher needs to spend sufficient time to understand the culture of the group 
being studied. The researcher spent over twelve months at each of the sites, 
building rapport and dedicating time to understanding the nature of the CCGs being 
ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞŝƐ ‘ƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶƚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŽĚŽƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ
should be open to multiple different influences from actors and other influences 
(ibid 1985). In this study, the researcher spent time observing the working of the 
CCG and observed various actors across different environments and their ability to 
influence the decision making processes. This assisted in uncovering other actors to 
interview and the exploration of new areas of enquiry. The third technique is 
triangulation of data. In this instance the researcher used the observational data 
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and the interviews to combine to provide a rich account of the commissioning 
process. These use of these techniques illustrates that the data produced by the 
study is credible.  
 
The second indicator is transferability, which concerns demonstrating that the 
findings have applicability in other contexts (Guba and Lincoln 1985). If a study has 
described the process being studied in enough detail, then there is scope to 
evaluate whether or not those same conclusions are transferable to other cases. 
dŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĞŶŽƵŐŚĚĞƚĂŝůŝƐ ‘ƚŚŝĐŬĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
The use of both observational and interview data collected over an extended period 
of time, delve into the structure and culture of the two CCGs means that this study 
does provide thick description. 
 
The third indicator is dependability, which illustrates that the findings are 
consistent and could be repeated (Ibid 1985).  To ensure dependability, the 
researcher kept notes on the observations, the interviews, supervision meetings 
and the data analysis. The reflective notes after observations also aided with this. 
These should allow for a researcher to replicate the methods used and draw their 
own conclusions about the process.   
 
The last indicator is confirmability, that there is some degree of neutrality between 
the researcher and the subjects, so far that the conclusions are shaped not by the 
biases of the researcher (Ibid 1985). The first technique to ensure confirmability is 
an audit trail. All of the files which have been collected during the course of the 
study have been kept and an outline of the process has been found in this chapter. 
The second technique is reflexivity. In this context, in all of the field notes, the 
researcher kept notes about methodological choices and which avenues of inquiry 
to pursue. Finally, triangulation also assists with this, and as outlined earlier, the 
multiple data streams aid with this.  
 
Other possible criteria can be used to judge the effectiveness of an ethnography. 
One of them which will be considered is credibility (Hammersley 2000). This entails 
checking how credible the account that is provided by the researcher is to those 
who have been the object of the study. This was achieved by the researcher going 
back to the CCGs and providing them with short policy briefings/summaries of the 
relevant findings.  
One key issue with transferability relates to the differences in the service and site 
selection. The researcher was unable to gain access to a CCG which was as similar 
to site one as initially planned. The issue with access meant that there was a 
compromise on some criteria for site selection. The financial situation was clearly 
different and this was something which is illustrated in the data. However, site two 
did have similar access to a diverse set of providers and did have similar catchment 
areas, and served similar sized populations. In addition, tracking mental health 
commissioning across both of the sites did assist in ensuring that there was an 
ability to compare commissioning of a specific services across the two sites. The 
selection of MSK services to be compared at site two allows the researcher to 
  107 
explore commissioning in an area where there is a history of private provision, and 
an area which commissioners spend relatively similar amounts of money at both 
sites. Ultimately the ability of commissioners to select the provider, in areas where 
there is a certain amount of market penetration still ensures that there is some 
transferability of data. This is further explored in chapter 7.  
Timeline 
The research took around twelve months to complete at site one. Further 
observations were carried out afterwards to provide additional triangulation of the 
data. There was a brief pause between data collection at sites one and two, which 
allowed the researcher to analyse the data, rework the topic guides and explore 
new avenues of inquiry.  
At site two there was a similar time frame, with a period of several months being 
used to build rapport with the commissioners and key decision makers within the 
CCG. The fact that the research was undertaken in two separate time blocks, rather 
than simultaneously at both sites, aided the researcher both in practicalities and in 
the time available for continuous building analysis of data.  
Ethical Implications 
Ethical approval for the research was first sought form the School of Social Policy, 
Sociology and Social Research (SSPSSR) Research Ethics Committee (REC). The 
researcher completed the necessary documentation outlining the aims of the 
research and the safeguards that were necessary to protect participants. This 
referred to issues such as data protection and anonymisation of names and dates 
during the research  W within interviews, observations and any of the documents 
that were to be used in the analysis.  
At site one, the researcher worked with the Head of Governance to arrange access 
to meetings and to provide more information about the nature of the research, 
after presenting a short paper in the CCG's key meeting and gaining approval at 
Governing Body level (which was similar to that provided via the information 
sheet). This was considered to be enough for observation access. For the 
interviews, informed consent was sought from each individual, and the 
anonymisation of their names and information was also confirmed. Each participant 
signed a consent form and was made aware of their rights to withdraw/not answer 
any questions if they chose. They were also provided with information sheets with 
the contact details of the supervisory team and University REC (see Appendix). All 
of the participants were debriefed after their interviews and given the opportunity 
to ask the researcher any questions that they may have.  
When dealing with changing circumstances at meetings at both sites, where 
external groups came into the meetings, the commissioners introduced the 
researcher and ensured that they were happy for field notes to be taken during the 
process.  
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The research collected valuable information about the commissioning process. As 
this was the case, specific sensitive information such as names of providers or 
commissioners was redacted from the write up to ensure anonymity. That included 
financial information and documents which related to patient confidentiality as 
well.  
At site two there was also an initial conversation with the CCG Chair and the 
Managing Director. They agreed to support the research, and this was then brought 
to a Governing Body meeting. Once approval had been gained, the researcher 
made contact with the Head of Governance who arranged for a confidentiality 
agreement to be signed by the researcher. They acted as the main points of contact 
and arranged interviews and papers for meetings that were observed. Clerical staff 
handled additional facilitation of interviews instead through direct contact between 
the researcher and the subjects. The interviews also followed a similar process to 
those at site one, with written consent being obtained by the researcher and a 
debrief undertaken after the interview. There was a further meeting with the Head 
of Governance to ensure that no sensitive data was left within the data set.   
In summary, this thesis explored the process of decision making and how it affected 
the use of private providers in the NHS. It involved the study of two CCGs and 
specialist services at two sites. All of the services which were examined had been 
delivered by a combination of public and private providers. The epistemological 
approach which was employed was symbolic interactionism. This approach was 
used to analyse the interaction between actors who comprised the CCG boards 
through immersing the researcher in their day-to-day workings. The empirical study 
consisted of over 150 hours of observation of relevant board meetings at the two 
sites and 21 interviews with key decision makers, including providers at both of the 
respective sites. The themes and findings will be explored in the subsequent 
chapters. 
 
The following two chapters present the findings from the ethnography of the 
decision making processes and contains data from both the observation and the 
interviews with key actors. The first of these chapters focuses on the data elicited 
from the first CCG site and explores how commissioners made their decisions and 
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Chapter 5: Understanding the commissioning process ʹ 
Evidence from CCG One  
 
Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the themes that emerge from the analysis 
of the first case study site, a CCG in a large urban setting in Southern England. The 
general aim is to gain a better understanding of the manner in which decisions are 
reached in the new Commissioning Groups. This chapter will begin by providing a 
description of the structure of the CCG and how decisions are reached within these 
structures. This discussion will be followed by an exploration of the how the CCG 
made decisions about the selection of providers, using evidence from the 
ethnography. There will also be a discussion of how these themes relate to the 
conceptual framework and how they help to answer the questions posed in this 
thesis. It will be concluded with a summary of the key findings and what is to be 
explored at site two.   
 
The analysis will focus on the following questions:  
 
1. What influences the decisions of commissioners in /during the commissioning 
process? 
2. Why do commissioners select certain providers over others? 
3. How has this affected the private/public balance in the NHS? 
As stated, the purpose is to gain an understanding of the manner in which the 
commissioners select a particular type of provider over any other type and what 
influences their decisions. The analysis will address the critical influences over 
decision makers; and if and how decision making fits within the internal/external 
pressure framework created in the previous chapters. It will explore whether 
commissioners are restricted, or enabled by, the policy framework to exercise their 
decision-making ability.  
 
The first part of this chapter will outline the general governance/decision-making 
process in the CCG, with an aim to understand decisions within the broader context 
in which the CCG operates. The precise structure helps to highlight the goals of the 
CCG and how they function in a new commissioning space. This is key to addressing 
the first research question. Without establishing the context in which 
commissioners' work, it would be difficult to fully understand their decisions and 
the process by which they are reached. 
 
The informants interviewed as part of the ethnography from site one were 
interpretive and reflective. Being part of the loose symbolic interactionist 
framework that was used, this meant that the data they provided was part of a 
narrative of how they viewed their own roles within the CCG. This was confirmed as 
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the observational data was used to explore the workings of the CCG and to 
understand the roles of the participants, through the immersion of the researcher 
in the research site. Thus the interviews allowed participants to express their own 
views and relationship with other actors, both internal and external to the CCG. The 
first part of this chapter will explore the structure of the CCG and the power 
relationships amongst the actors, before further exploring the commissioning 
process with respect to key services.  
 
Site one: the characteristics of the CCG  
The first site chosen for the research in a large urban area. The CCG in question has 
an annual budget of just under £300m and commissions services for a population of 
approximately 300,000 people. It is slightly larger than the median CCG in terms of 
population (ONS 2012, NHS CC 2015). The budget allocation for the CCG is average 
for the country. The CCG consists of over 50 GP practices and employs a locality 
structure where groups of practices have a GP chair and vice-chair with the aim to 
involve as many GPs in the CCG. These GPs do not sit on the CCG boards, but relay 
feedback of GPs to the Clinical Board  W the main clinical decision-making body - as a 
way for the CCG to communicate with the constituent practices. This is not 
standard practice across all CCGs, although it is used in CCGs with a large number of 
practices  W circa 70% (Checkland et al., 2012). 
 
Being in a large urban area means that the CCG is more likely to have access to a 
mixture of public, private and third sector providers. It has been suggested that a 
significant part of the private provision is located in large urban areas (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ 
Fund 2014).  Therefore commissioners were able to choose providers from what 
can be characterised as an active  ?marketplace,' i.e., they can select different types 
of providers for the same service. 
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Figure 9 - Decision-making structures of CCG one 
 
Understanding the structure of the CCG and the role of the commissioners aided 
the researcher in exploring the culture of the organisation and the roles of key 
actors. It further assisted in understanding the decision-making process from the 
perspective of the commissioners, with an emphasis on embedding of the 
researcher in the CCG.  
The Structure of the CCG: implications for decision-making 
The purpose of this section is to outline basic governance structure of the CCG and 
to elaborate on how commissioners select providers. The basic decision-making 
structure can be seen in Figure 6.  
 
All CCGs are required to have a Governing Body (GB) in which all decisions are 
reached (NHS England 2016). The CCG has several different layers that feed into the 
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GB (see figure 6). The research found that the GB served to authorise the decisions 
of other bodies within the CCG. The GB consists of the elected Chair of the CCG 
(who is always a GP), the Vice Chair, the Managing Director (MD), elected 
commissioning leads (local GPs elected by the CCG membership), lay members, 
Chief Officer, Managing Director, Chief Finance Officer and several other managers 
who work within the CCG and the local council. The GP Chair and Vice-Chair had 
recently been re-elected to lead the CCG on a platform of being fiscally responsible 
and continuing to expand services in certain areas. The meetings consist of two 
sections, one in which the public is allowed to attend and a second section in which 
the GB discusses issues in private. This research identified that the most important 
body regarding the selection of providers was the Clinical Board (CB).  This was 
after initial observations in which all decisions would appear to have been taken by 
this body, and with other board referring their own decisions to be ratified there.  
 
The decisions regarding which services are commissioned occurs at the CB, which is 
also where existing services are periodically reviewed. The membership consists of 
the commissioning GP leads and several key managers, such as the Managing 
Director (MD), the Accountability Officer, Assistant Director of Commissioning and 
the Compliance Officer amongst several other managers, with the CCG Chair in 
charge. There is a large overlap between the GB and CB. Also present are 
commissioners from the local council with a public health remit. The CB meets once 
a month, with meetings lasting for approximately five hours. Noted in all of the 
observations, the CB has a horseshoe seating format and welcome groups/other 
commissioners/Trust representatives whom they invite to provide services, or who 
request funds from the CCG. These groups attend CB meetings at the invitation of 
the commissioners, usually after identifying a need through a Joint Strategic Needs 
Assessment (JSNA) with the local Council. This process can be adversarial in certain 
situations where representatives/CCG Board Members were unhappy with certain 
elements of proposals. After the relevant parties have made their presentation or 
laid out their intentions and plans, the members of the Board reach a decision 
about the service in question. Once the external representatives have left the 
meeting, commissioners discuss the issues before deciding whether or not to 
approve a plan or return it for amendments. From the observed meetings, the 
majority of the decisions appeared to be made on the basis of clinical outcomes, 
not on financial ones.  This includes the weighting of the procurements that the 
CCG carries out, as a local provider told the researcher: "[Site one] often does 90% 
quality, 10% price, which is unbelievable, you ŬŶŽǁ ? ?  (3rd Sector Provider, 
Interview). This suggests that there is a perception amongst provider that the local 
commissioners did still focus on quality aspects and clinical need than solely 
financial issues. The other task the CB addressed is the review/auditing of services, 
providers and business cases of new services. Before any of the decisions that are 
made in the CB go to the GB, they have to pass through a specific sub-committee, 
Finance and Performance (FP).   
 
The FP sub-committee consists of a Chair (a GP commissioner who is also a member 
of the CB, but not the CCG Chair) a second GP commissioner (the Vice Chair of the 
CB) and several managers, such as the Managing Director, Head of Finance, 
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Assistant Director of Commissioning and a lay member. While the membership is 
considerably smaller, the meetings are only slightly shorter than that of the CB. The 
central role of the sub-committee is to see if the decisions reached by the CB are 
viable within the budgetary constraints of the CCG. The FP looks at business cases 
put before it and either approve them or send them back to the relevant body with 
a series of questions or revisions. Other GP commissioners may also be invited to 
the meeting to answer questions and/or to assist in the process. 
 
GP practices and individual members do have the ability to express views to the 
CCG leadership through one of the several ways. The first is through their organised 
localities that link into the CB. As mentioned previously, GP practices in the CCG are 
organised into localities (CCG information 2015). These localities have an elected 
Chair and Vice-Chair who feed back concerns and issues to the CB. In turn, they are 
required to ensure that constituent practices are implementing and following 
strategic objectives.  The second is through the Council of Members (CoM) where 
GPs can ask members of the CB questions about what has been agreed, or 
nominate themselves to stand for election. Finally, there is the Local Medical 
Committee (LMC) which has some interaction with the CCG leadership. The public 
can interact via the GB or the Health and Wellbeing Board (HWB). The purpose of 
the HWB is to have a body formed of local representatives that feeds into the 
decision-making of the local CCG (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ Fund 2016). However, their input at 
site one was negligible. Throughout the observations, there is no evidence of the 
HWB being given serious consideration during CB discussions, being absent from 
any observations. Further to this, during the observation of the GB, only three 
questions were allowed from the public per meeting, which had to be submitted in 
advance. There was an antagonistic atmosphere between the CCG leadership and 
members of the public during the AGM, in which the question period was extended 
to deal with the demands of the audience, and there were even outbursts from 
members of the public and local councillors (AGM Observation, July 2015).    
 
From the first observation in December 2014 to the one in April 2015, the members 
of the CB always sat in the same pattern, as illustrated by the ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ field 
notes: 
 
Chair and Vice-Chair at the head of the table, discussions centre on them, Role of 
Managing Director and Assistant Managing Director also important, second after Chair 
(CB First Observation, December 2014, field notes) 
 
The same people were present and in a similar format, with the Chair and Vice Chair at 
one end of the table - there was a more evident divide with commissioners around one 
end of the table and managers around the other (CB Fourth Observation, April 2015, 
field notes) 
 
This consistent structure helps us to understand the manner in which decisions are 
reached in the CCG. It suggests that the structure gives greater weight to the 
decision-making power of the managers and the key clinicians, all of whom sit on 
the CB.  
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The decision-making power is concentrated in the Clinical Board.  Here the key 
decisions are taken and while they can be altered by other boards, this did not 
happen often. Within the CB, all of the key decision-makers are also situated, both 
clinicians (GPs) and managerial staff (Managing Directors, Assistant Directors of 
Commissioning, Directors of Finance). As CCGs are allowed to develop their own 
structures, this situation does not necessarily represent a standard structure 
adopted by all other CCGs. As such, these key decisions are negotiated in this 
committee between the various powerful key actors, which are explored in the 
subsequent section.  
Commissioners decision-making: two types of actor  
This section will expand on the difference between the two types of actors found at 
site one. This will assist in understanding the role of the Clinical Commissioners 
(GPs) and Managers (non-clinical commissioners, henceforth managers). 
Throughout the study, key actors from both groups were identified. The GP Chair 
and the Managing Director (MD) were the two most powerful actors involved in the 
decision-making process. This manifested in two ways. First, the agenda of each CB 
meeting was set by both actors in advance. This would suggest that they are able to 
exert greater power, as they dictate the items and discussions that take place. 
Second, the final decisions reached by the CB are directed by these two actors. This 
is expanded on in this section. 
 
In order to explore the relationship between the key actors in more depth, there is 
an outline of the differing roles of the actors and the types of discussion that take 
place. As already stated there are clinical and non-clinical commissioners. The 
clinical commissioners have more power than their managerial counterparts. In 
part this is due to the nature of the discussions within the CB. They tend to be more 
clinically focused and as such, there is less that the managerial staff can contribute. 
However, there is also a general deference to the clinical staff due to the agenda 
and focus of the CB. It appears that the focus of the meetings matched those of the 
Chair, with a focus on improving clinical outcomes and as a result, the contributions 
made by clinical commissioners were considered to be more valuable.  This is 
outlined below. 
 
There were two key types of debate around decisions that were observed during 
the course of the study. These further highlighted the distinction between GP 
commissioners and managers. The first type of discussion was about clinical 
objectives/results. These discussions focused on the effectiveness of a new 
proposed service or how it would address a gap in existing provisions. In these 
discussions, it was the GP commissioners who dominated the conversation. 
Commissioners perceive themselves as being best placed to have a critical but fair 
relationship to the CCG and have discussions in a particular manner, as noted in the 
approach by one commissioner: 
 “ďƵƚ ?ǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŽĚŽŝƚŝŶĂƐŽƌƚŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĨƌŝĞŶd type, with reasonable and proper 
ŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚ ?  ?'W ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ  ?). The GP commissioners view their own roles as 
being important and their high level of knowledge of the subject matter reinforces 
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this. Within clinical discussions, these commissioners lead the debates. Managers 
can become involved, independently of being asked, when there needs to be input 
relating to a non-clinical issue, such as whether or not a proposed new service 
needs to utilise a specific facility, or statutory obligations which may exist with 
regards to a specific service. This was observed several times: 
 
There were several options presented to the CB about how they wished to proceed with 
co-commissioning and how the CCG would work with the others in the local cluster. 
Managers ruled out one of the options as soon as the debate started as being 
unworkable in practice. (CB Second Observation, February 2015, field notes) 
 
Similar practices were observed at another CB:  
 
The MD brought up how the CoM (Council of Members) would need to be consulted 
about a new care pathway,  ? conversation needs to be had with General Practice,' 
agreement came from other Board members. (CB Fifth Observation, June 2015, field 
notes) 
 
The Managing Director had to intervene to ensure that the statutory regulations 
were followed and that the CoM was consulted about a change in working pattern.   
 
The second form of debate observed within the CB related to issues connected to 
the broader policy framework. This type of discussion related to whether or not 
commissioning a new service is possible and how it would be implemented. With 
these discussions, it was managers who controlled the debate, with some input 
from the GP commissioners on issues that have a clinical and administrative 
overlap. This generally relates to how a new service or procurement would fit 
within the rules and regulations laid out by the compliance bodies within the 
system, namely NHS England. In the July 2015 CB, the Chair and several managers 
argued over practicalities with the implementation of a new service. The managers 
were concerned about how the service would be monitored. This was observed in 
the meeting and in the field notes (CB Sixth Observation, July 2015, field notes). As 
previously explained, in these discussions the ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? knowledge of the 
regulations may allow them to have more decision-making power. However as 
observed in the ethnography, the managers made efforts to ensure that clinical 
decisions were to be delivered within the regulatory framework. 
 
While discussion relating to the broader policy framework is the most prominent (in 
the form of discussion about NHS E), there are other important debates with which 
the managers are involved. There is a clear divide between the GP commissioners 
and managers and their respective remits. Moreover, this did not appear to be an 
impediment to reaching decisions on service provision. The two different groupings 
complemented one another and assisted in ensuring the CB reaches decisions that 
are both clinically effective and practically possible. In both forms of discussion, 
final decisions appeared to be reached via consensus, with little dissent except on 
rare occasions. The CCG Chair had their own views:  
 
"If you talk to managers one of the things you will probably find they say is if you have 
clinicians in the room it changes the content of conversations completely. Now, I can't 
see that, So, if you put clinicians in the room, normally clinicians can come up with a 
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solution, and if you can then get some competent managers to enact the solution you 
can usually work it out, that is your best way". 
 
There are times when we ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ [agreed], so we ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ ended up with an agreement 
with the [consultants at local trust]  ? ? ? ?so [service] is an inefficient, autocratic place, 
but with other places like [service 1], [service 2] and [service 3] [all elective services] we 
have put the clinicians [secondary care doctors] and GPs [CCG commissioners] together 
and we normally thrash something out that will work for patients and be cost-effective 
for the health service (CCG Chair, Interview) 
 
This is an example of how the two different groups, despite having different 
approaches, views or remits, can find mutually acceptable solutions within an 
agenda that had been set by the Chair. Part of the reason that decisions do appear 
to be reached is that there is embedded power within the CB, as the Chair is able to 
set the agenda, with the co-operation of the MD. This suggests that the discussions 
take place in the way they do because the chair utilises the second face of power  W 
agenda setting - to ensure that discussions take place the way that they want them 
to.  
 
This general notion of consensus decision-making is further reinforced by the lack 
of voting. Instead, principal actors (Chair and MD) seek consensus by alleviating the 
concerns or making concessions to members of the board. There was minimal 
confrontation between members throughout the study. This was repeatedly 
recorded in the field notes:  ‘Decisions appear to be reached by consensus, 
unanimous agreement, votes did not take place at the BŽĂƌĚ ? (CB Second 
Observation, February 2015, field notes). A similar observation was made in April: 
 ‘ ‘ǀŽƚŝŶŐ ? has been very informal, again it appears to be more along the lines of 
consensus, unanimous ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? (CB Fourth observation, April 2015, field notes). 
This would fit in with the perception that decisions are reached by consensus with 
minimum disagreement as both the Chair and MD seek to forge consensus.   
 
This is also apparent in the interviews, with clinical commissioners also viewing 
decisions as being reached through consensus:  
 
 “We'll nearly always come to a consensus decision. We've never really had voting. 
Voting is very rare on issues because I think we are a reasonably good team, gelling 
and challenging to one another and there are certain contracts, or certain tenders, 
which have gone back, and we have re-done and looked at it again.  ? ? ? I was working 
on a funding proposal which took almost a year to come to change or whatever and 
that was the traumatic brain injury one  ? ? ? ?but again it was refining it and working 
together and seeing what the sort of continuing cost to the CCGs would be, rather than 
set-up costs. And that's the kind of thing you need to take a look at because, you've got 
the  ? ? ? thing of the CCG, that it needs to be reasonably in the budget, or you know, you 
[sic.] got to set a budget which is realistic." (GP Commissioner, Interview 2)  
 
This extract highlights how there appears to be an acceptance of this consensus 
model, with a lack of pressure for voting in any formal sense. However it is clear 
that this consensus is developed by the key actors, as the Chair and MD tend to 
steer the discussions and influence when concessions need to be made to another 
actor or commissioner. Power is situated with these key actors. As already 
mentioned, they set the agenda and the strategic direction of the CCG. Their power 
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is further illustrated by the ability to develop a consensus position, which appears 
always to follow the interests of the Chair and MD.   
 
On infrequent occasions in which a member is persistent in their opposition, and 
remains unconvinced, their views are noted, and the CB proceeds with the majority 
decision while noting the views of that person: 
 
"Because we don't actually vote, oh and also wanting to have sight of how each 
member of  ? ? ? each elected board member has voted on each particular issue. 
Actually, the number of votes that I have been part of in the last year, I can't even think 
of one. It's been a capturing of expressions of support, or occasionally there's been  ? ? ? 
a strong opinion of somebody, and we made sure that that strong opinion against the 
consensus was recorded in minutes ? ?(GP Commissioner, 5) 
 
However, this decision does not take place before a clinical commissioner, Chair, or 
the Managing Director attempts to find some consensus position, which would still 
see the proposal be adopted. This highlights the power of the key actors within the 
CB, even within a broad consensus decision-making process. This may take place by 
providing more time for discussion, as seen in the researcher's field notes:   
 
  “ ?ƚŚĞ ? Chair makes decisions related to how much time each agenda item has. In 
rare circumstances, commissioners or managers can push for extra time if they feel that 
consensus has not been reached ? ?(March 2015 Clinical Board, field notes).  
 
These types of situations remain rare, in that strong dissent has rarely been 
observed in the Clinical Boards. These situations clearly demonstrate the ability of 
the Chair to exert power through control of the agenda. The items on the agenda fit 
their strategic objectives and ensure that the items under discussion fit the broader 
agenda.  
 
Decisions about commissioning new services tend to have a set, procedural 
structure. Once a need has been identified, relevant groups will be contacted and 
outline an initial case. These groups are either existing providers or potential new 
providers or partners. Their proposal is then debated and approved or approved 
with some revisions. There have been some cases where the proposal has been 
rejected, but in the majority of observed cases it was sent back to the provider who 
carried out amendments. The provider would work on a business case with 
managers, which would result in a budgeted business plan with a timeframe for 
implementation. This would again be debated at the CB. When approved, it is sent 
to the FP sub-committee. In the case of mental health services at the CCG, it 
followed a similar pattern as outlined above, with the need being identified, and 
there being regulations and availability of resources. The Chair highlighted the 
various different actors that the CCG has worked with in order to commission 
mental health services:   
 
 “&Žƌ [site 1] ǁĞ ?ǀĞ been stone broke for eight to ten years, so that would be completely 
atypical.  ? ? ? ?ǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ different in commissioning because you can be 
commissioning little bits and pieces of mental health, but mental health has so 
changed over the last three years, because if you were doing it five/six years ago, you 
would have done a block contract to the mental health trust, whereas now ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞ 
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saying we ĚŽŶ ?ƚ want it to go to the mental health trust; we want to employ more 
voluntary and lay people, so the whole thing just cycles on ? ?(CCG Chair, Interview)  
 
Again, there was an identified need (mental health services) and the ability to 
provide the necessary resources to make sure that the service could be funded. 
What was also observed was the acceptance and use of third sector providers for 
the provision of services. This included the contracting of a charity to work in 
providing care for the homeless, including mental health care, rather than changing 
the existing contract with the local Mental Health Trust (CB Observation, January 
2016, Field notes). Rather than simply seeking new providers, commissioners based 
some of their plans on the capacity of existing providers to take on additional 
patients or services. There was also the issue of the availability of staff with the 
expertise to ensure the service has a good business plan, as noted by the Chair:   
 
"Because actually [mental health commissioner] is particularly good and I don't have 
to worry about mental health because I know it's in safe hands  ? ? ? ?So we knew some 
of the holes anyway like we knew CAMHS [Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Services] was really weak, but there's been some quite interesting debate." 
 
This was further supported by a local third sector provider which believed 
that the presence of immersed commissioners at site one aided the process 
of bringing in other providers and working collaboratively: 
 
 “the real positive thing is the GP MH leads  ? so I actually think that what the major 
change or big changes has been actually something that was explicit in its design which 
was about putting GPs really where they need to be, in terms of influence and 
commissioning intentions, and I have seen very strong evidence of that actually 
happening, across the entire [Local Borough], [Site one Borough] and [Local Borough] 
patch, it does mean that you need, the weakness in the system is that you need, is that 
it relies on leadership skills for things to work properly, so I am lucky to have a great GP 
MH Lead in this borough, and [Mental Health GP lead]  is very good in [Site one] ? (3rd 
Sector Mental Health Provider, Interview) 
 
Working alongside commissioners who are deemed to be engaged assists in forging 
consensus, not only at the Board level but also with providers in the system. This 
further allows the key actors to help influence the decision-making process. The 
commissioning lead GPs tend to be in role as they have similar views to that of the 
Chair and other key actors. In this sense, when these commissioners are involved in 
the process, it helps remove potential issues. As these commissioners share the 
views of the Chair, they arguably reflect the power which the Chair possess, having 
allies on the board, who also work with other actors in the system. It reduced the 
need of the Chair to overtly exercise their power, as the CB generally is favourable 
to their plans. Again, this highlights the overwhelming presence of the second face 
of power: control of the agenda. This is carried out by the general agenda of the 
Chair and the MD. 
 
Once the CB has reached a decision on a service, it is sent to the FP sub-committee. 
The primary focus here is on the business case - not on clinical considerations but 
on the value for money case that has been put forward by the CB, as well as general 
quality control of the contracting element. Discussions tend to be focused on 
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practicalities, i.e. working out the care pathway that a third sector provider may fit 
into, utilising existing arrangements (CB Observation, January 2016, field notes). 
The GP commissioners can help with providing answers about the clinical cases for 
services (i.e. checking the clinical evidence/data/research) but they tend to take a 
backseat during the discussion, as managers work out and decide on how to best 
fund and approve a new service. There is scope for oversight here, with the FP 
working as a check on the power of the Clinical Board.  A lay member (elected to 
the CCG from a pool of interested persons) participates in the discussions of the FB 
while there is no such representative in the CB. The purpose of the lay members is 
to represent the local population; however, they have limited power. Debates at 
the FP tend to be shorter and more concise, but one where there is some 
disagreement. Business cases can be sent back to the proposing body (i.e. the CB or 
the relevant commissioner) for further work if the members are not satisfied. For 
example, the continence (elective) service business case was sent back to the 
responsible party for further refinement (FP observation 2, field notes). FP 
functions as a balance, to ensure that the funding of proposed services by the 
clinical case is possible. The budgetary effects are dealt with at the FP, but they are 
also considered in the CB. Once approved, business cases are sent to the GB.   
 
There was a discussion about some of the decisions that have been reached. 
However the GB seemed unable to override decisions or send them back to one of 
the other bodies - at least not during any observation. The following exchange 
between the Chair, Chief Officer, and Lay member is an example of this: 
 
Lay Member: Paper [about ambulance services] doesn't give me great assurance it will 
solve the problem, my perception was that the issue was around recruitment, how 
does the paper resolve it? Q2, what about ambulances sitting in front of A&E? 
Chief Officer: Very detailed questions. I may not be able to answer them but will circulate 
the larger paper that we have. But there has been the successful recruitment of 400 
Australians to help ease the problem. 
Chair: Also, money was not utilised well. We are losing staff to the periphery, due to their 
ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ƐĂůĂƌŝĞƐ ? ůŽǁĞƌ ǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ ? tĞ ĂƐ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ ĚŽŶĞ Ă ŐŽŽĚ ũŽď
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŝƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚ ƐƚĂĨĨ ? KůĚ ĂŵďƵůĂŶĐĞ ƐƚŽĐŬ ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ ŚĞůƉ
eitheƌ ?ĚŽĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƐƐƵƌĞǇŽƵ ? ? 
Lay Member: Same question, I am not assured. (CCG GB First Observation, May 2015, field 
notes) 
The GB does not seem to change or influence the decisions that are made in other 
parts of the CCG in a significant manner, although it is the only meeting open to the 
public (attendance is minimal). Once this final approval has taken place, the cases 
go to their relevant managers and an implementation plan is put into operation. It 
is supervised by the CB and put into practice. 
 
Within the CCG, the CB is the body in which the key decisions are reached about 
the selection of new providers. This decision-making approach is one of seeking a 
consensus, due to the role of the Chair and MD. They are able to exert power 
through controlling the agenda of the CB ensuring that decisions are reached in the 
way in which they want them to be. This is an example of the second face of power 
being used within site one. There is limited evidence that the third face of power is 
also being used, as many clinical commissioners and managers are members of the 
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board as they share similar views to that of the Chair. As such, while there is a 
general consensus model of decision-making, there are embedded power relations 
within, where the Chair is able to exert power on other actors. The subsequent 
section will explore the roles of actors and how they interact in more depth.  
Decision making by commissioners 
The role and influence of Clinicians  
 
This section outlines the roles of the clinical commissioners and managers in more 
depth, and how they may influence the decision-making process. The clinical 
commissioners focus on clinical outcomes of services. They appear to be the most 
influential actors in the context of decision-making. 
 
The most critical actors regarding setting the agenda of the CCG are the Chair and 
Vice-Chair. The Chair has long experience of working in commissioning, having been 
in post since 2012, also serving as Chair when the site was a pathfinder CCG. The 
role of the Chair is to set the agenda at the Clinical Board (CB) and the Governing 
Body (GB) and to guide the manner in which discussion takes place.  
 
The Chair, through agenda setting, can dictate the flow of discussion in the CB and 
the GB. This means that the manner in which commissioning takes place tends to 
have more of a clinical focus, rather than on regulatory or financial issues. While 
the final decisions about the provision of new services is carried out via consensus, 
the clinical staff tend to have more influence on the outcomes than managerial 
staff. The Chair has utilised their power to set the agenda which illustrates the 
second face of power. While the CCG seems to work on the basis of (broad) 
consensus, this only happens due to the power of the Chair and the clinical staff.  
 
The Chair and Vice-Chair set the strategic direction of the CCG, having been elected 
on a specific platform. Part of their role is to administer part of the CCG budget: 
 “ ?Chair], and I cannot have a cheque to write out for whatever we liked, I think we 
can only absolutely and completely control, probably 25% of that [total CCG 
Budget], you know." (Vice-Chair, Interview). This may not appear to be a large 
amount, but with the majority of CCG funds allocated to the local Trusts, this 
represents a considerable amount. It further represents the power given to the 
medical profession (Harrison et al., 1992), as the Chair and Vice-Chair have control 
of a large part of the budget and are trusted with it.  
 
The Chair and Vice-Chair also assist in creating compromises between different 
actors who sit on the Boards, to ensure that the board reaches decisions with 
regards to services. This is made more effective due to their own commissioning 
experience, with both having been involved with PCTs. Their experience, coupled 
with their election, allows the Chair and Vice-Chair to set the agenda and control 
the discussion of certain topics at the CCG.  
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The above impressions have been borne out by the data, in which the 
commissioners appear to defer to Chair:  
 
 “ ?dŚĞ Chair was] there previously with the PCT anyway, and I think that  ? ? ? you have to 
give credit to them and the previous interim chief exec. of the PCT where they made 
changes looking at commissioning and getting GPs on board, whereas you may look 
back and go back about seven/eight years where [Site 1] was the poor counterpart of 
the eight in [the area] and now I think ŝƚ ?Ɛ on a par.  “ ?ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ? interview 1) 
 
dŚĞŚĂŝƌ ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶŶŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛobservations, such 
as 
  ‘ ?dŚĞ ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŝƐĞŶĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŚĂŝƌ ?ĂĨƚĞƌĂŐƌĞĞŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ
Board that most had no significant reservations' (Clinical Board March 2015, field 
notes).  
This demonstrates that debate is controlled by the Chair, so they control what 
aspects of a discussion receive more or less time and what input may be permitted 
from other staff members. The ŚĂŝƌ ?Ɛ method of managing the meeting was seen 
at further CBs by the researcher, for example,  ‘Clinical debate starting with the 
commissioner in question and Chair and being opened up to other members of the 
Board ? ? (Clinical Board April 2015, field notes). While the system does not rely on 
these individuals, having such a powerful individual means that decisions are 
reached.  
 
Lead commissioners play a significant role as they decide on where additional 
services are purchased or lead the procurement process. They are elected from the 
general pool of GPs who form the CCG. The lead commissioners at site one all have 
similar views to the Chair and as they influence the selection of providers, so it can 
ďĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŚĂŝƌ ĞǆĞƌƚ ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?  dŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ  ‘ďĞƐƚ
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĨŽƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐŝŶŝƚŝĂůƉůĂŶƐĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌŵĂǇďĞ
best suited for any particular service. This is then refined at the CB. While there 
were no observed incidents in which the CB refused the suggestion of a lead 
commissioner, there were cases in which they made amendments to initial business 
cases and plans. While these commissioners may have a degree of discretion to 
choose providers and parts of the service, their decisions still need approval from 
the CB and GB. In addition, they only have this freedom in specific fields and are not 
exempt from oversight, which is why, while having a significant role in the selection 
of services and contribution to discussions, this latitude ultimately remains limited.  
 
In the case of the CAMHS service, it was the mental health lead commissioner who 
guided the package from start to finish  W being the member of the CCG responsible 
for the delivery of the service. This included convincing other members of both the 
FP, CB and GB that proceeding with the service was the right thing to do. It also 
included working with managers to make sure that the package abided by the rules 
as set out by NHSE and the CCG constitution and that at various points it was 
presented in the appropriate manner (i.e. business case, business plan and the 
implementation plan). 
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Role of Managers  ? Dominance of the Managing Director 
The managers are the staff who are not clinical commissioners, but rather 
managers or non-clinical commissioners. This includes members such as the Chief 
Officer, the Managing Director (MD), Deputy Managing Director (DMD) and 
Assistant Directors of Commissioning (ADCs). The role of these managers is to 
ensure that the CCG is fulfilling its obligations and that it is following rules as set out 
by bodies such as NHSE.  
 
The role of the MD is to assist in providing strategic direction to the CCG and to aid 
in the implementation of services. While the Chair controls the majority of the 
discussion and debate, the MD and DMD are the actors who bridge the gap 
between the GP commissioners and the managers. The MDs are the actors who can 
bring the relevant people into the discussion if a particular person is unsure about 
whether or not they should participate. The MDs also ensure that the appropriate 
people attend the meetings and that discussion remains relevant to the topic. They 
also help to set the agenda prior to the meeting with the Chair.  
 
The MDs at times also appear to provide a counter to the Chair. The MDs seem to 
be the committee members who disagree most openly with the Chair, as has been 
observed, e.g.  ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŚĂŝƌĂŶĚDĞĂƌůǇŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ
meeting over implications of a service for the care pathway ? ?  ?ůŝŶŝĐĂů ŽĂƌĚ Ɖƌŝů
2015  W Field notes). This highlights how important the role of the MDs is, as they 
challenge the Chair. For example, 
  ? ?ƚŚĞ ? DĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶagers in 
ƐŽŵĞĂŐĞŶĚĂŝƚĞŵƐďǇĚŝĐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?(Clinical Board March 
2015  W Field notes). 
Therefore, the role of the MD is vital in understanding how decisions are reached, 
as they function as another key actor, who focuses on different concerns to the 
Chair. 
 
In the CB, debate flows through these two actors, with other GP commissioners and 
managers taking the lead from them. Other commissioners or managers may have 
essential roles within agenda issues or a particular item. However, both the Chair 
and MD remain key in every debate. This is made apparent by the fact that both the 
Chair and MD also shape the agenda, not only by formally deciding it, but also by 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵǀĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŝƚĞŵƐĐĂŶďĞ  ‘ƚĂŬĞŶŽƵt 
of the meeting' to a more informal space. tŚŝůĞƌĂƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ? ‘After 
a disagreement about how a specific service may be implemented by the CCG, the 
MD and Chair agreed that the MD could discuss the issue with relevant parties 
ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĂǀŽŝĚ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ďĂĐŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ? (Clinical 
Board April 2015  W Field Notes). This would further suggest that these actors have 
more power than other members of the CB. It further reflects the second face of 
power, with the MD not only controlling what is on the agenda, but what can be 
taken out of the formal decision-making process.  
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The other important role of the managerial staff is to negotiate and navigate the 
decisions of the clinical commissioners through relevant meetings to completion, in 
the form of implementation plans. They can exert some influence in the process of 
reaching decisions, with the ability to look at contracts from a different perspective: 
 
 “we've got lots of small contracts as well, historically, that's where it is and you've always got 
the acutes [local NHS Trust], the community and Mental Health Service and substance misuse 
and they've had their historical budgets, but if you are shifting activity there are lots of other 
smaller contracts that have money put in ƚŚĞŵ ? ?(Deputy Managing Director, Interview).  
 
This helps to highlight how managers approach the commissioning budget in a 
more creative way, looking to shift activity in line with the broader strategic agenda 
of the CCG. The agenda is set by the key actors, such as the Chair and MD, with the 
managers constantly working to those ends. This suggests that even if key actors 
are not exerting overt power, many of the other staff in the CCG are still working to 
the same aims.  
 Selection of service provider: key influences 
To contextualise the decision-making process, the majority of the budget that the 
CCG spends annually is committed to large contracts with several local Trusts, 
which roll over each year. This includes both NHS Trusts and Community Trusts, 
with the CCG committing over two thirds of their annual budget in this fashion. 
Some of these contracts have site one as the lead contractor, and others are 
administered in partnership with other local CCGs. This means that the majority of 
new services are commissioned on the periphery of these much larger Trust 
contracts. In terms of the specialist services that were tracked, mental health 
ĂŵŽƵŶƚĞĚƚŽĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞ' ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂůďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ
an investment into CAMHS of £3m. This increase represents a total outlay of 
ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ? ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞ' ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂůďƵĚŐĞƚ ? 
 
The commissioning of new services was only possible because the CCG was 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĂŶŶƵĂů ƐƵƌƉůƵƐ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐŚĞůƉĞĚďǇ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŽĨ ƚŚĞŚĂŝƌ ?Ɛ 
mandate was to ensure fiscal responsibility. In addition, the CCG was part of a large 
local CCG Collaborative, in which certain financial risks were shared. Through this 
collaboration, the commissioners could draw on reserves and procurement 
specialists for support if needed.   
 
Following the conceptual framework, the next section will look at how internal and 
external influences affect the decisions of key actors by using examples that were 
observed and which emerged from the interviews. The purpose is to understand 
how the actors and their own roles are affected by the internal and external 
influences which exist.  
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Internal pressures 
Regarding the internal pressures, the impression gained particularly from the 
observational data was that the most important issue that dictated new service 
commissioning was the clinical needs of the local population. The CCGs stable 
financial situation allowed the commissioners to focus on the clinical issues. The 
decision on which new provider to utilise would be made by a combination of what 
resources are available and what target could be met with that resource. New 
services are considered more suitable if they also fit within the CCG's broader 
agenda of moving services into the community: "on the strategic level it's about 
taking people from acute services, so my job is about stopping us spending so much 
on acute services and moving them into planned care and looking after people in 
the community ?  ?ƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ? ?dŚƵƐ ? ƚŚĞ' ?Ɛ
financial surplus allows the commissioners to explore which providers they think 
are best suited to their situation, rather than allowing the financial situation to limit 
their options.  
 
Using data such as hospital admissions and provider information data, 
commissioners and managers would identify clinical concerns and those areas 
where the CCG was not performing to targets. This was done through carrying out a 
Joint Strategic Needs Assessment (JSNA). These would then be discussed at 
meetings of the CB, at which possible options to deal with the identified issues 
would be considered. After identifying the potential resources to address the need, 
commissioners would discuss whether or not they could proceed with 
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? Žƌ ŝĨ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵent to meet the need. 
Transformation is the terminology used by commissioners to signify that they 
ŝŶƚĞŶĚƚŽƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĨƌŽŵĂŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ? ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞ
existing contract. Procurement is when commissioners write a tender document 
and invite potential providers to bid for the contract, in line with general 
procurement law. The ability to appoint new providers is only possible because the 
CCG was in a relatively stable financial state, which allows it to commit resources to 
new services. Interview data supported this conclusion:  
 
 “when you are commissioning a new service, you've got to look at the options, does the 
service need to go through procurement process, to follow procurement law, or can we do 
service redesign and whichever it is, it's the same commissioning process [once 
procurement has delivered the winning provider], so you've got to know what service you 
want to commission, you have to develop the service specification, stakeholder 
engagement, stakeholder analysis, look at what the service costs now, where do we want 
to get to, and then we have to do a full business case to see its value for money, and 
viable and following on from that business case we have to decide can we do a service 
redesign or do we have to go through a full procurement process ? ?(Deputy Managing 
Director, Interview) 
 
This pattern was fairly consistent and was typified by the process of a Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) contract that followed this path. The 
following outlines the way in which the CAMHS package was commissioned.  
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The initial discussions about the new service delivery were held at a meeting of the 
CB in which the CCG Chair said there was inadequate provision of CAMHS. This 
assertion was then further supported by the CAMHS lead GP commissioner, who 
produced a variety of papers outlining the issues with existing provision (CB 
Observation 5, May 2015, Field Notes). The clinical need was clearly an internal 
consideration, as was the financial management of the CCG. This new service was 
also something that the Chair had identified as a key need, which suggests that it 
was one of their objectives. This was first observed in the Clinical Board in April 
2015, with need being identified as the key driver for service expansion because 
"arguments were made that the new Mental Health Provision being commissioned 
would help generate savings, and relieve pressure on the local Trust which has a 
ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ? ?(Clinical Board, Observation, April 2015, Field Notes). This also highlights 
how some considerations can align, as this decision was also driven by financial 
considerations. When interviewed, the GP Mental Health lead confirmed that there 
was an availability of resources and that additional services could be purchased 
from existing contracts, rather than seeking a full procurement:   
 
 “ŝƚũƵƐƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚǇŽƵǁĂŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŝĨŝƚ ?ƐũƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ǁŚǇŶŽƚũƵƐƚŐĞƚŝƚ ?/Ĩ
it's more of what's already there and you're happy with the service, why do you need to 
procure? In this particular ... well because the money involved at each different level, 
for particularly the CAMHS thing, there were lots of them, but they were quite small 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŐĞƚĂŶǇƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?ŶŽ ? ?'W
Mental Health Lead Commissioner, Interview) 
 
Other commissioners further supported this. The contract was commissioned by 
utilising local arrangements with the existing Mental Health Trust: 
 
 “ƐŽ ŝĨ ǇŽƵ ůŽŽŬ Ăƚ D,^ ? ƐŽ  ?ůŽĐĂů DĞŶƚĂů ,ĞĂůƚŚ dƌƵƐƚ Ă ? ĚŽ ŵŽƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ CAMHS 
service already, if you want to put another £100k into CAMHS, the most sensible place 
ŝƐƚŽƉƵƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĂƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ŽƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ? ? ?ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ? 
 
When commissioning a new service, commissioners tend to utilise existing 
providers if they have the capacity to expand existing provision. This situation 
appeared to be the default choice as it avoided the procurement process, which 
was considered to be an additional transaction cost that commissioners wanted to 
avoid. This also ensured that a public provider was used, as a new private provider 
could only become involved through the procurement process. In addition to the 
financial aspect, the CCG would have to wait a further six to nine month wait for 
the procurement process to conclude before they could have a provider working. In 
this sense, the aims of the CCG leadership were best suited to using a local existing 
provider. Despite this, in the FP meeting, there were some initial disagreements 
about the funding of services. The funding was agreed after a vote and sent to the 
Governing Body for final approval, but only after a tense debate between board 
members about how the case should have been brought forward to the meeting, 
i.e. the timing of presenting the package to allow for greater scrutiny. As the 
following quote from the finance lay member highlights: 
 
 “/ ?ŵ not questioning the services on outcomes, but surely ŝƚ ?Ɛ better to get a lower 
clinical outcome at a good price, then a great outcome at an extortionate price  ? 
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we ?ƌĞ not able to make a value for money judgement on the cases we have seen  ? 
ǁĞ ?ƌĞ here to challenge and agree what comes here, otherwise, ǁŚĂƚ ?Ɛ the point ? ? 
(Lay member, F&P Observation, May 2015, Field notes) 
 
The lay member agreed to the plan only after the vote at the FP meeting. Other 
Board members could not alleviate their concerns. The same member commented 
about how the decision had been reached by the CB and had only come to the FP 
meeting as a sort of rubber-stamping/box-checking exercise. Another member 
commented that "significant details [relating to business cases] are missing  ? ? ? we 
have one [business case] and accepted it, as has the CB  ? ? ? we need to move on to 
finances ? (FP Member, FP First Observation, May 2015- Field Notes). There seemed 
to be agreement about making sure that all of the cases were brought forward at 
the next meeting. This shows there can be friction between the different Board 
members which has been a theme in some of the financial aspects of 
commissioning. The Chair appears to be challenged by those who do not share the 
same agenda. These concerns of the lay members tend to be conceded to in some 
way, but the Chair or the MD have also needed to use their power to move past 
some issues, which also occurs with other members of staff. In this sense, there are 
some examples of the use of the first face of power, where the Chair or MD explain 
that the discussions which create these concerns are of a clinical nature or have 
been approved by key managers and thus must be allowed to pass.  
 
When it comes to pursuing procurement, one of the critical new processes of the 
new reforms, commissioners seem to prefer avoid using it if they have the option of 
purchasing services from an existing contract to meet their needs. There are several 
reasons for this. At site one, commissioners have had negative experiences of using 
procurement:  
 
 “I mean you take community dermatology, I don't know if you've heard about dermatology 
at [Local Foundation Trust]? So you've got [Local Foundation Trust] right, run a 
dermatology department for years, very good dermatology department, and then along 
came the CCG, a while ago, and say well look, this is all very interesting, but in the new 
world, what we would like you to do is something different, upskill GPs, get them into your 
clinics, dermatology isn't rocket science, you know psoriasis, eczema, acne whatever, all 
the cancer stuff can still stay in the hospital, but it's ripe for the plucking, low-risk speciality 
to hive off the state money, so what do you want to do? Do you want to spend half a mill 
on a dermatology department or half a million on wheelchairs, this was at a time that [Site 
1] didn't quite have the money that we have at the moment, so we decommissioned it, and 
put in ... put in a procurement and [Local Foundation Trust] applied for it... and they got it 
back ? (Vice-Chair, Interview) 
 
The commissioners at site one wanted to move local care away from the local Trust, 
but the procurement process and rules meant that the Trust which was 
decommissioned, was awarded the contract again, thus defeating the aim of the 
exercise. This represented a decommissioning failure. This reflects a broader trend 
where more care is now being delivered out of hospital settings (Robertson et al., 
2014). The commissioners have no power to affect the outcome of a procurement 
process but they do have the ability to choose whether or not they work with 
existing providers to meet clinical needs, rather than turning to the market via 
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procurement. This was further supported by the GP Mental Health lead who also 
felt that the process of procurement would be too costly and labour intensive to 
deliver the outcomes that they would need: 
 
 “there was a lot of discussion about would we go out to procurement to allow anybody to 
provide that, or because it was a pilot and small and because we want it very much to 
blend with our primary care MH service it makes sense for it to be hosted by the Trust, as 
you want to get on and do it, but we did have interesting discussions about you know, if we 
did go out to procurement, it is such a tiny amount of money [laughter] you know, the cost 
of actually doing the procurement and people's time, was it a good use of public resources 
as ǁĞůů ? ? (GP Mental Health lead, Interview) 
 
There appear to be considerable disincentives to seek to use procurement; not 
because commissioners appear to be opposed to the use of private providers, 
rather the time taken to complete the process and have a provider start delivering 
care was considered to be too long. They were afraid of the transaction costs 
associated with the process. in addition to the lengthy process, procurement also 
requires a new provider to adapt and  ‘ďĞĚ ? in: 
 
 “procurement is lengthy, and it takes another 18 months once you have a service in to get 
service implementation up and running to what your vision and your dream is, so it's not 
easy, as you lose your staff, you've got GPs, so if you can do it by other ways, if by law 
that's right, then potentially that's a better way to do it ? (Deputy Managing Director, 
Interview)  
 
The aims of the commissioners at site one are to have providers working as quickly 
as possible. The financial management of the CCG has meant that clinical 
considerations, which have emerged from the Chair are the primary concern. 
Commissioners seek to implement new services as quickly as possible and in the 
majority of cases, this involves working alongside existing providers and purchasing 
additional services, rather than using procurement. It brings shades of what Le 
Grand stated,  “ƚŚĞ constraints are too great and the incentives too ǁĞĂŬ ? (Le Grand 
et al., 1998), the commissioners have little incentive to turn to new providers. The 
aims of the key actors are on the development of the CCG to meet local medical 
needs. As such, the mechanism which they appear to favour is one which enables 
commissioners and managers to develop services as quickly as possible (i.e. 
 “transformation ?). This does mean that they are limited to exploring how they can 
work with local providers, if they want to avoid procurement.   
 
There is some conflict between the CCG leadership (i.e. CB) and the general GP 
membership (the CoM and the LMC). According to some of the commissioners, 
there is a minority of GPs who are unhappy about the NHS reforms and are vocal in 
their opposition and wish to be continuously consulted about changes to their 
workload and role:  
 
[A]t the Council of Members there are a number of GPs who are not 
representative, but by the volume of their voice and the length of  ? ? ? meeting time 
that they occupied,  ? ? ? are very disproportionate to the actual representation, but 
not many members, in fact, I don't think you'll ever see a general member who is 
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not on the CCG board who will speak out at the Council of Members to basically 
say "shut up! ? (GP Commissioner 2, Interview) 
 
It is unclear how widespread the issue is, but it is a good illustration of the different 
dynamics within the CCG itself, as there are differing internal opinions about how it 
is meant to function. It also highlights the type of GPs who are decision-makers.  
  
This seems to create a degree of an  ‘ƵƐ versus them' mentality in some instances 
when the CoM and LMC are brought up, with a conflict between the leadership of 
the CCG and the local groups being a recurring theme. While this may not effect 
commissioning directly, it could be said that there is a particular type of GP that 
chooses to become actively involved in the new commissioning arrangements. This 
was possibly a significant internal dynamic and should be explored further in any 
subsequent research.   
 
External pressures: Interaction with other bodies 
The main bodies the CCG interact with (outside of Trusts) are the other local CCGs 
that form part of the local co-commissioning cluster and NHS England. This 
interaction aims to ensure that the services falling under co-commissioning are 
appropriately commissioned and comply with NHS England rules. This is to help 
share the risk and work alongside the Trusts, which tend to be much larger 
organisations than the CCGs. NHS England also forms part of the external network 
created by the 2012 reforms. Out of all of the bodies which form the external 
network, they are the only one which is explicitly mentioned by commissioners and 
managers in the meetings. The other bodies which form part of the system seem to 
be seen as forming part of the background, but not really being mentioned 
explicitly. 
 
NHS England (NHSE) seems to be very unpopular with both commissioners and 
managers, who are unclear about its role:  “Again it looks like NHS England ĚŽŶ ?ƚ 
know what ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌe doing ? (Board member, CB Third Observation, March 2015, Field 
notes). This theme remained constant throughout the observations.  
 
When asked about the role of NHSE while being interviewed one commissioner 
responded, "I don't know. I think it's yet to be worked out, isn't it? Because I think 
it's like with a big re-organisation, NHSE is sorting itself out as well" (GP 
Commissioner 1, Interview).  
This helps to highlight how there is some confusion among commissioners with 
regards to the role of NHSE within the broader framework.  This is shared in the 
meetings as when the Chair noted that  “dĂƌŐĞƚƐ that are set by NHS England are 
concerned with the broader framework and not clinical goals ? (Commissioner, 
Clinical Board Observation 2, February 2015, Field notes).  
 
There seems to be an implicit agreement that the targets set by external bodies are 
not always in the best clinical interests, as they tend to be focused on national 
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rather than local targets. During the study there was little direct conflict between 
the CCG and the local NHSE team, but part of this is due to the surplus which was 
generated by the CCG. So even with an apparent general dislike or mistrust of 
NHSE, there was little issue with them. This could explain why the relationship 
between NHSE and commissioners at site two was so different to site one. The 
fiscal context is key to this relationship. 
 
External pressures: The Health and Social Care Act (2012): A 
changing balance from public to private? 
In the interviews with key informants, more direct questions were asked about 
what commissioners thought about privatisation occurring in the NHS since the 
introduction of the Health and Social Care Act (2012) - a trend that has been alleged 
by many (BBC News 2015, Peedell 2011). The broad consensus is that it has not 
taken place to a large degree. Some stated outright privatisation was not taking 
place, such as GP Commissioner 1 who responded,  “Who is going to privatise the 
major mental health, long-term, you know conditions and look after them? Right 
[nodding], so there you͛ve got it, isn͛t ŝƚ ? ? 
 
There is a belief that private providers have little appetite to deal with complex 
services and a perception that the majority of commissioner spend should be given 
to NHS bodies:  
 
 “Well the experience will be is that[sic] if we're all committed, and I think a lot of 
reasonable people are committed to providing good care, and better care, and 
improving the care and whatever mechanism you can do that with, that's fine, and 
I said part of the problem that we have is that you see that who is going to then 
privatise chronic renal failure services?  ? I think that we need to be quite sure that 
the vast majority of the expenditure on the NHS is going to the NHS and I think 
what we've got to do is look at working collaboratively on how we can take out the 
massive changes that take place every time that cause a lot of disruption. And then 
you try and settle in, and then you get other changes coming in, so that's part of 
the problem and partly I think that the concern that I have is that where you are 
so-called competition and trusts trying to be totally autonomous, is the 
professional flow of information and the professional dialogue on contact but we 
need professionals themselves.  (Commissioner, Interview 1) 
This was borne from the manner in which the majority of commissioning took place 
on the periphery of the large Trust contracts.  This was observed in a CB meeting, 
where there was a discussion about the provision of pilot care programmes for 
specialist patients, with managers stating that there was no appetite in the market 
for such a low-value contract (CB Observation, January 2016, Field notes).  In the 
observations, the value of new contracts was not large and as such there was a 
general perception that private providers were not interested in them. The largest 
contract which was given out by commissioners was the £3m CAMHS contract. 
Commissioners shared this view: "Since 2012 there has been a slight increase in the 
private provider aspect, but from what I have seen with my 
  130 
commissioning/procurement experience, it's in a well-controlled and balanced way, 
it's not just allowing them to cherry pick the good things and leave all the bad 
things ? ? ?'WĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ? ? 
The commissioners did not have any ideological opposition to the use of private 
providers, but rather their priority was that care remained free at the point of use: 
 “So, why is the health service in England so important? It's because it is free at the 
point of use, we all get confused, so to be free at the point of access is really 
important" (Commissioner Interview 6). 
 
Commissioners did not have a preference as to whether a service was provided by 
the public, third or private sector. Their primary concern was that any new provider 
should be able to provide adequate care. Competition was generally seen as a 
positive, giving commissioners more choice about which provider to choose in 
specific contexts (this is discussed in more detail in the subsequent section). This 
was evident in other interviews. For example, the Chair commented:  
 
 “I ĚŽŶ ?ƚ care, as long as they can do a good service for the population at a reasonable price 
ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ fine by me, because actually when it comes to the NHS, and people, ŝƚ ?Ɛ usually - 
assuming this is patient-facing services - it's normally how the people react with the 
patients they're seeing, and what goes on in the admin and the HR and the parent 
company, doesn't matter to me  ? ? ? I don't think trying to hold a private company to 
account is any more different ? ? 
 
There was a view that the reputation of providers would mean that they would 
adhere to specific standards and that they would not endanger their positive image 
by behaving in an  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ? manner.  
 
The scope for privatisation seems to be quite limited, although this was not always 
the case:  
 
 “This was 3 years ago when [Large national charity] was being ignored, and people were 
lining their own pockets like there was no tomorrow. Another one, the front page of the 
Guardian about two years ago, Harmony, David Lloyd made £49m out of Harmony by 
selling it to Care UK ? ? (Manager Interview 4). 
 
This extract suggests that there were more opportunities for private providers in 
the system. However, the private sector seems to remain limited to some specialist 
services, as the contracts which were commissioned at site one did not appear to 
offer a substantial profit for providers. They seem to be restricted to what types of 
work they are willing to take on, focusing on shorter-term more profitable work. 
This may not remain the case indefinitely and may change in the future. However, 
despite these limitations, commissioners seem to be willing to engage with private 
providers, and as such, there appears to be scope for growth in the future.  
 
Apart from the NHSE, there was also a generally ambivalent attitude towards the 
local Trusts. As already mentioned, the majority of the ' ?Ɛ resource is spent on 
the large local NHS Trusts. Commissioners are limited in what approaches they can 
take to reducing or improving the contract value, the Trusts are much larger 
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(regarding finance), and this is reflected by the CCG commissioning a Trust as a 
collaborative rather than an individual organisation. The balance of power in the 
NHS remains on the provider side, due to their size. As stated previously, the CCG 
had to decommission services that had gone out to procurement and were won by 
the Trust, as they did not match the objectives of the commissioners who wanted 
more services to be provided in community providers. The research highlighted 
how commissioners feel restricted by the Trusts: 
 
"we can't re-procure another hospital to provide the same services as [large local NHS 
Trust], it's something we can't do, but we can tinker with say MSK, diabetes, 
ophthalmology ... what else can we ĚŽ ? ? (Vice-Chair, Interview). 
 
Commissioners believed that they should not destabilise the local Trusts and that 
they would have to keep working with them, as there is a mutual dependency, as 
they were also reliant on them; hence limiting potential achievements. However 
currently, the stable financial situation means that the commissioners are not 
actively looking to reduce the amount of activity that goes to the local Trusts. Thus 
they can afford to maintain their contractual relationships and seek to generate 
savings in other areas of care.  
 
Why do commissioners select certain providers over others? 
The second research question is why commissioners may choose one type of 
provider over another. Commissioners have two key tools at their disposal. They 
can either turn to the market and pursue a full procurement, or they can seek to 
purchase additional services from existing providers to fit new needs (i.e. 
transformation). The choice commissioners make, either to utilise procurement or 
purchase additional services is their most important choice when it comes to 
selecting a provider for a service. They can either choose to utilise existing 
contracts or go through the procurement process, which could mean using a new 
provider or still having an existing provider win the contract.  
 
Commissioners and managers differed slightly in why they may choose one path 
over another. At the majority of the CBs that were observed, purchasing additional 
services was the preferred option of the Board. As stated previously, the primary 
reason is that procurement is seen as costly, both in terms of financial and human 
resources. 
 
The majority of the commissioners also did not express any real preference of 
provider even when they were given a choice:  
 
 “We're quite open, we're not really worried what sort of provider it is, I mean the private 
providers are quite good, with all the glossy brochures and death by PowerPoint, talking 
the talk, and depending on what their track record is, [um] they clearly aren't delivering 
what they say they're delivering, the NHS providers ... aren't very good at doing business 
plans and this that and the other, but do have a certain level of expertise, clinically, and 
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this is completely unjustified, and you could probably argue in your own mind that, they 
perhaps weren't ... driven so much by money ? (GP Commissioner 5, Interview) 
 
However, as the quote above illustrates, there is a perception that the public 
providers are still more focused on the clinical outcomes and that the aims of the 
private providers are not always as clear. While there was some appetite for the 
use of third sector providers there was strong support for their local NHS Trusts 
that commissioners wanted to maintain.  
 
What may appear to be contradictory was that commissioners and managers 
repeatedly expressed support for  ‘ƵƐŝŶŐ the market.', as long as it suited their 
objectives. Many commissioners and managers were not critical of the use of new 
commissioning tools. In fact, many believe that their use would be beneficial:   
 
"is competition a bad thing? And I think that's a different question or discussion. The critics 
of it being, I don't understand what their worry is, unless your argument is everything 
public is brilliant, and everything private is dreadful, and many public organizations have 
no accountability because they're left in a world of their own, so if it is competition through 
the back door, is it a bad thing?" (GP Commissioner, Interview 6) 
 
While opposing the idea of privatisation, as reported earlier, commissioners were 
open to the idea of competition and utilising the market even if it could be argued 
that these views are incompatible. It would not be possible to have both 
competition and choice without the use of private providers to some extent and 
hence the presence of marketisation. Commissioners tend to focus very much on 
what they perceive to be best for their patients, as the system was intended under 
the Health and Social Care Act (2012). There is evidence of this, with many public 
providers also  ‘ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? procurements, hence even when turning to the market, 
there is limited privatisation as the assets remain with the public sector.  
 
One GP commissioner went into detail about the effect he thought marketisation 
was having on the health service stating:  
 
 “ŝƚ puts war into the middle of health services, which will have  ? ? ? repercussions and it 
causes flak [sic]  ? ? ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ a lot of duplicate work happening on both sides of this thing, 
now, potentially because the business, you know a hospital is now a business, and ŝƚ ?Ɛ got 
to survive and do all this sort of thing, it could bring/introduce efficiencies, but whether 
those efficiencies are worth the cost ? ? (Commissioner, Interview 2). 
 
This extract highlights how commissioners view some of the more recent NHS 
changes as adversarial. These comments were indicative of the view held by both 
managers and commissioners in the CCG. They were frustrated further by the lack 
of a developed private sector (i.e., supply-side failure to keep up with the reforms) 
which limited the options of commissioners:  
 
  “ ?T]here's generally a limited number of providers, and that's the overriding 
impression that I got, even when you're talking about something like PTS [patient 
transport service], there's only really sort of maybe two or three providers, maybe 
four if you're counting the ones which predominantly work out of Birmingham or 
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sort of up North, and they want to expand down South, and as such there's a, as I 
said, a limited number of providers in the marketplace. Makes it easier to some 
extent, for the people who are running the tender process, makes it more difficult 
in that  ? ? ? you might not always get the number of providers you need to be able 
to create the best marketplace if you see what I mean. Regarding supply and 
demand, if you've only got one supplier for a service they can pretty much - but 
they don't- name their price, whereas if you've got ten suppliers, then there's a bit 
of competition ? ? (Manager 3, Interview) 
 
The managers and commissioners were keen to avoid the procurement process, 
being seen to be overly time- and resource-intensive concerning transaction costs 
(the average tender takes nine months to complete) rather than it faced them with 
a choice between public or private providers. This was a key finding. This was 
further compounded by the fear of the procurement being challenged. For 
example, when the researcher asked whether many tender decisions get 
challenged the response was: 
 
 “The last two procurements that I've been involved in, there's been a challenge, 
not always formal, and not always unfriendly, but if a provider thinks that they've 
been unfairly treated there will be  ? ? ? They're' quite quick to want to know the 
reason why they lost out  ? ? ? had the assurance that they wanted, that they had 
lost out fair and square, and they didn't want to take it any ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ?But if you 
can prove quite early on that you followed the correct procedure, then those kinds 
of things usually die a pretty quick death. Like I say, I've been through both of 
those, and it's not fun going through the one where you have to go to court. The 
amount of preparation that you need to do in order to go to court is just absolutely 
horrendous, and the solicitor's bills are thousands, hundreds of thousands of 
pounds.  ? Q ? ? (Manager 2, Interview) 
 
This highlights the extent to which the system can lead to conflicting perceptions of 
the procurement process. There is general approval of using private providers in 
the correct context, but a dislike of the process. There is also a perception that 
there are few providers and little money for commissioners to  ‘ƉůĂǇ ? with, despite 
the annual surplus, so it is not difficult to understand why tendering is not seen as 
being a useful, or even fair, tool:  
 
 “/ think that partly, ǁĞ ?ƌĞ not able to enable, you know? Commissioners also need 
to understand the ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?Ɛ difficulties that they may well have, especially, if with 
these big Trusts, you have fixed costs you ĐĂŶ ?ƚ do much about anyway, so ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ 
an issue, private providers may not have that. A lot of the training and approved 
jobs and whatever, with the Royal colleges and whatever, you know? Private 
providers ĚŽŶ ?ƚ have that, is it really a level playing ĨŝĞůĚ ? ? (Manager 1, Interview) 
 
In the CB meetings, there were discussions about how the process had been 
arranged to avoid procuring some contracts, and both managers and 
commissioners appeared to be happy with this outcome. Even though this type of 
intervention was rare, there was a fear of intervention from outside groups, in case 
managers and commissioners were  ‘ĨŽƵŶĚ ŽƵƚ ? ? Again this is to do with high costs of 
the procurement process and that in some cases the clinical case meant that 
intervention needed to be swift. The commissioners were not actively seeking to 
break the rules, but to find solutions which were most advantageous for the CCG. 
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There is also a lack of debate in the meetings about the types of provider that are 
chosen to deliver a service. There seems to be more of a focus on the manner in 
which clinical outcomes can be improved in a climate in which savings seem to be 
the number one priority. As papers in a CB illustrated, there is evidence that 
commissioners prefer to work alongside public or third sector providers that they 
have experience with, rather than use the market, when additional funding was 
provided to a local Mental Health Trust (CB Observation, January 2016  W Field 
Notes). This is, in part, due to the agenda of the Chair, which seems to have been 
accepted by all of the commissioners at the CCG. This links back to the consensus 
decision making, but also the way in which the agenda is set by the Chair, which 
narrows the opportunity to explore other options during CB meetings.  
 
The ability to invest into CAMHS was gained by the commissioners being able to 
generate a surplus. Part of the surplus was invested, with a need identified. Once 
the funds were confirmed, the lead commissioner was given the freedom to help 
craft a business case which would address this need, and within the context of the 
available budget, the only provider they could turn to was the local public mental 
health trusts. As one interviewee put it: 
 
 “^Ž ?it depends, ƚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ commissioning, procurement and purchasing yeah?  ? ? ? if 
commissioning means you do a specification, and you go out to the market, then, and 
you do a whole procurement, tendering exercise on the whole what [Site 1] do is they 
have a big contract with [local mental health trust a], a big contract with [community 
trust] and a big contract with [local foundation trust], and they renegotiate that every 
year, some would say they re-commission, I would say they re-negotiate it, and then 
they purchase a few new things, some would say they recommission, but they don't do 
a procurement they go to [foundation trust], could we give you this amount of money 
to do this, and then I think your question is so if you asked a [foundation trust] to do a 
paediatric assessment unit, why doesn't another hospital come in, why are you asking 
them, when we could do it? It's difficult as it's all part of the hospital and so no one ever 
challenges, so I would say the answer to your question is, in our current environment, 
no one really knows these things are happening, [emphasis added] ? (Commissioner, 
Interview 5) 
 
Even if commissioners appear to want to engage more with a different sector (i.e. 
private or voluntary) they are able to do so only in a limited manner, due to the 
resources that are available to them, the real lack of other providers on the supply 
side who are able to take on more significant roles in the provision of services, as 
well as the lack of incentive to change the way in which providers are selected. 
Commissioners tend to adhere to the agenda of the Chair and the other inner/outer 
pressures. Commissioners are still bound by the resources available in this context 
and the marketplace they operate in. Combined with the ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ attitudes 
to competition and use of commissioning tools, it paints a very complex picture. 
The agenda of powerful local actor has meant that there is a way of doing things 
and other actors seem to be in agreement. In some cases, this has resulted in a 
limited increase in marketisation, with a much greater emphasis on value for 
money but no preference for the type of provider used.  
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Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter set out to explore three interrelated questions at site one:  
 
1. What influences the decisions of commissioners in/during the 
commissioning process? 
2. Why do commissioners select certain providers over others? 
3. How has this affected the private/public balance in the NHS? 
Addressing the first question, this chapter provided evidence that shed light on how 
commissioners reach decisions about the type of providers they select for the 
provision of new services. The CCG has a distinct decision-making process which 
was clearly shaped by key decision-makers, even if there was a general  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? 
decision-making process. There are clear restrictions on what the CCG can and 
cannot do, which stem from the broader policy network (i.e. NHS England and 
directives, such as those about mental health). However, there is flexibility in 
commissioning services with parts of the budget that are not used for the contracts 
with the local NHS Trusts. When a JSNA has been carried out, the CCG has the 
discretion to attempt to address any issues with the resources that it has at its 
disposal. The decision-making process at this site follows a model of consensus 
building and minimising conflict that stems from the agenda-setting power of the 
Chair and MD. This model is further aided by the relatively resource-rich context in 
which decisions are reached. The CCG had managed to generate a consistent 
surplus, having worked to create savings over previous years, so this does not seem 
to be the determining factor in whether or not the commissioners choose to utilise 
a procurement or transformation process.  
 
When commissioners want to select a provider they have two basic tools at their 
disposal. They may choose to purchase additional services from existing provider 
 ? “ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵ ? ?or commissioners may choose to  ‘ƚƵƌŶ to the market' and carry out a 
procurement. Once this key decision has been reached, there will be a selection of 
a specific provider. This provider may be public, private or third sector. There is not 
much that can be done by the commissioners after this decision is reached. That is 
to say that a public provider may have its contract changed and additional services 
purchased, or a private provider may win the procurement process. There is much 
work that goes into commissioning for what is, in effect, a space on the periphery 
of the CCG's total budget. Again, these choices are still made within the objectives 
of the CCG, which is to find providers who can start to provide care as quickly as 
possible. 
 
There is a lack of new private providers as a result of the reforms. Commissioners 
will pursue existing providers (the majority being public providers) as this fulfils the 
aims of the CCG leadership. It allows commissioners to work with providers that 
they are familiar with, and ones which will not need a  ‘ďĞĚĚŝŶŐ in' period. The only 
exceptions to this are the contracts they are legally obligated to use procurement 
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for. However, none of these were observed as during the research period the CCG 
did not utilise a procurement process for any clinical services.  
 
To answer the second question, commissioners do not directly select the type of 
provider but instead choose the tool which will, by a process, select the provider 
(regardless of type  W public or private) for them. However, the internal and external 
influences work in conjunction to  ‘ŶƵĚŐĞ ? commissioners in a specific direction. In 
the instance of site one, the involvement of external regulatory bodies is very 
limited in the day-to-day work of the CCG though they do exert influence in more 
implicit ways in ensuring that providers meet specific standards. It is the internal 
pressures, stemming from the local aims and objectives of powerful actors which 
seem to have the most potent influence on commissioning decisions. Identifying 
needs of the population and then moving to tackle these issues was the most 
significant impetus for change. The resources that were dedicated to the cause 
came from savings generated by the CCG in previous years. So there is some 
evidence of interaction between the commissioners and the policy framework that 
was created.  
 
The role of the external regulatory framework seems to be very limited. It is only in 
the longer contracts that the external policy framework comes into play. 
Commissioners also attempt to support their local Trusts by not actively reducing 
the activity they receive unless they have to. This reveals an interesting dynamic 
which was further explored at site two. 
 
At site one, power within the CCG is concentrated in a few individuals, even if there 
is a general consensus approach to decision-making. Rather than exerting direct 
control or the first face of power, the key actors, namely the Chair and MD, control 
the agenda of the key body, the CB. They actively control the agenda, and many of 
the other commissioners and managers that form the CB are, in part, there because 
they have similar goals as the Chair. The Chair, while being the most powerful 
individual actor, still relies on the support of the MD in building consensus and 
developing the agenda of the CB. This is further enhanced with the Vice-Chair, 
other clinical commissioners and managers working to their aims and objectives.  
This system of decision-making would suggest that the second face of power is 
being demonstrated here, with the control of the agenda. The Chair and MD rarely 
have to take part in overt conflict with other actors. In this sense, agenda control is 
made easier when many other actors share the same aims. There appeared to be a 
general consensus model of decision making within set parameters, with certain 
actors being embedded in the CB.  
 
How has the decision-making process affected the private-public balance in the 
NHS? There remains a general preference for public providers amongst 
commissioners, even if this does not inherently mean that they actively  ‘ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ? 
public providers. Commissioners seem to dislike the idea of privatisation and 
specific rules such as having to re-commission procured contracts every five years, 
but they are not opposed to using private providers. There is little evidence to 
suggest there is significant privatisation or marketisation taking place, both from 
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the observations of the researcher and the reports from the commissioners. 
However, there appears to be a modest increase in non-public providers providing 
services. Private/third-sector providers cannot be stopped from competing for 
contracts and with the use of procurement has been accompanied with a growth of 
the number of private providers delivering services. However, these contracts 
remain on the periphery of the service and make up a small amount of the total 
budget (approximately 5-7% of the CCGs annual budget).  
 
The type of provider, private or public, does not seem to be a pressing question for 
commissioners. Rather it is whether or not the service can deliver within the 
financial constraints they are contracted for. However there seems to be an implicit 
preference for public providers, as commissioners are more familiar with the public 
providers rather than through any ideological conviction. There is also a lack of 
consensus on whether or not GPs are truly satisfied the reforms as evidenced by 
the conflict that exists internally, even if they enjoy the idea of having been given 
additional commissioning tools. Marketisation is seen more favourably, as 
commissioners and managers do not consider competition between providers to be 
a negativity.  
 
At site one, there was a limited increase in the use of market mechanisms to deliver 
services. Procurement has been used, and this suggests that market mechanisms 
play a role in the selection of providers. This did create some competition amongst 
public providers but its effect on private providers at site one was negligible. The 
reason that this represents marketisation, rather than privatisation, is that public 
providers more often than not won these tenders and delivered services at site 
one.  
 
There is evidence of very limited of privatisation at site one. There has been the use 
of private provision, but that has not happened intentionally, i.e. commissioners are 
not deciding to use private providers more than might have been the case 
previously. Instead, the new arrangements make the use of private providers more 
likely as a result of the procurement process. It has also resulted in the increased 
use of market mechanisms, and thus further marketisation, with competition 
between providers becoming more frequent. 
 
The following chapter presents evidence from the analysis collected at site two. The 
data at site one suggested a need to explore further the reasons why 
commissioners might choose to pursue a procurement process. The commissioners 
at site one had also established working relationships with an ensuing high level of 
familiarity and shared approach to commissioning. There was also a shift in one of 
the services, with electives being replaced with MSK services to gain richer data. 
There was further exploration of the relationship between the regulatory 
framework and the commissioners, which only offered limited data at site one, as 
the relative financial stability means that bodies such as NHSE did not intervene 
much in the work of commissioners.  
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Chapter 6: Understanding the commissioning process ʹ 
Evidence from CCG Two  
Introduction 
This chapter will present the themes that emerged from the analysis of the second 
case study site. The site was a CCG based in Southern England. This chapter will 
begin by outlining the structure of the decision-making bodies at site two using 
evidence from the ethnography. Following on from this, there will be an exploration 
of how different services are commissioned; how the processes differ from site 
one; and how and why commissioners employ the tools at their disposal.  
 
Data collection took place through an iterative approach, building on what was 
discovered at site one, changing one of the services that were studied; and focusing 
more on the relationship between local Trusts and the commissioners at site two. 
However there were differences in the composition of the CCG and in the 
challenges it faced. Over the course of twelve months, the researcher carried out 
over 65 hours of observation and nine interviews with key decision-makers and 
providers at the CCG. 
 
The questions that were explored here remain the same as in previous chapters: 
 
1. What influences the decisions of commissioners in/during the 
commissioning process? 
2. Why do commissioners select certain providers over others? 
3. How has this affected the private/public balance in the NHS? 
 
The first part of this chapter will outline the general governance and decision-
making processes in the CCG, with the aim of putting those decisions into context. 
Without establishing the context in which commissioners work, it would be difficult 
to fully understand the decisions of the CCG and how they are reached.  The 
chapter will also attempt to identify the similarities and differences of the decision-
making processes at the two sites.   
Differences in specialist service tracking between sites one and 
two  
The data at site one was particularly illuminating when examining commissioning of 
mental health services. However, the examination of electives yielded fewer 
insights as an exemplar and was therefore not tracked further at site two. It was 
replaced by Muscular Skeletal services (MSK) with a focus on physiotherapy 
services, as there is a history of private sector involvement (Iacobucci 2013).  
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Data from site one did not fully delve into the relationship between the 
commissioners and the local NHS Trusts. At site two, there was much more of a 
focus on exploring this relationship following from the analysis of data found at site 
one.  
 
Characterising the CCG at site two 
The second site is a medium-sized CCG, serving a population comparable to that of 
site one. It is also based in a large urban area in Southern England. The population 
is diverse, with a high employment rate; and it serves a range of older individuals 
and deprived communities. This suggests that the CCG commissioned a broad range 
of services, as they would have to cater to a varied population, including the ones 
that were tracked in the ethnography.  
 
The annual budget of the CCG is in the region of £300m, which excludes additional 
resource that is accrued through working as part of a CCG collaborative. This is 
similar to the situation at site one, where the CCG works with other CCGs to 
consolidate larger contracts with Trusts, in order to share financial risk. 
Furthermore the CCG has access to a relatively developed marketplace of providers, 
being based in the South of England. The ability to utilise the private and third 
sector market was one of the key determinants in selecting the site and in gauging 
its suitability for the study. This was to ensure that the commissioners would have 
access to a variety of providers in their selection process. While sites one and two 
share several similarities (budget, diverse populations, access to ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?Ɛ market) 
they differ in their financial situation. Site two is faced with much more severe 
resource pressures, which appears to have had had a considerable effect on 
commissioning. This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
 
There were key differences between the manner in which decisions are reached 
between sites ones and two. At site one, there was one large key decision-making 
meeting in which many conclusions were reached regarding the provision of 
services. At site two, there were several smaller meetings at which similar 
conclusions are reached. This meant that the researcher observed a greater 
number of meetings at site two. 
The structure of the decision-making process 
Both CCGs operate a committee structure, with groups of decision-makers meeting 
to deliver recommendations in certain areas before referring these decisions to 
their respective Governing Bodies. Site one had a very centralised decision-making 
process, with key decision-makers meeting in one meeting  W the Clinical Board, 
which made recommendations to the Governing Body, which were always accepted 
and nominally voted through. At site two, there are several different committees 
which operate in place of the Clinical Board at site one. There is a Governing Body 
(GB) through which all formal decisions on governance, financial and clinical issues 
are reached. It remains the group through which the CCG makes all official 
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decisions. The committees that feed into the Governing body are Finance and 
Performance (F&P); Quality and Safety; Transformational Redesign Group (TRG); 
Leadership Executive and the Joint Co-commissioning group. This can be seen in 
Figure 7, which outlines the decision-making structure and how they feed into one 
another. The observational data suggested that most clinical decisions about 
transformation/purchasing or commissioning services were taken in these meetings 
and nominally voted through in the GB, in a similar arrangement to that at site one.   
 
 
Figure 10 - Decision-making structures at CCG two 
 
 
Each of these groups have their terms of reference and their work informs the 
decisions that are reached by the Governing Body. Through providing information 
and suggested courses of action, the Governing Body tends to concur with their 
decisions and implements them. It is through the Governing Body that the CCG 
receives reports on the status of the co-commissioning cluster. The Governing Body 
is also responsible for communicating its decisions to the membership of the CCG. A 
fundamental difference however is that the Leadership Executive Committee, 
consisting of the GP Chair, Vice-Chair and Managing Director, has the ability to 
reach decisions on its own, outside of the Governing Body in situations in which a 
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short term response is reuqired. Nevertheless, they have to relay decisions to the 
Governing Body and are seen as being able to reach decisions at short notice  W to 
provide the CCG with the ability to react to changing situations more effectively 
than the Governing Body. As stated by the Chair:  “It is more of an executive sort of 
if you like, making sure that things are getting done, making sure that what we 
need to do to push something along, and I think it's been quite important with the 
turnabout situation that we've put ourselves into ? (Chair, Interview). It is part of the 
decision-making process and assists in the financial improvement of the CCG, which 
is one of the overarching aims of the commissioners at site two. This reinforces the 
power of the Chair, as they have been elected to improve the financial situation of 
the CCG and have latitude to reach decisions, outside of direct oversight, that they 
think will suit site two. It illustrates how other actors within the CCG agree with the 
agenda of the Chair and remain willing to work within such a framework. It is a 
clear demonstration of the second face of power, something that the CCG has in 
common with site one.  
 
Below the committees are the lead commissioners who work on their portfolios 
and feed back to the relevant committees or Governing Body, depending on the 
issue. There are also contract management meetings on both a CCG level and 
collaborative cluster level. The CCG works directly with the collaborative cluster and 
relays information to the Governing Body on relevant initiatives. 
 
Compared to site one, there are several other key groups that feed into the 
Governing Body, rather than just two. The Transformation and Redesign Group 
(TRG); the Quality and Safety group; and the Leadership and executive committee 
all deal with clinical decision-making. They explore clinical needs and possible 
solutions for the CCG. They are complemented by the financial stream which comes 
from the F&P committee, which focuses on  ‘ǀĂůƵĞ for ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ? Finally, there is the 
co-commissioning stream, which affects both of these, where the CCG agrees with 
other groups about what they can commission as a larger collective (i.e., giving 
them the advantage of acting as a single large provider). This means that there are 
more inputs from different committees, even if there is overlap between the 
various memberships. 
 
Ultimately, decisions are reached by the Governing Body using the information and 
discussions that take place in other committee meetings. The fundamental 
differences compared with site one are that there are several different committees 
and the formal role of the Leadership and Executive committee, which can reach 
decisions alone outside of the Governing Body. This provides added flexibility to the 
CCG, as it is able to make decisions about services if needed. Again this would 
highlight the relative power of the Chair and the acceptance of their agenda.  
 
Similarly, as at site one, commissioners have two primary tools when selecting new 
providers. They can either go through the full procurement process, which is similar 
to the one at site one (i.e. there is a considerable time and staff cost) or they may 
purchase additional services from existing (referred to as  “transformation ? by 
informants) providers. The other tool available to commissioners is the 
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decommissioning of services, something that was observed more frequently than at 
site one. 
 
In this sense, the structure of the CCG means that commissioning decisions go 
through several meetings before approval at the GB. This is different to what was 
found at site one. It means that there are multiple sources of scrutiny and there is a 
clear distinction between managerial and clinical commissioners across the 
meetings. Decisions about new providers are not made in one meeting, but across 
several, which allowed different actors to influence the commissioning process 
differently. The financial pressures at site two were also much more severe than at 
site one. This is discussed later in this chapter. 
Context of decision-making 
At site one, the CCG was able to commission new services and demonstrated that it 
could utilise the commissioning tools at their disposal. At site two, the financial 
context in which the CCG operates in is different. Over the course of the 12-month 
period of this ethnography, the CCG had attempted to eliminate a deficit in excess 
of 6% of its annual budget. Commissioners have attempted to achieve this aim 
through entering a voluntary  ‘ƚƵƌŶĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? in which they agreed to reduce the 
deficit. The CCG Chair was elected on a platform of bringing the finances into order:  
 
"Yes, we had to change direction because we were in the ... in a financial hole, and the 
only way of getting out of that financial hole was too... bring the clinicians in the 
practices on board, and say look, you are the solution to this, if we go on doing the 
same, we will be a problem, so how can we do it? I think the previous Chair, probably 
[um] hadn't got the confidence that... of her peers that she was going to do that P ? 
(Chair, Interview).  
 
The reduction of this deficit has been the primary concern of the CCG during the 
ethnography. During the observations, it became clear that this was not the first 
year in which the CCG faced considerable financial pressures. This was supported 
by evidence from the field notes:  
A new MD was appointed. Old post holder resigned as unhappy with situation of 
CCG. Justification being that CCG needed more support in reaching financial targets. 
(F&P, October 2016, Field notes). This turnaround plan has been entered into after 
there was engagement with NHS England which threatened to intervene with the 
workings of the CCG. This course of action strengthened the hand of the Chair and 
meant that many of the staff ultimately believed in their financial agenda, 
demonstrating the second face of power. The turnaround plan has informed many 
of the commissioning decisions and is one of the key themes to emerge from the 
data as it had a significant influence on the remaining themes identified during the 
observation. 
 
The CCG has access to public, private and third sector providers to a similar degree 
to site one. This means that comparisons between the two sites can be justifiably 
made and the influence of the commissioner's choices examined. Both sets of 
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commissioners were able to exercise choice in comparable settings, with access to 
a relatively developed marketplace. 
Meetings Observed  
Over the course of the initial discussions with the Chair and Managing Director, as 
well as, taking into account the data that was generated from the first ethnography, 
the decision was reached to observe the Transformational Redesign Group (TRG), 
the Finance and Performance meeting (F&P) and the Governing Body meetings and 
private seminars. The researcher was unable to gain access to the Leadership 
Executive meetings due to the sensitive nature of some of the information. The 
decisions taken in this meeting were for any action that the CCG would have to take 
in a short space of time and where there would be no meeting of the relevant body 
to discuss the relevant action. However, the key outcomes from the meeting were 
observed through discussion of the results in the GB and other clinical/financial 
meetings.  
  
The F&P meeting was chosen so that the researcher could stay up to date on the 
financial situation of the CCG. This proved to be fruitful as the financial situation 
affected most decisions that were reached by the CCG. It highlighted the 
importance of resource allocation discussions and how these pressures affected the 
commissioners. It also provided an insight into how commissioners juggled the 
competing demands of providing high-quality service and being a sustainable 
organisation.  
Characterising the role of CCG Staff at site two 
As at site one, there was an overlap of staff with commissioners and managerial 
staff comprising the GB and also the membership of other committees.  
 
The deployment of CCG staff was fundamentally different to site one, with less 
overall cohesion being observed. Cohesion was defined by the amount of staff 
members who were in the different meetings. At site two there was less overlap of 
the members and less time working together. In part, the financial situation of the 
Trust meant that each of the observed meetings had a smaller, specific remit, with 
the commissioning process being divided, with only the Leadership Executive 
Committee having oversight of the entire process. There is a general perception 
that the CCG has too many staff members, and indeed that the NHS as a whole was 
over-staffed; 
 
 “EŽ ?we are really in big trouble, I don't mean to be disrespectful, because we have 
some fantastic people, but we are struggling, I mean if I think about what the 3 CCGs 
[part of the CCG collaborative] have delivered... because there are so many people 
involved and the decision-making is so hard, I mean you've sat in a Governing Body, 
you know they don't make any decisions or talk about anything meaningful, because 
so much other ridiculousness [sic] is going on, I mean there are all these papers ... I 
mean I would like to know what all those people sitting out there are doing [gesturing 
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to CCG staff], and are they realistically affecting patient care and delivering the change 
that we need? I would probably say no, and I know that"  W (Deputy Managing 
Director 1, Interview) 
 
This further developed into discussions about the efficacy of staff members and the 
use of information by the CCG to reach decisions about how to best use the limited 
resources. Again, this is related to the underlying theme of resource pressures, 
which influences how the CCG functions. Many of the staff members feel that there 
are many others who are not  ‘ƉƵůůŝŶŐ their ǁĞŝŐŚƚ ? which contributed to the 
financial situation of the CCG. However, it also reflects on the changing staff 
numbers related to the policy framework. It is mandated that the CCG has to 
determine the number of staff members, which had changed from when the Health 
and Social Care Act (2012) was first implemented to the present day. Initially, CCGs 
had to downsize and utilise the Commissioning Support Units (CSUs), which could 
have represented a form of privatisation, as private providers could bid for those 
contracts. However, CSU's proved to be ineffective, and the CCG had to re-start 
hiring staff, as occurred at site one as well. 
 
Staffing issues have been an issue in previous reforms of the NHS. This is a 
reflection highlighted too other academics (Hunter 1996). In the broader context, 
the staffing issues in the NHS could be viewed as a political question as the 
Government realised that some services were too essential to fail due to the 
potential public opposition. It may make economic sense to decommission services 
or release staff members to reduce wage bills, with wages representing the most 
significant single cost to the NHS (NHS Confederation 2017). The NHS still needs to 
provide the same standard of service, but with reduced resources and increased 
levels of treatment activity in providers. There is also more pressure on CCG staff to 
work to tighter deadlines because of the financial situation.  
 
These sorts of financial and framework pressure could potentially limit the ability of 
private providers to become further involved in the NHS  W additional contracts 
would create more work for CCGs, thus commissioners may be less likely to favour 
tools such as tendering in favour of working and changing existing contracts (i.e., 
transformation). This, however, stands in contrast to site one, in which the staff 
numbers allowed the CCG to devote more time to various contracts and to explore 
options for commissioning more effectively.  
 
The commissioners at site two did not utilise a CSU and instead utilised support 
staff from their co-commissioning cluster. As a result, the CCG had all of the 
necessary support staff to operate on a day-to-day basis. Most of the services that 
they were meant to provide have been moved back to the CCG, resulting in an 
increase in staff after the initial cuts in 2012. The CSUs were also heralded as being 
a potential opportunity for the private sector to get involved in the NHS. However, 
this was not the case in practice. It appears that throughout the system, 
commissioners have been reluctant to engage with CSUs (Petsoulas et al,. 2014). 
This attitude towards staff (hiring/firing) could create a situation in could ultimately 
affect private providers if the delivery of contracting slows due to staffing issues 
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(i.e., lack of staff). Commissioners at site one enjoyed a financial surplus, meaning 
that their key consideration when pursuing new providers were clinical issues. The 
financial issue at site meant that financial considerations were much more 
prevalent in the decision-making process.  
Specialist Services examined 
Mental health commissioning yielded data about the commissioning process and as 
such, was retained and further explored at site two. While mental health services 
can be commissioned through a variety of providers, the majority of care is 
commissioned by the CCGs directly. The data at site two was rich, adding to and 
providing some results which reflect the state of mental health commissioning as 
found at site one. Both CCGs remain committed to following the  ‘ƉĂƌŝƚǇ of ĞƐƚĞĞŵ ? 
(NHS England 2013) model where commissioners are obligated to match funding 
between mental and physical health services. While there was not as much 
investment into mental health services at site two, there remained enough for the 
researcher to explore the commissioning of services.  
Key influences on the decisions of commissioners 
As described earlier in this chapter, the key factor influencing and limiting the 
activities of the CCG was the budget deficit of the organisation. The observation at 
site two focused on this aspect and its effects on the commissioning process using 
the internal/external pressure conceptual framework and comparison to what was 
discovered at site one.  The financial considerations meant that the key regulatory 
body, NHS England, was much more involved in the situation of site two and this 
manifested itself with the financial turnaround plan. This affected the decision-
making latitude of commissioners as the plan restricted their ability to commission 
new providers without first decommissioning others and/or generating savings.  
 
The internal pressures were those that arose from the organisational structure of 
the CCG and the resulting decision-making process. The others emanated from the 
use of commissioning tools which had a direct effect on the extent to which 
privatisation and marketisation occurred as a result of these decision-making 
processes.  
Internal pressures: Financial Pressures 
The first and most important theme in understanding the decisions of 
commissioners is the effect of severe financial pressures they were exposed to at 
site two. At one of the Governing Body meetings, it became apparent that the 
deficit that the commissioners needed to address in that financial year was in 
excess of £10m (Governing Body Observation, January 2017, Field Notes). This issue 
was the most important one that the CCG was facing, as the current CCG Chair was 
elected on the basis of tackling the financial deficit (Governing Body Observation, 
November 2016, Field Notes). This financial agenda accepted by other CCG staff as 
the threat of external interference in the work of the CCG is viewed as something 
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more severe than adjusting current behaviours. The implementation stems from 
the Chair who controls the agenda of the CCG, with a strict focus on reaching the 
financial targets which have been agreed with NHS England to avoid further 
sanctions. The CCG committees also follow this agenda and their actions can also 
best be understood as following the directive of alleviating the financial pressures.  
 
Throughout the data collection, tackling the financial pressures was the dominant 
theme, occupying both managerial staff and commissioners, being mentioned in 
every commissioning debate and meeting. In each of the observations at site two, 
there was a discussion relating to the financial situation of the CCG. Primarily the 
discussions were focused in the F&P meetings, but other decision-making meetings 
also discussed the issue, framing it in terms of contract management: Discussions 
took place reflecting on the ability of the TRG to manage contracts and generate savings 
from the start to the end of the financial year (TRG, April 2017, Field notes).  The 
financial situation facing commissioners at site two was what distinguished them 
from commissioners at site one.  
 
Through the co-commissioning collaboration, the CCG had been able to offset its 
losses in the previous financial year. However, these financial issues remained a 
central pressure when discussing new services. The CCG ceased commissioning new 
services focusing instead on changing existing contracts and the decommissioning 
of some services. It also limited the ability of commissioners to explore their 
commissioning options, focusing instead on generating savings.  
 
An example of decommissioning was at a meeting of the Transformation Group in 
February of 2017 at which the possibility of decommissioning a service was 
discussed in light of the financial pressures. The CCG had two months before the 
end of the financial year to reduce a deficit in excess of £8 million. At one of the 
TRG meeting, the commissioners agreed that a small podiatry clinic, operated by a 
local Trust, was to be decommissioned. The service, which provided nail cutting 
services to older people, was decommissioned to generate an annual saving of 
£75,000 (TRG, February 2017, Field notes). The commissioners and managers were 
in general agreement that the service had to be decommissioned to save the CCG 
money but did not agree to sanction the move unless there were alternative 
services available. A third sector provider existed in the catchment area but was not 
in a contractual relationship with the CCG. It did mean that patients would be 
forced to pay to use this other provider. This was considered enough alternate 
provision to justify the decommissioning of the podiatry clinic. Thus the 
commissioners justified their choice and believed that patients would go to the 
third sector provider of their own volition. This is an example of limited 
privatisation, with the public sector being replaced with a third sector provider due 
to resource limitations. It reflects the overarching influence of the financial 
pressure on the decision-making of commissioners, adhering to the ŚĂŝƌ ?Ɛ agenda. 
 
During the discussion about the decommissioning of the podiatry clinic, the patient 
representative did raise some objections to the removal of services but ultimately 
was unable to convince the commissioners to not decommission the service (TRG, 
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February 2017, Field notes). This highlighted a growing shift, from commissioning of 
services to  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? commissioning and the removal of services to meet growing 
financial pressures, especially with the CCG in financial turnaround. While the 
service would be cut, the commissioners did state, on record, that they would if 
possible have kept the service open, understanding its impact on the local 
community (TRG, February 2017, Field notes). This discussion was a microcosm of 
the situation that the commissioners at site two faced. Commissioners and 
managers are being forced to look at decommissioning of services and to reduce 
existing contracts to ensure financial stability so that the NHS England did not 
intervene. This is in contrast to the opinion of some staff who express concern that 
financial considerations could influence clinical outcomes, with a belief that they 
are best suited to carry them out:  
 
 “Those decisions will be taken in a more clinically informed way than they would have 
been, hopefully, we will not simply have salami style cuts. Hopefully, it will not be a 
purely financially driven process, but equally, we know that this is the requirement. 
Otherwise, I would consider leaving ? (Commissioner  W Head of Finance, 
Interview) 
 
This also highlights how commissioning at site two also takes place on the 
periphery, outside of the contracts with the major local Trusts. However the 
discussion with regards to the podiatry clinic was lengthy and did become heated. 
As seen in the field notes:  
 
One GP commissioner very unhappy with the head of the TRG arguing that the 
decommissioning of the clinic in principle represented a serious challenge to the principles of 
the NHS. Other cŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? express general agreement (TRG, February 2017, Field 
notes). 
 
While there was opposition to this course of action, the overriding financial 
pressure was in the end enough to convince the commissioners to agree to the 
decommissioning. As was observed later in the same meeting:  
 
The Head of the TRG continued to highlight the need to meet the financial control total. 
Better to close down the  “ŶŽŶ-ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ? service than other more important ones. Mention of 
NHSE. Eventual agreement from all the involved commissioners. (TRG, February 2017, 
Field notes).  
 
The TRG Chair, who is also the Vice-Chair of the CCG, utilised the narrative of 
financial issues to ensure that other commissioners would eventually agree to the 
decommissioning process. While this agreement was secured, it was not a simple 
process which would suggest while the Heads of the relevant committees do have 
power and acceptance of the overarching agenda, conflict can still occur. In this 
respect, it is much clearer that the first face of power is being deployed. The Head 
of the TRG had to convince the other commissioners of the importance of reaching 
their financial targets reminding them that they could face actions from NHS 
England. 
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Decommissioning as a method of reaching financial targets is unpopular with the 
commissioners, and it seems that they are prepared to remain in post in the belief 
that they might be able to ameliorate its effects. Some commissioners have said 
that even this has its limits: 
 
 “Yeah because we're failing, you know, even if, when I go into lots of these 
discussions about efficiencies, and we've been told, you know, make a 9% cut, well 
now I'm not going to do that, I'll tell you clinically how to make it as efficient as 
possible, and the savings that you can make from that, but I'm not going to further 
into cutting things, because I don't want to basically, and the way I see it, is if you 
present the best thing for our population and you still say that's not good enough, 
that's when I'll walk, and I'm not even joking, that's when my conscience will kick in 
when you're being told over and above and you know it'll cause people ŚĂƌŵ ?  W 
(Commissioner 4, Interview) 
 
It emerged from the observations that the voluntary turnaround that the CCG had 
entered had been influenced by the role of NHS England. This was later confirmed 
via interview with several commissioners and resulted in the appointing of business 
consultants to assist in the delivery of savings. It was also found in observations: 
Consultants were brought in by the MD. They have a remit to evaluate contracts and to see if they 
are  ?ǀĂůƵĞ for ŵŽŶĞǇ ? and to advise the commissioners which contracts they may want to 
decommission. (F&P Observation, November 2016, Field notes).  
 
Hence there is clear evidence of the financial pressures having affected the 
behaviour of commissioners, as they engaged in behaviour that would reduce the 
financial pressure on the CCG.  
 
Commissioners can generate two types of saving. They can either generate savings 
over a longer period of time (termed recurrent by informants) or generate one-off 
savings (termed non-recurrent by informants). The majority of the money that the 
CCG had been able to save during the ethnography were one-off savings, 
decommissioning services and reducing services nearing the end of their 
contracting cycles. The CCG also utilised most of its reserves to tackle the deficit in 
an attempt to reduce it by the end of the financial year. However, as the deficit was 
primarily handled by one-off savings, the next financial year could mean cutting of 
further substantive contracts might be unavoidable.  This could have more severe 
implications for the local Trusts, whose contracts have managed to avoid being 
changed or reduced over the course of the ethnography. The agenda has become 
more prominent since the election of the current Chair. Similar to site one, the 
Chair uses the second face of power in order to control the agenda. The remaining 
commissioners and managers work to that aim, but unlike at site one, the 
commissioners are more likely to openly disagree with the leadership. So while 
power may still be in the hands of key actors, they have to also use the first face of 
power to ensure co-operation with their agenda.  
 
Another element is that the CCG has engaged business consultants to improve the 
 ‘ƚƵƌŶĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƉůĂŶ ? ? which is mentioned at every F&P meeting. The consultants had 
been tasked with delivering a plan assist the CCG in reducing spending to make it 
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sustainable, something which has been placed on the agenda by the Chair and MD. 
This was where the suggestion to decommission the podiatry clinic emerged: 
 
 “A contract [the podiatry] clinic of little clinical value was cut, ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ not saving or 
QIPP [Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention scheme, a large scale savings 
and improvement programme], ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ just good contract management ? Business 
Consultant  W (F&P Observation February 2017, Field notes) 
 
This illustrated the acceptance of the overarching agenda that has been 
implemented by the Chair of the CCG. They are also reviewing all of the CCG's 
contracts (with Trusts, other providers, and nonclinical contracts), trying to identify 
other areas for savings. 
 
This contributes to a different theme that commissioners consider when reaching 
decisions about services - that of the role of the local Trusts, where the bulk of the 
CCG resource is spent. The commissioners have been exploring their options, 
believing that part of the reason that they are facing financial pressures is due to 
the cost of utilising the local Trusts. When exploring commissioning options, they 
are seeking to use more cost-effective community providers instead of the larger 
Trusts. There is a consensus amongst the commissioners that the financial 
pressures are forcing the CCG to look at other providers, including private sector 
ones, and as a result they are pursuing a greater use of private providers. There is 
not an ideological dislike of NHS Trusts, but commissioners are seeking to engage in 
behaviour which would improve the financial situation of the CCG. The data 
suggests that there exists a perception that private providers (i.e., the supply side) 
are more responsive to the needs of the CCG and are seen in a favourable light by 
commissioners. To engage a greater number of private prŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ? commissioners 
are more likely to attempt to use procurement to identify the best value provider, 
almost being forced by their financial situation to turn to procurement, even 
incurring additional transaction costs, which is different to the attitude of 
commissioners at site one. This may seem paradoxical in the short term due to the 
costs associated with procurement, commissioners at site two however believe that 
private providers would generate savings for them over the long term. This all fits 
within the ŚĂŝƌ ?Ɛ agenda of cutting costs which appears to be accepted by the 
commissioners and the managers in the CCG. This general approach has been 
observed: 
 
Commissioners vote to impose fines against local Trust due to not meeting certain targets. Argument 
that Trust has been warned about failure to meet obligations.  (F&P Observation, August 
2016, Field notes). 
 
The agenda of the CCG and the internal dynamic with the Chair has led to 
commissioners prioritising a policy that focuses on reducing their financial 
pressures rather than thinking of other actors in the system i.e., local NHS Trusts.  
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External pressures: Role of the local Trusts 
The vast majority of the ' ?Ɛ resources are dedicated to the Trusts, which is a 
similar situation to that found in site one. This emerged from data of the finance 
meetings and the documents that were seen in these meetings (F&P Observation, 
February 2017, Field Notes). This is for several reasons. First, the CCG is obligated to 
use local providers. It is obliged to as NHS England requires that CCGs provide care 
for their patients in their local areas (NHS England 2017). Second, working within 
the co-commissioning collaborative, the CCGs work together to sign larger 
contracts with the Trusts, allowing some CCGs only to commission the services that 
they need. Lastly, relationships with the local Trusts have also existed over a much 
more extended period; there is some institutional knowledge and belief that the 
CCG needs to support their local Trusts, even if these Trusts are exacerbating 
financial pressures. While there is a perception that the financial situation is 
partially due to external bodies, there is still some hesitancy about the movement 
of treatment away from the Trusts. This is explored in the subsequent section.  
 
While there is a commitment to the Trusts, there still remains an overall negative 
perception amongst commissioners, as can be evidenced from the deputy 
managing director. This highlights the tension in the system and the ambivalent 
attitude that commissioners have to the Trusts.: 
 
 “the other thing is that the hospital is being constantly told that they have to meet 
their targets, they have to see people in 18 weeks, so they suck up all these people in 
because they need the money to pay, but they can't meet their targets, but we can't 
reduce the amount of money we pay them or reduce the number of people we let 
them see, as they'll fall over, it's this conundrum that'll never be fixed and there's not 
enough money in the world to pump into places like [large Foundation Trust] to make 
them sustainable, because every time you pump a load of money in, their costs spiral, 
because they haven't worked out I don't think, how much it costs them to see people, 
and they don't have any clue, so they have clinics going on which could cost a fortune 
and they never have those conversations ?  W Deputy Managing Director 1, Interview 
 
The Deputy Managing Director (DMD), who is responsible for the contract 
management, suggests that the local Trusts generate the most substantial financial 
pressures. The CCG needs to keep funding these arrangements, so that its 
population can continue receiving health care even if commissioners believe that it 
is beyond their financial capacity. Commissioners feel that they have a 
responsibility to support the Trust even if they think that the relationship is not 
mutually sustainable. This would suggest that the commissioners perceive 
themselves as having limited scope for action: they cannot utilise other providers 
and therefore have to find another solution to deal with their financial pressures. 
Part of the agenda of the Chair is to improve the financial situation of the CCG and 
part of this is to create an atmosphere where savings are generated wherever 
possible. There is an attitude that these large contracts are very difficult to 
influence, but other smaller providers may be more susceptible to change. The 
main difference between sites one and two is that the better financial situation at 
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site two means that the financial pressures are not so severe and thus the Chair 
agenda at site one has a different focus even if power is exerted in a similar fashion.  
 
The view of the system as a whole by some of the actors at site two, is one in which 
the Trusts represent a threat to the financial stability of the CCG. The significant 
resources committed on behalf of the Trust further the belief on the part of the 
CCG staff that the system favours the Trusts but that there is little that can be done 
to change this. Data from observations confirms this perception amongst the staff 
with the CCG Vice-Chair citing the following conversation with a Trust director 
during an F&P meeting: 
 
 “You ĚŽŶ ?ƚ need to work so hard for the savings, as when it all crashes, ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ when the 
government will step in" CCG Vice-Chair, F&P Observation January 2017, Field 
notes 
 
This is a small example of the perception of the relationship between the CCG and 
the local Trusts. The commissioners view the Trusts as unresponsive organisations, 
which have a focus on developing their own services, with financial concerns being 
secondary issues. The inherent competition in the system creates this tension, with 
the dominance of PbR contracts over fixed annual value contract (referred to as 
block contracts by informants). They remain a key mechanism that has been used 
by governments to enhance competition  W which was meant to ensure that 
providers only charged for the care they provided. While the purpose of the 
contracts may have been to ensure that commissioners only paid for treatments 
carried out by the Trusts, commissioners instead view it as a major financial 
challenge that they face.  During times of recession the number of treatments 
carried out by Trusts continue to increase, exacerbating the pressure (Doetter and 
Gotze, 2011). Providers are expected to compete, but there remain a limited 
number of large Trusts that can deliver a wide variety of services. As such, 
commissioners are unable to generate significant savings.  
 
There is also a conflicting pressure that working with several other CCGs in the 
delivery and use of Trusts, creates additional work;  
 
 “There is lots of opportunity, but the thing is in [site two], is that we have lots of 
different services and you've got several different CCGs working for the same services 
and it makes decision making difficult, if you are one CCG in one area with one main 
hospital, you'll get a lot more done, here you have 5 CCGs working together, who can't 
effectively delegate amongst themselves without leadership in that respect, and 
you've got all these different ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ? ? ? ? (Commissioner 3, Interview) 
 
This is in addition to the resource pressures that arise from the use of the Trusts. 
There is also a perception amongst commissioners that they have no ability to 
influence the Trusts, or the other local CCGs, which furthers the supposed disparity 
within the system. While the benefits of collaborative working relate to 
commissioning services on a larger scale, generating savings, commissioners believe 
it also makes contract management more difficult. This highlights the contradiction 
  152 
between the need to scale care up and make it cost effective and the need to be 
able to exert control so that local patients can benefit from the new commissioning 
arrangements. One of the collaborative staff illustrated this perception in a 
discussion about the best way to generate savings within the local collaborative at a 
F&P meeting: 
 
 “/ƚ is impossible to get to the juicy bits of the turnaround unless you work across, 3, 5, 
or 8 'Ɛ ? We have to put a lot of time working with the other CCGs ?  W 
(Collaborative Finance Committee Member  W F&P Observation, January 2017, 
Field notes) 
 
Therefore, generating the needed savings becomes an even more difficult task as 
the CCG needs to work with the lead contract commissioner (i.e. another CCG) to 
negotiate changes to existing contracts, thus limiting its independence and the 
options available to commissioners. 
These issues combine to make it more difficult for the commissioners at site two to 
manage their financial pressures. As highlighted by the Head of Finance:  
 
 “particularly those acutes [Hospital Trusts] which have major deficits, and they are 
very much aware of the sponge cake theory of commissioning, you press down in one 
area, the cream squidges [sic] off into another area, so if we press down too much on 
the CCGs then that will transmit deficit pressure further into the acutes [Hospital 
Trusts], which obviously has consequences  ? in the aggregate it is the commissioners 
who are in the black and the acute providers who are in the red ?  W (Commissioner 1 
 W Head of Finance, Interview) 
 
Commissioners feel unfairly treated, as they perceive themselves to have generally 
been the more  ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? part of the provider/commissioner split, yet are left to 
deal with the financial problems. This fits into the agenda of the Chair as it ensures 
that commissioners and managers are seeking to reduce costs. To some degree this 
is borne out by statistics in the system, that the underspend by commissioners is 
£599 million whilst Trusts operate a £2.45 billion deficit (NHS Confederation 2017).  
The agenda becomes one which is about justifying the actions of the CCG staff as 
they seek to generate savings from these large Trust contracts. It does appear to be 
a rationale for the justification of the actions of commissioners within the CCG, 
especially as they seek to utilise more community providers to lessen the spend on 
the NHS Trusts.  
 
Two further elements appear to pose difficulties additional challenges for the CCG. 
The first is that the CCG is bound by Payment by Results (PbR) contracts with the 
local Trusts. The CCG is unable to seriously affect demand management (limiting 
treatments in the Trusts). Second, with some of the Trusts, site two is not the 
contract lead as already mentioned, which further limits their influence on the 
Trusts. Commissioners need to cooperate with the other CCGs who are part of the 
larger contracting collaborative and this can present additional difficulties. Instead, 
the commissioners at site two rely on good working relationships with the CCGs 
that are the lead contractors to act on their behalf, but this still limits the power of 
commissioners to change the behaviour of the Trusts. Overall, the contractual 
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arrangements remain complex and this limits the ability of the commissioners to 
exert control over Trust treatments. 
 
Commissioners also question the motivation of hospital doctors working in Trusts, 
believing that they are more concerned about the service they run than the 
patients and clinical outcomes; 
 
 “ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ the person who runs the dermatology service, that is not what motivates 
them, they are a dermatology consultant, they are motivated by dermatology, and if 
they are motivated by running a business they'll do some private medicine because 
that's what consultants do, GPs generally, there's no ... long story but for me, there is 
no desire to do private medicine because as a GP, me, but as a consultant, why not? 
Half a million a year... they can, and they do ? ?(Commissioner 3, Interview) 
 
This highlights the perception that doctors in the Trusts do not have to deal with 
the same issues that clinical commissioners do. It further enhances the narrative 
that the CCG staff are being responsible and focus on the patients and the limits 
which exist within the system. This perception also highlights the perceived 
difference between the doctors who work within the same system.   
 
Regarding the issue of PbR - across the NHS, there have been increases in 
treatment numbers over the past several years (Maguire et al., 2016). Site two is no 
exception. Under PbR, the CCG is bound to pay the Trusts for any treatment that 
they carry out, regardless of their ability to do so. While there is an acceptance of 
the agenda that the CCG needs to make financial savings, many of the 
commissioners also still feel bound to try and help the Trusts as much as they can 
and as such keep the PbR contracts. They also trust the NHS providers not to 
overcharge/oversupply treatments and cases, but that they are doing what is best 
for the patients. This relates to some public sector ethos and is part of the reason 
why some staff still need to be convinced to decommission/alter contracts. At site 
two, the smaller mental health Trusts did show flexibility and changed their 
contracts to fixed annual ones, which is discussed later in this chapter. This has 
created resentment amongst some of the staff, who see competition amongst NHS 
bodies, as being a negative that has come about as a result of the reforms and 
made the work of commissioners more difficult through added financial pressures; 
 
 “So I think modern commissioning is about collaboration, I think the days of 
commissioner/provider roles are ... or should be over, we are one NHS, and we have 
one pot of money, and we do not need to make sure that people are delivering and 
doing the things that they are supposed to be doing, but actually doing them in 
isolation of providers is madness and of course we've got, we spend all the money on 
then having a whole infrastructure of commissioning and the providers have all the 
infrastructure of their workforce to train and keep the commissioners happy, and it's 
just complete madness ? ? W (Deputy Managing Director 1, Interview) 
 
The purchaser/provider split, while not a direct result of the HSCA, has been 
brought into sharp focus by the reforms. It has increased the competition amongst 
NHS bodies and is making collaborative working more difficult, in a situation in 
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which resources are limited. It highlights the tension between purchasers and 
providers in a system which lacks resources. These issues are being used to justify 
the actions of the commissioners at site two as they seek to reduce their own costs. 
This has resulted in the staff at the CCG exploring different ways to generate saving, 
such as commissioning business consultants to assist them with the task. This does 
not inherently represent marketisation. Instead, it is their suggestion to either 
decommission services, or to levy fines which would signify the growing role of 
marketisation. The example of the podiatry clinic is the most explicit example of 
this.  
 
The issues which the commissioners are exposed to are not unique to CCGs. Indeed, 
as mentioned previously, many Trusts face deficit positions and some CCGs have 
been placed under special measures. There is little the Trusts can do to alleviate 
their own fixed costs and the increased numbers of treatments would be out of the 
control of clinicians in the Trusts. This illustrates the broader issues within the 
system, but the commissioners at site two focus on their own financial pressures to 
alleviate the risk posed by NHS England.  
 
The commissioners at site two would like to see fixed value annual contracts 
utilised, with some staff even suggesting that PbR is the root cause of many issues 
in the NHS:  
 “I mean we have to stop paying every time someone asks for money, it's just 
madness, that's the biggest, PbR was the biggest failure of the NHS as far as I'm 
concerned. ?  W (Deputy Managing Director 1, Interview).  
 
The question that arises is whether market reforms that were introduced at a time 
of plentiful resources are still adequate in present circumstances. The framework 
developed by the HSCA has created conflicting pressures: on the one hand, there is 
the demand for savings; and on the other, the need to provide adequate care, 
whilst retaining the quasi-market and the division between purchasers and 
providers. This creates a level of tension within the system and means that there 
are issues with the role of the Trusts, as evidenced above. There is a perception 
that the only manner in which the local Trusts can continue in their present form is 
by generating increased activity  W for which the CCG cannot pay.  
 
This is not the case for all services. At both of the sites, the majority of the mental 
health services are delivered by the public sector. There is a difference between the 
local Trusts, which operate PbR contracts and the mental health trusts. The mental 
health trusts operate on fixed value annual contracts and have worked with 
commissioners to find mutually beneficial arrangements (F&P Observation, March 
2017, Field notes).  The mental health trusts are smaller, and thus the balance of 
power lies with the CCG and not the trust. This is an illustration, firstly, that these 
Trusts enjoy a preferential status and secondly, that there is an alternative to the 
PbR contract, as exemplified by the smaller mental health trusts.  
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Fixed value annual contracts have become more prevalent due to the more 
stringent management of contracts, however, only the local mental health trusts 
were willing to change the contractual relationship with the CCG: 
 
The commissioners discussed what value they should set for the block contract for the local 
mental health trust. Several figures discussed before settling on specific range and informing 
Trust of the said range and potential structure of contract (TRG Observation November 
2016, Field notes).  
 
Some other providers, including the private MSK provider, have also engaged in 
discussions to change their contract to a fixed value annual contract, which has 
further made private providers an attractive option to some commissioners within 
the financial context of site two. Apart from accepting fixed value annual contracts 
instead of PbR, some private providers have also engaged in sub-contracting 
arrangements with a mixture of third sector and other private providers to 
generate additional savings. They have also explored other ways to generate 
savings. This has emerged from interviews with staff: 
 
 “ƐŽ [local Mental Health Trust], which is our local mental health Trust, they're going out 
and looking at providing community services as well as mental health services, because 
they are not sustainable, they're block mental health and they've always historically been 
block, and so because they think block and they've been kind of ... they've lost money, but 
they're just a bit behind regarding data and things and are better at mental health ? 
(Interview, Manager) 
 
The mental health service is the only partner with which the CCG has been able to 
find success in generating savings and maintain the service with no disruption.  
 
The Trusts utilise around 60% of the CCG's resources, which means that there is 
little room for the commissioners to hire additional public, private or third sector 
providers. The CCGs use their commissioning tools on the periphery of the large 
Trust PbR contracts. Commissioners have to maintain the status quo and attempt to 
limit the cost of PbR contracts. There was some scope for the use of private 
providers, but the overall value of these contracts was minimal. It was confirmed in 
one of the observations that there was no private provider contract which 
exceeded £2 million at site two (F&P, Observation December 2016, Field notes). 
 
In addition, as part of seeking to generate the necessary savings, commissioners at 
site two sought to move services into the community and wrote several 
procurements, which included tenders for an Urgent Care Centre (UCC), MSK 
service and ophthalmology. The local Trusts wrote effective bids and won several 
contracts as they are allowed to compete for these contracts. It has created 
dissatisfaction amongst the CCG staff, claiming that they are merely  “feeding the 
beast" (Deputy Managing Director 1, Interview), and not achieving the aim of 
moving care out of hospital settings. This was made clear in the case of the Urgent 
Care Centre (UCC) tender:  
 
 “/ was leading on the urgent care centre before I went away and that was a really 
interesting process, so UCC at [Local Hospital], [Local Foundation Trust] had it, they 
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actually came to us and said, we don't want to do this anymore, as they were having lots 
of issues with subcontractors providing GPs for the UCC and they thought they weren't 
making money on it, so we looked at it, and realised we were paying a lot of money for it 
compared to other UCCs, we need to be better, so point number 1, we weren't aware how 
much we were paying, it was just rolling on, number 2, [Local Foundation Trust] realised 
they were making money and wanted to change their mind, but it was too late, then we 
had to look at it very carefully, then the joint CCGs had a great idea, of taking the front 
desk away from Accident and Emergency (A&E) and putting it in the UCC, which meant 
that patients would be triaged in favour of the UCC which makes sense, as most people 
walking in do not need to be seen in A&E, and if they do, they can then put them back in, 
but it meant that [Large Trust] is losing a lot of control over A&E if someone else is 
triaging their patients ? (Commissioner 3, Interview) 
 
This further helps the narrative that the commissioners are facing an increasingly 
difficult financial challenge and that the local NHS Trusts do not care about the 
situation of the CCG. There is other evidence that the commissioners have written a 
procurement and had to decommission the service when it proved that the care 
was not being delivered as they had intended (Governing Body Observation, 
November 2016, Field notes).  This provides a partial explanation for why 
commissioners are unhappy with the Trusts  W there is a perception that the Trusts 
focus primarily on their own needs, rather than seeking to work in partnership. The 
ŚĂŝƌ ?Ɛ agenda is one where there is a perception that the CCG is unable to keep 
paying the PbR contracts. Either the relationship with Trusts will need to change, or 
it will lead to the commissioners exploring alternative avenues of provision, 
including private providers. This has manifested itself in some of the decisions of 
the CCG: 
 
  “we cut the easiest bit, so if you're spending £20/30k it's easier to cut that then to go 
to the acute and take away 30% of outpatient activity, although they are trying, and 
so I think we should, and there are private providers which are fantastic, and they 
provide and know how to run a business, and I think we need more ? (Manager, 
Interview). 
 
A clear example of this is the ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ decision to award a contract for 
physiotherapy services to a private provider via procurement. There was a 
perception that the local Trust attempted to obstruct the private provider from 
providing the service. Initially, the Trust refused to allow the private provider into 
the facilities that it owned, thought the provider was ultimately permitted to access 
the building and provide services. This was discovered through an interview: 
 
 “So we go to [Site two] and the example there is when the contract went out to tender, 
there was an estate that was designated by the CCG that you had to use, so the tender 
was written up and then off it went, and the award was made, but then it transpired that 
the estate didn't belong to the CCG and didn't belong to the NHS proper, it belonged to 
the incumbent [local NHS trust] who are unwilling to release the estate, so we found 
ourselves in a position where we didn't have the estate, again, we had to do a 
workaround, go to the GPs, try and get the estate, and we managed it in the end ? 
(Private Provider 2, Interview) 
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Again, this further went to support the notion that there was a diagreement 
between the Trusts and the CCG; and that they were blocking the actions of the 
commissioners. This further enhanced the perception of that specific MSK provider 
amongst the commissioners, as they continued to provide the service even if they 
faced substantial challenges from the Trusts.   
Internal pressures: Use of commissioning tools/levers 
The overarching agenda of the CCG is to generate savings in order to be able to 
avoid sanction by NHS England. The lack of resources in the CCG means that 
commissioners were limited, they could not easily select new providers but used 
their commissioning tools to attempt to improve their financial situation. Part of 
this was achieved through attempts to improve contract management and part 
through decommissioning certain providers. In order to extend provision of service, 
the commissioners would need to generate savings first. This proved to be 
challenging, and as mentioned previously, the focus was much more on negative 
commissioning. However, the commissioners at site two were much more positive 
about using procurement as there was a belief that in the long run this would 
generate savings if some services could be transferred out of the local Trusts.  
 
Apart from the considerable staff cost in running a procurement from start to 
finish, just as at site one, there have also been disruptions associated with the 
commissioning of the particular service. Overall, it appears that procurement as a 
method of commissioning has not delivered the benefits that might have been 
expected, at least according to commissioners. The ability of the Trusts to 
participate in the procurement process it is claimed to be a significant limiting 
factor in attempts to diversify providers. Commissioners seem to be supportive of a 
greater plurality of providers, and that seems to a view shared both by managerial 
and clinical staff. On the other hand, while expressing discontent, commissioners 
remain happy that the procurement process should remain  ‘ĨĂŝƌ ? and open to all; 
 
 “ƐŽ I've seen it from a practical viewpoint the spec has been clear, and I think the 
guidelines the commissioning teams are clear on the expectations on what the service is 
aimed at providing, the one that I've seen is objective and fair, and clear and a split 
marking system ? ?(Commissioner 2, Interview) 
 
Commissioners at site two appear to be more positively inclined towards the 
procurement process as it presently is and are satisfied with the system in relation 
to this. At the same time, they are concerned that the Trusts have a significant 
advantage in that they possess significant experience and knowledge of competing 
for bids. This also works against the  ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ of ƚƌĂǀĞů ? of the CCG and its aim to 
move more services into the community as a method of achieving savings. This is 
compounded by the financial situation of the Trusts: 
 
There was discussion of a board paper highlighting the cost of the contract with the local 
Trusts. Overall for the month of December, the Trusts had spent £1m more than commissioners 
expected. (Financial Paper, F&P Observation, December 2016, Field Notes).  
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Another concern that appears to be affecting the ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ decisions is the 
fear of legal challenge and their decisions being overturned. Commissioners openly 
admit that they are concerned with this prospect and that it has made them more 
reluctant to use the tools at their disposal. However no challenges were lodged 
during the ethnography. The use of procurement to transfer care out of the local 
Trusts and to community settings did manage to generate around £450,000 of 
annual savings (F&P Observation, December 2016 - Documents). This represents a 
large potential saving for commissioners. It still did not achieve enough for them to 
pursue new provider, as again, the financial pressures limited this.  
 
While some savings were generated, the financial pressures facing the 
commissioners at site two remain considerable. The local Trusts continue to use the 
bulk of the CCG's resources, as at site one. While there may be an appetite for the 
use of the private providers to help alleviate this pressure, the present set of 
circumstances means that commissioners at site two are unable to engage them in 
greater number. In summary, there is evidence of limited privatisation and 
marketisation, with a modest growth of the use of private providers and growing 
acceptance of a mixed economy of care. The increased use of procurement would 
point to increasing marketisation with competition amongst providers encouraged 
by commissioners to help alleviate their own financial issues.  
 
One example of the use of greater use of private providers is the ' ?Ɛ use of one 
to deliver MSK services throughout the catchment area. This has been mentioned 
several times in interviews;  
 
 “eventually they agreed that they would put this out to tender, with a lot of 
scepticism on the part of managers. However, an open tender was run, it was won by 
an excellent, albeit private organisation and within 3 months they had transformed 
that service into something that people wanted to refer to, patients wanted to go to 
and to give a real example, at that time I had a chap come to me, who lived rough ? 
used more drugs than was strictly good for him, and had the most stunning deformity 
of his knee that I had ever seen, and he suggested that he should get some 
physiotherapy, and began to laugh at the concept that somebody like him would ever 
get to see a physio, and I was able to draw to myself some forms, put it into his hand 
and I said, go around these two corners, you would come to [Local Treatment 
Facility], it'll take you 2 minutes, you show this to the large  chap on the door, he will 
send you 30 yards down the corridor to your left, you will come to another desk, your 
hand in this form at the desk, you then do not leave that desk until you have received 
in your hand, the date and time of your appointment, if that appointment is more 
than 14 days from the present moment, you come and tell me as that's not meant to 
happen, so said, so done. And that was such a radical transformation of that service, 
which it made us all believe ? (Commissioner 1  W Head of Finance, Interview) 
[emphasis added] 
 
 ‘dŚĂƚ it made us all ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ?  W this statement is crucial to understanding the 
acceptance of private providers at site two. Having such a strong positive 
experience made the commissioners at site two feel more comfortable using a 
private provider. This is further facilitated by the private provider being willing to fix 
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their annual rates rather than using a PbR contract. While this may reflect the lower 
operating costs of a small private provider when compared to a NHS Trust, it fits 
within the agenda of the CCG which enhances their reputation. If commissioners do 
develop a working relationship with private providers, then their use could further 
become normalised, especially if other CCGs find themselves in similar financial 
issues.  
 
The private providers at site two were prominent in the areas where private 
providers have experience of delivering care. At site two this was physiotherapy, 
with the local private provider being recognised as one of the best in the country:  
"we just won last year for Clinical team and MSK service of the year, nationally, so 
that's what we can deliver with a good CCG behind us" (Private Provider 1, 
Interview).  
These private providers are able to operate with lower costs as many of the 
services they provide do not require specialist doctors or consultants. Rather they 
require less well trained professionals and less specialised equipment, which means 
that the associated costs are considerably lower than Trusts. These private 
providers also do not need to cross-subsidise their business as they only focus on 
these profitable enterprises. In certain contexts, where there is a perception that 
there are increasing financial pressures, these types of private providers may 
become more attractive options for commissioners. Currently, this represents a 
limited form of privatisation as commissioners are only able to use some private 
provision for areas such as MSK or ophthalmology.  
 
At site two there has been consistent use of private providers to deliver 
physiotherapy services (as part of the larger MSK pathway). Not only did they 
secure the contract via a procurement process, but commissioners view the private 
provider as delivering the service to a high standard. Several commissioners are so 
impressed that they say they would like to replicate their efficiency in the CCG;   
 
 “Our best provider of the things that we have commissioned is a private 
organisation, [Name of private provider], physios, is the best provider, they do everything, 
everyone is happy with them, because they run things with energy, when there is 
something that is a threat to my practice, we need to be better and provide a better 
service, provide better care, because of performance reviews and we need to get big, and 
that's it, and I think like that, and I think that's what's missing, it's a market out there but 
you can use it to your advantage but you have to be smart, so, the hospitals don't think 
like that ?  W (Commissioner 3, Interview) 
 
This experience of working with a private provider seems to have left an impression 
on the commissioners. Primarily, it seems, because of the quality of the delivery of 
the service. It also further fits in to the narrative that the commissioners have of the 
Trusts being inefficient. This is further evidence of limited privatisation, and just as 
at site one, it came in an area in which the private sector specialises and has 
dominated for a number of years. Another such area is Ophthalmology; 
 
 “we've long believed that it [Ophthalmology] offered real opportunities for clinical benefit 
and financial efficiency, fundamentally to ophthalmology, you need a chap with a torch, 
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and a ready supply of patients, because fundamentally, the common single referral into 
ophthalmology, is the optician has seen something he's not quite sure about at the back 
of somebody's eye, will somebody who does this for a living have a look, now somebody 
who does that for a living can have a look whenever you want, you can get 3 clinics in this 
room, this is the same size room that they have in the [hospital name], and they have 4 
SHOs in ophthalmology looking into people's eyes! So it's not a hard thing to provide, so 
the feeling was that this could be done anywhere, and all you need is the cost of the chap, 
his torch, and his chair, and if you really want a chair for the patient! [laughter] It is that 
simple ?  W (Commissioner 1  W Head of Finance, Interview) 
 
The targeting of services by private providers and the willingness of commissioners 
to engage them motivated by their need to generate savings seems to be a trend 
across both sites. The private providers appeared to be more willing to compete on 
price and move to a fixed value annual contract (or a  “ďůŽĐŬ ? contract). At site two, 
this commissioning strategy is much more of a need as a result of the financial 
pressures faced by commissioners. While this trend has met with little opposition in 
the present circumstances, it is not certain whether there will be a similar 
acceptance for greater use of private providers in other services (i.e. outside of MSK 
services). The kinds of positive experiences that commissioners have had with 
private providers, in comparison to the public sector Trusts, could gain momentum 
and lead CCGs to pursue a greater number of private providers. Currently, the 
private sector has not developed enough to generate profit out of more complex 
forms of care which require specialist doctors and equipment, which means that 
most private providers have remained in areas of care where they have prior 
experience.  
 
This positive perception of private providers is not universal within the CCG. Some 
commissioners are not satisfied with the idea of further privatisation or use of 
private providers in order to meet the goals of the Chair. They would much rather 
support local providers or work with them to reach their aims. Most commissioners 
are also acutely aware of the context that they are working in, and of previous 
policy issues:  
 
 “I think the major ultimate driver of privatisation is the toxic legacy of PFI, this is not a 
political point, because governments of both colours have been engaged in that 
process, but those very large PFI contracts, including some not far from here, I think 
are major concerns because ultimately that accumulation of deficit must... the only 
way of resolving that will be some sort of debt to equity transfer which is a very direct 
form of privatisation, so I think the acutes [Hospital Trusts] are at big risk of that, 
within General Practice, the stresses are such that a lot of GPs are looking to become 
private organizations ? (Commissioner 1  W Head of Finance, Interview) 
 
The  ‘ƚŽǆŝĐ ? legacy of PFI is the cost associated with the scheme which it is argued 
has left many NHS trusts facing financial issues (Sweet 2017). These issues have 
been recognised as placing the NHS at a disadvantage. There is some consternation 
amongst the commissioners about the use of private providers as they may force 
public providers to behave in a similar way and to potentially compromise care in 
order to have a surplus/deal with their own deficit issues. It also highlights the view 
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of many commissioners that they are wary of giving the private sector free reign 
but are willing to proceed with a mixed economy of care: 
 
 “I'm not against it [the use of private providers], but you have to be tight, you have to look 
at the outcomes and managed the contract properly, so for example if you look at, and 
profit does motivate people, the best-run organisations that we see run, are run for profit, 
so if you look at example our federation, not run for profit, knowing it's the money, they 
exist to continue their existence, if they ran for profit, and the GPs, or whoever... they 
might be a bit ŵŽƌĞ ? you might get something a bit more commercially involved ?  W 
(Commissioner 3, Interview)  
 
There are contradictory views about the use of for-profit providers. In some 
instances, commissioners are opposed, but in the areas where these types of 
providers may assist in alleviating their financial pressures they seem much more 
willing to engage. This could have far-reaching implications for commissioning 
services in future, there seems to be a growing view amongst commissioners that 
the provision of services is no longer the sole responsibility of the public sector, but 
that there is a need for a mixed economy of care, which includes private providers 
being introduced in a gradual and controlled manner. 
 
Possibly the most significant effect of the above-described circumstances at site 
two, is the acceptance of private provision as a  ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů norm'. The evidence 
confirms an increased level of marketisation and limited privatisation  W a trend that 
could increase in both scenarios: an underfunded NHS searching for savings, and 
turning to private providers to achieve them and the opposite in which a well-
funded NHS could turn to the private sector simply by commissioner's opting for 
procurement as a method of selecting providers. In the shorter term however, the 
use of private providers might increase by direct privatisation, and/or  ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ? 
privatisation in which private providers work alongside public providers in 
community settings. This was a possibility Rondinelli (1984) described and 
characterised as privatisation. Simultaneously this trend would increase the level of 
marketisation, with the introduction of bodies necessary to regulate the system and 
to enforce competition and choice. 
External Pressures: The role of the regulatory framework  
NHS England 
As at site one, the dominant external regulatory body that interacts with the CCG is 
NHS England (NHSE) which is tasked with ensuring the financial stability of 
commissioning organisations. The key relationship here is between the CCG and the 
NHSE. As stated, the Chair was elected to improve the financial situation of the CCG 
and coupled with their possible intervention has been able to have other 
commissioners and managers accept their agenda. The acceptance of agenda has 
made all other concerns secondary to the commissioners at site two. Having 
entered voluntary turnaround, the commissioners have continued to remain in 
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contact with NHSE to ensure that they remain on track to meet their financial 
targets.  
 
It is worth noting that unlike at site one, NHSE is not viewed as a single monolithic 
organisation, as the commissioners have had to work with NHSE much more 
frequently, rather it is seen as being a vast and internally complex organisation; 
 
 “/ think it's a mistake in the same way that ŝƚ ?Ɛ a mistake to think of Islam as a single 
religion, I think it's a mistake to think of NHSE as a single organisation, there are lots and 
lots of bits of it and they are not always terribly well-coordinated in their approach, so 
NHSE [Local Region] regional team that commissions general practice isn't in the same 
building and doesn't always have very clear relationships with the bit of NHSE that 
authorises CCGs and marks their homework, and similarly, that is a different sort of thing 
to the NHSE [Regional Centre] Region, that administers strategy for health services within 
[local City] and takes a much more strategic approach ?  W (Commissioner  W Head of 
Finance, Interview) 
 
The relations between NHSE and the CCGs are complex. The financial oversight role 
of NHSE was very present at the site, however, the commissioners had discretion 
when it came to actually reaching their financial objectives. While NHSE is more 
present as a powerful regulator, they still allowed the commissioners to control the 
process and in this sense the role of the Chair, guiding the CCG proved to be 
important. They could shape how the CCG generated savings alongside other key 
actors such as the MD and the Vice-Chair who were also placed within key meetings 
to exert power. Even so, there was still a perception that NHSE were making the 
commissioners carry out jobs they were not particularly satisfied with:  
 
 “ŝƚ always seems like they're the baddies, I guess in every story you need to have a good 
baddy right? That's how we work! And they are definitely the baddies as it feels like they 
are the ones pushing down these, or the DoH, they're the ones pushing down these ... 
directives on us, and this STP [sustainability and transformation plan] business, a lot of it 
seems to be unevidenced  ?ƐŝĐ ? ?  W (Commissioner 4, Interview) 
 
This further highlights the perception amongst the commissioners at site two that 
the framework created by the HSCA restricts the ability of the commissioners to 
carry out their remits by giving precedence to considerations other than clinical 
outcomes, such as financial concerns. Some of the staff at site two felt they had no 
choice but to enter  ‘ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ turnaround' to ensure their independence from 
NHSE. In this scenario the CCG agrees to focus on reducing its financial deficit. This 
appears to have had a subsequent effect on the commissioning of services and the 
decommissioning of some services.  
 
Financially underperforming CCGs can be placed in special measures (NHS England 
2016) and halfway through the ethnography, the CCG had to directly tell NHSE that 
there was no need for this to happen, as was stated: 
 
 “we are coming that time when it is really difficult, because we are in a deficit position, 
fortunately not a recurrent deficit position, we will meet our control total for the year, we 
will still meet some of our QIPP expectations, and Friday before last, in this very room, we 
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managed to persuade NHSE that we were still likely to be better at doing this than any 
likely alternative that is available to them, so I think we are in as good a place as can be, I 
think ?  W (Commissioner  W Head of Finance, Interview) 
 
This highlights that NHSE appears to be most interested in intervening in the 
working of a CCG when there are financial issues. The manner in which the 
commissioners at site two convinced NHSE not to take further actions (outside of 
the turnaround plan), was by pointing out the advantages of being part of the co-
commissioning collaborative (multiple CCGs), which would offset some of their 
financial losses, and by establishing a turnaround board to explore and implement 
savings plans. This further strengthened the agenda of the Chair, as the CCG could 
only remain autonomous if it agreed to generating savings. This is an example of 
how the actions of a national body did affect the commissioning process. The threat 
of interference made the commissioners and managers adhere to the ŚĂŝƌ ?Ɛ plan 
and engage with the national body and many of the actions can be seen as being 
affected by this. It also further goes to highlight the influence of the clinical 
commissioners; they are still viewed as being best suited to deliver the financial 
turnaround. There was a second meeting between NHSE and the CCG at which 
there was further scrutiny of the ' ?Ɛ financial performance. Through reading the 
financial papers;  
The CCG assured NHSE that it would meet its control totals for the 16/17 financial 
year and has adequate plans in place for 17/18 ? (Commissioner, F&P Observation 
January 2017, Field notes). 
 
This also illustrates how an internal pressure (financial situation) can lead an 
external regulatory body (NHSE) to become involved and affect the commissioning 
process. The commissioners at site two entered turnaround to maintain their 
autonomy after a 'soft' nudge by NHSE. The commissioners maintain their 
autonomy at the cost of having their ability to commission new services/providers 
limited. Their latitude for decisions in terms of selecting new providers is reduced 
and are effectively limited to working alongside existing providers or carrying out 
small procurements. The financial turnaround plan strengthens the agenda and 
authority of the Chair. The commissioners believe that they are best suited to carry 
out the turnaround so that in future they can commission in the best interests of 
their patients again.   
 
In these discussions, there was also talk of how commissioning arrangements will 
change to allow the CCG to achieve savings. The resulting turnaround plan 
represented a form of marketisation, as meant that the CCG had agreed to 
effectively cut expenditure through decommissioning providers and in order to 
cover the provision gap would run small procurements which could involve private 
providers. What was not discussed at the meetings with NHSE, was explicitly how 
the CCG would generate these savings, rather that they would use the tools at their 
disposal to try meaning that they retained decision making latitude in this sense  W 
they were allowed to pursue their own plans.  
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There are other mentions of external bodies, such as the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) concerning clinical discussions, where the 
decisions of commissioners are justified using the guidelines laid out by NICE. This is 
also carried through when discussing how to transform services or to reduce them 
 W such as the decommissioning of the podiatry clinic, using NICE guidelines as 
justification for decommissioning the service. However, this was in a very limited 
context. 
 
Decisions at site two are still taken based on primarily clinical considerations. 
However rather than exploring new services to commission, the staff at site two 
focus on minimising disruption when decommissioning/altering existing contracts. 
The relationship between the CCG and the regulatory bodies is also different. Again, 
this stems from the financial pressures. The CCG has a large amount of autonomy in 
how they alleviate financial pressures but is restricted in commissioning new 
providers. This is an example of power relations between the two organisations: 
the CCG is still given the time and space to carry out its work. This has enabled the 
Chair to strengthen their agenda and focus staff on achieving financial goals, even if 
there are some reservations about the process. This interaction between the CCG 
and NHSE has shaped all other aspects of commissioning and has generated tension 
within the CCG as commissioners and managers seek to make the necessary 
savings.  They have engaged some private providers in order to enable the 
generation of savings and this represents some privatisation as these providers 
appear to be an attractive alternative to the NHS Trusts. These pressures have also 
led to the increased use of market mechanisms with commissioners seeking to use 
procurement to generate additional savings. 
Summary and conclusion  
This final section will briefly address some of the differences between the evidence 
gained at sites one and two, before discussing the data that directly relates to the 
research questions. The financial pressures at site two have shaped the approach to 
all other aspects of commissioning. Having convinced NHS England to allow them to 
continue, the commissioners at site two have considerable ability to generate the 
necessary savings how they deem best. The presence of powerful actors, similar to 
site one, shaped the agenda of the CCG and focused it on addressing the financial 
deficit. As a result, they had to carry out  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? commissioning, i.e. 
decommissioning services and clinics. This can also be argued to be the withdrawal 
of public services and fall under the Saltman taxonomy  W where the private or third 
sector replaces the departing public sector which had a reduced role due to the 
savings which are to be generated under the Health and Social Care Act.  This 
means that there is more evidence of privatisation at site two than at site one. The 
regulatory framework is much more present at site two, with the financial situation 
meaning that the commissioners have to adhere to the turnaround plan to remain 
free from NHS England sanctions. This seems to have been the most significant 
influence on their decisions in the short term, with commissioners hoping that once 
they have achieved the relevant savings, they will be able to operate more freely 
and consider expansion of services.  
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This had helped to create an atmosphere where the commissioners are more 
ambivalent towards the Trusts, viewing them as responsible for their own financial 
issues. They seek to limit the cost of these contracts and aim to reduce the amount 
of care carried out in the Trusts and want to transfer care to community settings. 
This has led to the decommissioning of smaller contracts and the greater use of 
private providers in an attempt to reduce the financial pressures. Many of the 
decisions at site two were primarily informed by these financial pressures, although 
clinical considerations were also taken into account. It highlights the dominance of 
the financial agenda at the CCG. It is in contrast to site one, where the 
commissioner had more flexibility to commission new providers to address clinical 
needs.  
 
There are similarities between the two sites and the decisions that they reach. 
Commissioning generally takes place within the same  ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ? space, with the 
majority of decision-making taking place with the resource that is left after securing 
the contracts with the local Trusts. Marketisation continues to play a role in the 
manner in which decisions are reached, with private sector practices being 
important. This also includes private and third sector providers, who still currently 
only operate in this periphery space. 
 
At both sites, the local Trusts compete for contracts when they are sent to 
procurement, despite the commissioner's agenda to secure more community 
services.  However at site two there is more open frustration with the Trusts, due to 
the several negative experiences which commissioners have had. At site two, this 
has led to frustration amongst commissioners as they believe that the with Trusts 
which were not fulfilling their obligations.  
 
What influences the decisions of commissioners? Commissioners at site two have 
the same tools as commissioners have at site one. They can turn to the market and 
use procurement, or they can purchase additional services from existing providers. 
However, the adverse financial situation at site two has increased the use of the 
third tool - decommissioning. The commissioners at site two have directly 
decommissioned and changed services due to the need to generate savings. This 
differs from site one, as the CCG generated a surplus. In this sense, the internal 
financial pressures directly influenced the decisions of commissioners. The 
commissioners were also more likely to turn to the market to find more financially 
friendly providers, despite many commissioners having reservations about utilising 
private providers instead of public providers. The financial situation has also 
resulted in direct intervention by a body from the external framework, with NHSE 
becoming directly involved with the workings of the CCG at site two. The result of 
that intervention concerning the focus of this thesis is that the commissioners at 
site two entered voluntary turnaround, which increased the level of marketisation 
through focusing on reducing its deficit, and the amount of privatisation than the at 
site one. This is most clearly visible through the reduction of providers and the 
willingness to work with private providers.  
 
  166 
In terms of selection of any particular provider, commissioners at site two seem to 
be led by pressures emanating from their financial difficulties. Commissioners at 
site two use procurement more often than commissioners at site one due to the 
perception that this will generate savings over a longer period of time. They are 
also more likely to decommission providers as well. The observations indicate that 
the staff at site two remain united in seeking to generate savings. The overall effect 
is increased use of procurement, more stringent contract management and 
decommissioning with the priority being financial stability. 
 
As a result of all of the mentioned pressures, there is a growing acceptance of the 
presence of private providers in the market at site two. The success of the private 
physiotherapy provider has left a deep impression on some commissioners and is 
an example of how a perception that the private sector is more  ‘ĂŐŝůĞ' and 
responsive to the needs of commissioners could lead to further expansion of 
private provision. It also illustrates why some commissioners find the private 
provider more attractive, as it appears to be willing to work with them more than 
the local Trusts, despite the difference in size and financial issues they face. This 
could signal the possibility of a broader culture shift in the NHS - that the private 
sector does have a role in the delivery of services in future. The private providers 
seem to have found a niche in the market in which they are comfortable and are 
proving to be successful in the delivery of services.   
 
This negative perception of local Trusts is further compounded by the perceived 
inability of the commissioners to affect activity levels. The Trusts also have the 
ability to compete with other providers when there is a procurement, which 
disrupts the work of the commissioners who want to see more care being provided 
in the community and is the main objective of them using a procurement process. 
The private providers (and some mental health trusts) are more willing to accept 
fixed value contracts, which makes them more attractive to the commissioners in 
the context of their own financial pressures. In part this could be due to the 
difficulties of fixing costs to mental health treatment compared to physical illnesses 
(Mason et al., 2011). There are also fixed costs in the hospital Trusts that the 
commissioners do not seem to discuss in their own commissioning meetings 
(Propper et al., 2008) However, decommissioning services provided by the Trust is 
still a rare event, primarily due to a view shared by commissioners that they have 
some responsibility to work with the Trusts, as well as the provider market being 
under developed and incapable of meeting the demands and providing the service 
of a large hospital.  
 
The public/private balance in the NHS has slightly shifted as private providers have 
managed to establish their presence in areas where they already have experience. 
Commissioners at site two select private providers more often than their colleagues 
at site one. This does not necessarily indicate that the private providers will expand 
further as many private providers have not expanded into other areas of care. The 
limited resources available to the CCG at site two, has led to this, with the private 
provider being willing to change their own contract to ensure continued business 
with the CCG. However, these private providers remain limited as the value of the 
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contract with the largest private provider, had a value of £2 million. The tool that 
commissioners still turn to most often is purchasing/changing of existing contracts. 
 
At site two, the growth of private provision is indirectly assisted by the regulatory 
framework. NHS England only became directly involved in the work of the CCG, 
because of financial, not clinical issues. This enabled the Chair to focus the CCG on 
reducing the financial pressures, exerting the second face of power. This somewhat 
changed the priorities of the commissioners, who now seem to give a greater level 
of consideration to financial aspects compared to clinical considerations. The CCG 
needs to generate savings, while also attempting not to disrupt the work of local 
Trusts, which is the source of their significant expenditures. This  ‘ƉƵƐŚ and ƉƵůů ? ? of 
seemingly contradictory pressures of providing services while retaining financial 
stability, seems not to be possible to maintain over the long term. These 
circumstances have been one of the reasons behind the expanding presence of the 
private sector in the NHS. At site two financial considerations are growing in 
importance, and influence on commissioning decisions, which is to a degree the 
consequence of NHS ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ intervention in its workings. At site one, which 
operates a small budget surplus, commissioners have been more cautious, but are 
able to consider various commissioning options with a view to the longer term.  
 
Overall the level of marketisation and privatisation has increased, although in a 
limited way despite the various pressures exerted by the external and internal 
networks on the CCGs. There appears to be a growing acceptance of the presence 
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Chapter 7: Discussion  
Introduction 
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) has been championed and denigrated in 
equal measure (The Nuffield Trust, 2015). It has provided commissioners with the 
ability to select whichever provider they think is best. It has also been argued that it 
has exposed the NHS to more competition laws with procurement becoming much 
more important in the context of the NHS (Ibid, 2015). The goal of this thesis is to 
examine if, and how, commissioners use their newfound powers and how that can 
affect the selection of providers.  
The primary purpose of most, if not all, of the attempts to reform the NHS, was to 
change the manner in which services are commissioned (Timmins 2012). This thesis 
explored the decision making processes in two CCGs, tracking different specialist 
services. This chapter will discuss some of the key findings and illustrate how they 
might assist in answering the broader questions posed in this thesis. They were:   
 
1. What influences the decisions of commissioners in and during the 
commissioning process? 
2. Why do commissioners select certain providers over others? 
3. How has this affected the private/public balance in the NHS? 
They focus on the new commissioning arrangements, the process of commissioning 
itself, as well as the factors and outcomes regarding the providers they selected. 
They also explored the extent to which commissioners have the autonomy to carry 
out their role. The innovative aspect of this work is that it tracked two years of in-
depth clinical commissioning, focusing on several key specialist services. It also 
focused on the new organisations and individuals and utilised a conceptual 
framework based on the work of Pettigrew et al. (1992) to understand how various 
competing internal and external pressures may have affected the decision making 
of commissioners. This conceptual framework aided the researcher in 
contextualising the various influences on the commissioners when making decisions 
on the type of provider that they selected. It also proved useful in exploring how 
various factors did or did not affect the commissioners in selecting new providers. 
There is also a discussion about the receptive contexts for change to see if they are 
relevant and if they assist in creating a better framework for understanding change 
in the NHS.   
At the outset of the project, there was a lack of literature about the way in which 
the Health and Social Care Act (2012) would affect the NHS. There has been a 
steady growth of new literature exploring the effects of the reforms, with which 
this study will be compared. The thesis has discovered a difference between policy 
and practice, in which the broad formal autonomy of the commissioners is in reality 
limited by varying influences. The methodological framework which informed the 
data collection was symbolic interactionism. This allowed for the exploration of the 
commissioning process from the perspective of the GPs and managers in their 
environments and how they understand their roles within a changing NHS 
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landscape. The key was to study the perspective from those who are working in 
that environment. This approach focuses on individuals rather than institutions as 
the determinants of outcomes as the focus is on the way in which commissioners 
interact with each other and the challenges that they face. This should should 
provide an insight into the commissioning process from the standpoint of the 
commissioners themselves. In effect, this should identify the micro-processes that 
have arisen between the commissioners in the environment/framework of the 
Health and Social Care Act (2012).  
The first question was explored using the observational and interview data from 
both sites that characterises the decision-making processes and the way in which 
they developed. The data illustrates that a combination of direct and indirect 
influences created by the policy framework affects the commissioners in their 
functioning. The second question examined the context in which these decisions 
were made and which services were selected. The third and final question 
examines the commissioner's personal preferences and the potential for them to 
exert their influence to ensure the selection of their preferred options.  
TŚĞƐĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂůƐŽĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ
how various influences affected the commissioner's orientation towards any 
specific type of provider. The influences were described in earlier chapters, but are 
restated below. The overall aim when answering these questions is to understand 
the preferences of the commissioners and their significance for the future of 
private provision in the NHS. The data gathered provides some insights into 
whether there may be an increase in privatisation in the NHS (Pollock et al., 2012). 
Quantitative data has allowed for the exploration of trends over longer periods of 
time and but the use of qualitative data allowed the researcher to explore the how 
decisions are reached and the implications of those decisions in local environments. 
The conclusions should be transferable to CCGs with similar characteristics.  
Overall, this chapter will explain these processes and how they compare across the 
two sites, with a focus on the degree to which the new arrangements allow for the 
expansion of private provision in the NHS. This is followed by a discussion of how 
this research fits with the broader literature and whether the new legislation has 
resulted in increased privatisation and/or marketization. Finally, there is a 
discussion of the explanatory power of the internal and external pressure 
framework on commissioners.   
Summary of evidence from the study   
The study has provided sufficient evidence to conclude that the new commissioning 
arrangements did result in an increase of privatisation, although in a limited sphere 
when examining the NHS as a whole. It also confirms a growing use of market 
mechanisms (e.g. procurements) and a lower level of involvement of the regulatory 
bodies than was initially expected.  
 
The acquired data also identifies questions that were not initially in the scope of the 
study as the study uncovered a more significant role than expected of the NHS 
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Trusts, seemingly resistant to the changes introduced by the Health and Social Care 
Act (2012). This evidence shows that despite the broad powers that commissioners 
are given by the Act, in reality they have a very limited choice when commissioning. 
Depending primarily on the financial circumstances, commissioners are, it suggests, 
more likely to opt for commissioning tools which end with a private provider being 
selected when faced with budget deficits (external pressure). This is opposed to a 
situation in which they possess a surplus, allowing them to prioritise quality of care 
(internal/local demand).  The latter is confirmed by the differences in the data 
gathered at the two CCGs. 
 
The data demonstrates that as a result of the dynamics between the external and 
internal pressures, the commissioner's autonomy is limiteĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
commissioning process, and when choosing the method to select providers. The 
research also showed that whether commissioners choose to either utilise 
procurement, decommissioning, or the purchasing of additional services (i.e., 
 “ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵ ? ? from an existing provider, is the major determinant of what type of 
provider is awarded the contract (procurement is the only entrance to the NHS 
market for a private provider). With regards to privatisation, commissioners are 
faced with a limited choice of private providers, as on the whole they do not have 
the capacity, either financially or in expertise, to provide complex care. This in 
effect puts a limit on the potential privatisation of the NHS.  
Key influences on commissioners during the selection process  
This section discusses the factors which influence the decision-making of 
commissioners at both sites. It includes a brief description of the commissioning 
tools they employ at both sites and will also provide a comparison of the 
differences between the two sites. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Internal/External Conceptual Framework 
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This thesis used an internal/external framework to understand which factor may 
affect the decision-making process. The basic framework is adapted from the work 
of Pettigrew at al. (1992) and illustrates the forces which can influence changes 
within organisations. The internal pressures relate to the structure and internal 
dynamics of the CCG. This includes the structure, the staff and desires of the CCG 
members. The external pressures relate to the policy framework, the rules and 
regulations of central bodies and the resources which are allocated to the CCGs. 
This study found that CCGs are exposed to sometimes contradicting pressures from 
the central authorities (i.e. NHS England) on the one hand and local demand and 
context on the other. This tension is often reflected in the provider selection 
process (see Figure 8). The framework proves useful in understanding which factors 
do restrict the ability of commissioners to exercise their autonomy. 
 
The commissioners at both sites have at their disposal three tools by which they 
can affect commissioning. They are procurement (turning to the market), 
purchasing additional services from existing providers (also known as 
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶŽĨĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?
The motivation of the commissioners varies as to why they choose any particular 
process or method, and is also affected by the dynamic between the 
internal/external pressures.  
 
The key influence on the decision making of CCGs is the financial situation of the 
CCG.  Commissioners are in the position of not being in control of either, the funds 
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŽĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ  ‘ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ? ?ŽƌƚŽĨƵůůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚŚĞ expenditure of 
their major contractual partners (Trusts). Therefore, commissioners are often 
operating in financial circumstances which, in practice, are beyond their control. 
Commissioners faced with a financial deficit seem to be more likely to use tools 
which have a higher probability of private providers securing the contract when 
they judge that such an option can relieve the financial pressures. Other research 
has highlighted the financial pressures that both NHS providers and commissioners 
face. To illustrate this: over the course of the 17/18 financial year, NHS providers 
generated a £960 million deficit, even after £1.8 billion of Sustainability and 
Transformation Plan (STW ?ƐĂǀŝŶŐƐ  ?dŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ?). Commissioners face an 
overspend of £250 million (Ibid 2017). Research also suggests that as a result many 
CCGs are considering reducing the amount of treatment being carried out in the 
system (Ibid 2018). However, there is little literature which explores the effects of 
these financial pressures on how commissioners within CCGs seek to utilise the 
powers they have been given through the Health and Social Care Act (2012). In this 
respect this is a unique finding which highlights the effects of these financial 
pressures and how they affect commissioners. 
 
Internal dynamics of CCGs are affected by the financial situation of the group. Both 
of the Chairs at the two sites exerted power to address certain issues which faced 
their CCGs. However, the agendas of the Chairs were different due to the financial 
situations at each of the sites. At site one, the financial surplus allowed the Chair to 
seek new providers to address clinical needs within the area of the CCG. There were 
fewer challenges to their authority and decision making took place in one meeting. 
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As such there was considerable latitude to select how and when to commission any 
new provider. With the pressures being perceived as more severe at site two there 
was some resistance to the overarching aims of the CCG leadership. The decision 
making process was also spread across several meetings and as such there were 
more opportunities for this resistance to manifest. However, the Chair also had the 
ability to take executive decisions which provided them with more ability to carry 
out actions without consensus within the CCG. This was triggered by interactions 
with NHS England and their potential intervention. So, while the commissioners had 
to reduce their financial deficit they had considerable latitude in how they went 
about this. The internal dynamics of the CCGs were important in understanding 
how power was distributed in the organisations and how this affected the 
commissioning processes. 
 
The CCGs are at once tasked with contributing to the development of the provider 
market,  whilst also being constrained by its relative weakness. There are no real 
alternatives to the NHS Trusts  W no other provider can provide adequate care for 
large numbers of people. In this context, commissioners seek to utilise private 
providers to relieve their own financial pressures. They are not seeking to develop 
the market, or use private providers as long term alternatives, but rather to use 
them to compliment the work of the Trusts.   
 
External pressures, primarily local demands, mean that commissioners show a 
propensity for risk aversion by generally opting to maintain the status quo, a 
conclusion shared with other research (Sanderson et al., 2017). Namely, preferring 
familiar providers with which they have experience in the past, and in which they 
have the confidence that they will fulfil their obligations. As mentioned previously, 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ĨĞĞů ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ Ă  ‘ĚƵƚǇ ? ƚŽ E,^ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă
perception that it may not be in their best financial interests. Commissioners do not 
seek to replace the NHS Trusts on a large scale but attempt to reduce the financial 
burden they face through the use of smaller private and third sector providers. 
 
The dynamic of these internal and external pressures on the CCGs constrain the 
choices that commissioners do make when selecting providers, and thereby the 
potential rate of privatisation of the NHS and its future shape. 
 
With regards to the public/private balance of the NHS, there have been several 
reviews of the effect of the Health and Social Care Act (2012). Initially, there was 
widespread concern about the increased role of market mechanisms, private 
providers and competition (Timmins 2012; Davies 2013). The current literature on 
the effects of the Health and Social Care Act (2012) suggests that it has not had the 
impact that many thought in 2012. Ham et al., (2015) argue that the reform has: 
 “resulted in greater marketisation of the NHS but that claims of mass privatisation 
ĂƌĞ ĞǆĂŐŐĞƌĂƚĞĚ ? ?Other work has drawn similar conclusions, with the role of 
competition and the regulatory framework being vague and undefined (Allen et al., 
2016, Sanderson et al., 2017). This thesis supports these findings while there are 
differences between the two sites and the degree to which privatisation has 
occurred.  
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Decision making by the CCGs: The similarities 
Commissioners at both of the sites are drawn from GPs from member practices, 
with those elected usually very motivated individuals as has been found in other 
research (Moran et al., 2017). This reflects a similarity to the type of GPs that were 
previously GP Fundholders and PBC commissioners (Miller et al., 2012). Also 
notably is the perception amongst the GPs involved in commissioning that they are 
the group in the best position to regulate and commission services. This manifests 
itself at both of the sites, with those GPs who are currently involved having 
previously held commissioning roles, and with very few commissioners having no 
past experience. At both of the sites, commissioners did not appear to have much 
appetite to radically change the providers they utilised. The data suggests that the 
majority of the commissioners are generally satisfied with existing arrangements. 
The bulk of the commissioning budget is spent on services from the local NHS 
dƌƵƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĂŶǇ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ƚĂŬĞƐ ƉůĂĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ? ƐƉĂĐĞ ŽĨ
existing arrangements. In this context, at both sites, over 85% of the annual 
commissioning budget went to large local Trusts. The remaining resources were 
spent on other providers (public/private/third sector), and it is here that there was 
competition over the procurement of contracts. Commissioners feel they have to 
maintain good working relationships/contracts with the larger Trusts to maintain 
the provision of existing services. There is little evidence that the commissioners 
feel they could change the practices of these large providers by adopting a different 
use of their new tools.  
 
 
At both sites commissioners focus their work in this periphery space. This approach 
to working on the edge of these larger contracts has been confirmed by other 
research (Checkland et al., 2016). This study shared some of these conclusions, that 
the decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐƐƉĂĐĞŽĨĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐŝƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ
larger Trust contracts. As has been illustrated by the data, commissioners were 
allowed to explore and use multiple different arrangements within the broader 
agenda of the CCG. However, their powers are much more limited than initially 
assumed and their functioning is not as was predicted (Pollock et al., 2011, Hunter 
2013). Commissioners at both of the sites felt that they were much more restricted 
in the delivery of services due to these large contracts. The extent to which these 
differences manifest was affected by the financial situation at the sites. This also 
resulted in commissioners focusing more on working with existing providers rather 
than commissioning new ones, as was the case at both of the CCGs. This further 
enabled the commissioners to bypass formal decision-making processes and 
allowed commissioners at both sites to avoid using procurement when the 
regulatory rules may have required them to do so. Contributing to this is the 
perceived length, cost and potential complications of a new procurement process 
meaning that undertaking the task of contracting a new provider is not seen as 
desirable. 
  
At both sites it appears that the commissioners wanted to continue working with 
the Trusts, partly due a lack of alternative but also because of a seeming 
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loyalty/duty to the NHS more broadly. In addition to a general feeling of loyalty to 
the NHS, commissioners also have experience of working alongside these public 
providers, and this further strengthens the commissioners' preference for these 
arrangements. There is evidence which would suggest that commissioners in many 
CCGs seek to work collaboratively with their local providers (Allen et al., 2016). 
Also, and similarly, while being able to fine providers who fail in their obligations, 
commissioners are reluctant to choose that option because of the relatively 
precarious financial situation of those providers who are part of the NHS. Again this 
reinforces the notion that commissioners are aware of the financial issues that face 
the entire system (Allen et al., 2016). There is however, a feeling of tension in the 
system, with commissioners unhappy with the Trusts seeming inability to reduce 
their costs. This was common to commissioners at both sites, as was their desire to 
work cooperatively with Trusts where possible, which they see as being part of the 
NHS system. From this standpoint, the manner in which the bulk of NHS services 
are selected and provided has mostly remained unchanged as the CCGs have 
principally continued to utilise the same providers that the PCTs did. This is true 
even though they do have a wider choice of providers as the market has somewhat 
evolved in the intervening period (Hunter 2013). 
 
While there is loyalty to local NHS providers the size of the private market limits 
the options of commissioners at both sites. While there is a general belief that 
local Trusts should be supported, there are no real private or third sector 
providers who would be able to provide the same care that an NHS Trust would. 
The nature of the latest set of reforms had led to a concentration of private 
providers and further issues to the development of providers (Sheaff and Allen 
2016), something that was also found in this study. In the present circumstances, 
if commissioners wanted to change provider they would have no alternative but 
to commission another large Trust. To split these contracts among smaller 
providers would be impractical due to the numbers of separate contracts that 
would need managing and the ensuing increased costs associated with this 
administration. Therefore, even if there is a support for public providers, the lack 
of an alternative means that commissioners would have to continue working 
alongside these providers even if there was more appetite for radical change.  
  
The way in which commissioners operate in this periphery space varies, but activity 
here represents only a fraction of the total expenditure of the CCGs. This is 
common to both sites and commissioners tend to utilise the tool which best fits 
within the broader agenda as set by the Chairs. Even here there is some use of 
existing providers (public or private) as it allows for quicker mobilisation of service 
provision. General commissioning activity is restricted to this area as the 
commissioners view themselves as a weaker partner and unable to affect the 
behaviour of the Trusts. The CCGs have little real ability to affect the clinical 
treatments with regard to PbR contracts, despite their formal powers to 
decommission services. This reflects a similar limitation that was found with both 
PCTs and PbC arrangements, where commissioners were unable to affect the 
behaviour of providers as was intended by the reforms (Smith et al., 2010). Similar 
conclusions have been drawn from other research which highlights the issues with 
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PbR contracts and their inability to reflect the capacity of local commissioners to 
pay for certain services (Allen and Petsoulas 2016, Allen et al., 2016, Robertson et 
al., 2017) 
 
The majority of procurements conducted at the two sites are in the previously 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ  ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ƐƉĂĐĞ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŝŶĂƌĞĂƐ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ
private sector involvement. Where there is evidence of privatisation and 
marketisation at the two sites, it occurs within this space. Procurements, as 
mentioned above, are the main entry point for private providers into the NHS.  At 
the same time, commissioners seem to be wary of this process as they perceive it 
as ĂůĞŶŐƚŚǇĂŶĚĐŽƐƚůǇ ? ?A?ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂůƐŽĐĂƌƌŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝƚƚŚĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƌĞ-
ƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚ ? ĞǀĞƌǇ ĨŝǀĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ? dŚŝƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞ ďĞůŝĞĨ ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ
commissioners that procurement guidance from the regulatory bodies is unclear, as 
commissioners are unsure of how and when they are obligated to carry out 
procurements. This means in some cases they are actively seeking to utilise local 
arrangements to avoid the process entirely, a finding reflected in other research 
(Allen et al., 2017). This lack of guidance afforded the Chairs at both of the sites 
more latitude in how and when they chose to utilise procurement, and in how it fits 
within their own agendas.  
 
WƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐ Žƌ ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ  ?ƚĞƌŵĞĚ  “ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďǇ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂŶƚƐ ? ŝƐ
primarily used in order to secure additional services from existing providers, as it 
allows commissioners to circumvent full procurement and the associated costs and 
time. As a result, this method seems to be one of the more popular options 
available to commissioners. At both sites, commissioners pursue the course which 
fits within their commissioning priorities as set by the Chair, which vary due to the 
financial situation at each CCG.  
 
Decommissioning has only been used infrequently at the CCGs, and only in cases in 
which a provider was judged not to be fulfilling contract specifications. It is viewed 
as a last resort and during this research was only found to be used on public 
providers. There was some limited evidence that the commissioners also sought to 
use decommissioning to assist in moving some care in to community settings. While 
decommissioning was uncommon at both sites, it was utilised more at site two. 
Other research also highlights that the focus of decommissioning appears to be to 
affect either financial aims or to have care moved into community settings 
(Williams et al., 2017). The use of this did vary somewhat according to the priorities 
of key decision makers at each CCG and will be explored in more depth in the next 
section.  
 
At both of the sites, commissioners made use of the tools that were provided by 
the Health and Social Care Act (2012) which resulted in an increased use of market 
mechanisms in the selection of providers. The use of procurement has been 
borrowed from the private sector as a model, and its use reflects the growing 
acceptance/norm of these processes in the public sector. At both sites, there is 
evidence of the use of these mechanisms, with commissioners using procurement 
to select providers rather than setting their terms and conditions. This finding is 
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supported by other literature; commissioners regard the usage of such mechanisms 
ĂƐ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ?ůůĞŶet al., 2016). The ability of commissioners to affect the outcome 
of the process is limited. Rather, they determine how important the financial and 
clinical elements are to any procurement process. The data from this study 
demonstrates that even in an environment in which financial pressures are 
becoming more severe, the focus still remained on quality. However, the use of 
procurement has been linked to the need to generate savings in some contexts and 
assists in commissioners being able to remain independent of NHS England. The 
reasons why commissioners may choose to utilise procurement may differ, as 
already outlined. The use of procurement is one part of several other processes 
which highlight the growth of market mechanisms within the NHS. This includes 
encouraging competition and greater use of subcontracting amongst providers. This 
represents a change in commissioning with a much greater emphasis on 
competition, which is in contrast to the more cooperative way in which 
commissioning previously took place (Glendenning et al., 1998). These examples 
confirm growing marketisation in the process of selection of providers with the goal 
ŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŵŽƌĞ ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ? 
 
The data from this research also highlights the limited scope of privatisation. 
Commissioners at both sites were unable, even if they wanted to, to 
alter/decommission the large contracts that the CCGs have with the Trusts. Those 
contracts represent a considerable proportion of the total budget and have already 
been set up; existing contractual methods (i.e. PbR) prove challenging for 
commissioners financially (Allen and Petsoulas 2016). These financial pressures are 
ŽŶůǇ ƐĞƚ ƚŽ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǆƚ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ǇĞĂƌƐ  ?dŚĞ <ŝŶŐƐ ? &ƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?
there appears to be a growing use and acceptance of private providers in the 
 ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ƐƉĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĐĐƵƌƐ ŝŶƚŚŝƐ
sphere. The targeting of private providers by commissioners at site two highlights 
how privatisation is increasing, albeit in a limited fashion. This targeting is aimed at 
services which have been highlighted internally as key areas for improvement, and 
while there are competing aims between the two CCGs, they focus on similar areas. 
As stated previously, private and third sector providers are unable to compete with 
large NHS Trusts. This leads the commissioners to target specific services (i.e. 
physiotherapy, MSK) for procurement as the evidence from this study has shown. 
However, future changes at the political level could mean an expansion of this 
process and point to the use of private providers on a much larger scale than 
previously seen within the NHS.  
 
CCGs operate in circumstances which are heavily influenced by their relationship 
with NHS England which manifests itself differently from site to site. It is the most 
influential of the new regulatory bodies. The commissioners at both of the 
researched sites seem to hold in common a negative perception of NHS England 
which appears to be primarily a result of the contradictions that exist between local 
needs and the high-level targets set by them. Similar tensions between local and 
national priorities have existed under previous commissioning arrangements, such 
as PCTs (Mays et al., 2004). Part of the reason why the new framework was 
perceived negatively relates to how it was viewed as confusing and at times 
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contradictory by commissioners in this study. Ham et al. (2015) report that 
 “reforms have resulted in top-down reorganisation of the NHS and this has been 
distracting and damaging ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “new systems of governance and 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵƐĂƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂŶĚĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŶŐ  ?ĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨ
system leadership is increasingly problematic when the NHS needs to undertake 
major service changes ? ?Ɖ ? ? ?ƚďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚĞƐƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƐtudy commissioners 
had concerns with the role adopted by NHS England. Again, there is other literature 
which has drawn similar conclusions about the role of the new regulatory 
framework (Allen et al., 2016). At site two, this relationship has had a much more 
tangible effect on the decision making of commissioners and has led the Chair to 
institute their own agenda to reduce the financial pressures faced by the CCG. This 
demonstrates the impact of the regulatory framework to affect the decision making 
of commissioners by helping to set their commissioning agendas. These effects of 
NHS England directives differ across the two sites and will be explored in the 
subsequent section.  
Decision making by the CCGs: The differences 
All commissioners have the same tools available to them with regards to selecting a 
new provider. However, there were differences in the applications of these at the 
two sites. The most influential element was the financial concerns of the two CCGs. 
At site one, the positive financial situation enabled the commissioners to exercise 
their decision making abilities relatively freely, with little interference from the 
external regulatory framework. At site two, the severe annual budget deficit has 
forced commiƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞŚĂŝƌ ?ƐƉůĂŶƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐŝŶ
order to maintain their autonomy, rather than have a plan imposed on them by 
NHS England. While commissioners at site two were unable to seek many new 
providers, they were given a large amount of freedom to tackle the deficit as they 
saw fit. This section will explore how the different pressures affected the choices of 
commissioners and how this resulted in different commissioning processes.  
 
The financial situation of the CCGs affected the internal dynamics which in turn 
influenced how commissioners reach their decisions. At both sites the Chairs were 
powerful actors who exerted their power through setting the agenda and creating 
general consensus. The data from this study suggests that the majority of GPs tend 
to not want to be involved in commissioning, and that those who do tend to have 
personal motivations for doing so. These personal motivations include prior 
experience of being a commissioner or the belief that they can affect change. The 
financial situations at the two CCGs led to different internal dynamics and agendas. 
From the data, it is clear that commissioners value their autonomy and will strive to 
protect it as best they can. Commissioning allows them a measure of independence 
in the shaping of services in the manner in which they deem to be the most 
effective.  
 
The significant difference between the two research sites are the budgetary 
pressures they face. At site one there is a small annual surplus (approximately 
£2m+ a year) which gave commissioners more room to examine options for new 
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services. In effect, this surplus allows the Chair at site one the ability to focus their 
agenda on commissioning new providers/services in areas where there is a clinical 
need. Thus commissioners at site one had the ability to utilise the full range of 
powers available to them within the periphery space. In practice, the surplus allows 
commissioners more time to pursue different options and also to purchase 
additional services to address needs. They additionally have the ability to invest in 
early intervention services which would yield savings in the future. At site one, they 
sought to purchase additional services from existing providers if it meant that they 
could do so and avoid the costs of carrying out a full procurement. They would seek 
to utilise a procurement only in the instances where existing contracts could not 
provide the necessary services or if they could not be carried out in the manner 
which suited the commissioning priorities of the CCG. This meant that if they 
wanted to have a service provided in community settings they would be more likely 
to utilise a procurement as the majority of existing providers are hospital based. 
The choice of the process that commissioners use is the most indicative and 
important part of the commissioning process, and it can be argued that it is more 
significant than the application of the chosen method, e.g. procurement, or 
purchasing additional services from existing providers. In conclusion, 
commissioners at site one can purchase new services due to their stable financial 
situation.  This highlights the way in which an external pressure, the financial 
situation, affects the internal structure of the CCG. The relatively stable financial 
situation of the CCG enabled the Chair to enact an agenda which focuses 
purchasing additional services in order to improve the health of the populace.   
 
There are varying reasons why commissioners carry out a procurement process. In 
situations where commissioners have selected procurement, they write the 
specification. However, they have no ability to affect the outcome afterwards. 
Procurement documents have to be marked anonymously, and commissioners are 
legally bound to respect the outcome. Arguably this means that the market chooses 
the best provider, as the commissioners only weight the clinical and financial 
elements of the process, dictating how important fulfilling the financial obligation is 
compared to the service itself. Site one has the ability to use a procurement process 
when they deem it as being the most useful mechanism for selecting a new 
provider. In general, they seek to avoid the process, but due to their financial 
surplus, they face less oversight from regulatory bodies and thus are able to use it 
when they are seeking to appoint a new provider, where commissioners feel that 
their existing providers may not be best suited. At site one, commissioners are 
ŵŽƌĞŽƉĞŶƚŽƵƐŝŶŐƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚƚŽĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĨŝŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ďĞƐƚ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ
under little pressure to focus on generating savings. They also state that they have 
no preference between private, public or third sector providers winning 
procurement processes. A contributing factor to this seems to be the possibility 
that the commissioners at site one can re-procure if necessary, as their budget 
surplus means they can manage any losses they may incur. There have been 
occasions where the commissioners at site one have had to re-procure, and this has 
not been viewed as a severe setback. On the other hand, at site two, 
commissioners turn to the market primarily to find less expensive providers and do 
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not possess the ability to absorb financial losses if those providers do not work as 
intended.  
 
Another tool at the disposal of commissioners is renĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?
of existing contracts. This occurs when commissioners renegotiate existing 
contracts with providers. In most cases this results in purchasing additional services 
predominantly from NHS Trusts where the majority of CCG resource is already 
committed, but is used with any existing provider. It gives the commissioners more 
 ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚ ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŽƐĞůĞĐƚƚŚĞ
provider directly. Formally this is not one of the new tools derived from the Health 
and Social Care Act (2012) but an option the commissioners have in order to alter 
existing contracts. The drawback of this approach is that it means commissioners 
are restricted if they are attempting to introduce a new service, as they can only 
work with their existing providers. Commissioners at site one prefer to redesign 
contracts as it reduces both time and administrative costs in comparison to 
procurement and removes the risks associated of working with new and unfamiliar 
partners. As stated before, it appears that the moment at which commissioners 
have the most space to exercise choice is when choosing the method by which they 
will commission any particular service. At site one, this is exhibited by a preference 
of commissioners to opt for redesign of contracts when a service needs quick 
improvement or expansion. This enables them to select an existing provider to 
work with. Procurement is used in cases in which there is less immediate clinical 
demand and thus commissioners are happy for the process to take place and 
ĚŝĐƚĂƚĞƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?dŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐĂƚƐŝƚĞƚǁŽŚĂǀĞĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
to transformation, as it allows them to quickly commission additional services on 
the one hand but also to renegotiate terms with existing providers when pressed to 
achieve savings.    
 
Commissioners at site one are in a position to give priority to clinical needs in the 
commissioning process. The primary consideration is related to how quickly new 
services can be established and begin delivering care. This ability to engage with the 
clinical cases stems from the stable financial situation and the agenda of the Chair. 
There is little consideration of the type of provider that is engaged, but rather a 
focus on the priorities of the commissioners and the means with which they feel 
they can best develop new services. While there is a lack of immediate financial 
pressures, the Chair and the other key actors at site one ensure that there is a focus 
on maintaining that independence and focus. This represents an example of 
positive change with greater clinical involvement in commissioning, something 
which did not always occur under previous primary care-led commissioning (Smith 
et al., 2010). Hence, it can be said that site one functions in the way that PCTs were 
intended to operate, with a view to the long-term (Robinson 2004). In the observed 
cases at site one the benefit of purchasing additional services was seen as yielding 
clinical results faster, i.e. commissioners did not need to go through a nine-month 
procurement to appoint a provider. The apparent willingness of providers to accept 
this type of contract negotiation process has been observed previously under other 
commissioning arrangements (Allen et al., 2012).  
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The financial surplus at site one also enables the commissioners to avoid serious 
interference from NHS England. While they are still subject to sharing information 
and adhering to general target sets by NHS England, they do not fear intervention 
in the way in which they commission providers. The Chair enjoys a lot of freedom in 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ĂŶĚ ŵĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ
agenda. This large amount of freedom means that the commissioners at site one 
are able to utilise tools in the way they see fit. To some degree their ability to 
choose when to use procurement or transformation as they wish means that they 
set their own agenda, and that the stricter rules laid out in the Health and Social 
Care Act (2012) are less important than ensuring commissioners can work as they 
choose too. This freedom from external oversight enabled the commissioners at 
site one to set their own priorities and methods of working within their local health 
economy. This is a conclusion which is shared with other research in the field, 
which found that cooperative working with some use of competition tools was the 
preferred mechanism of many CCGs (Allen et al., 2016). This approach of the 
regulatory body was the key difference between sites one and two.  
 
The commissioning situation at site two varies considerably from that at site one. 
The external financial pressures are much more severe and as a result the threat of 
intervention by NHS England was much more prevalent. This affected the decision 
making process of the CCG more than at site one. While other research has 
pinpointed that the regulatory framework can be vague in the guidance set out for 
procurement and contracting (Checkland et al., 2017), the effects of financial 
pressures is more severe. NHS England has had to be dissuaded from placing site 
two in financial special measures, which has led to the Chair having a much more 
important role in the strategy of commissioners at site two. This action acts as 
motivation for commissioners at site two. While they are limited in selecting new 
providers, they still have a considerable amount of autonomy in how they address 
their financial pressures. This was revealed through the way in which they used 
ƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ?dŚĞƐĞŽƚŚĞƌĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽ
be more important in the process than the rules which were created by the Health 
and Social Care Act (2012).     
  
The primary concern of commissioners at site two is to reduce the financial 
pressures that they are facing. The decisions of the commissioners are best 
understood as seeking to reduce the financial burden. The main method chosen for 
this is more stringent contract management, as well as the use of procurement to 
target private providers. While there is an associated time and cost element with 
procurement, it allows commissioners to seek to use less expensive community 
providers. Commissioners at site two do so by procuring services which they think 
are more attractive to the private, third sector, or community providers, relieving 
cost pressures by removing those services from hospital (i.e., NHS Trust) settings. 
This strategy has not always been successful and remains somewhat limited as it is 
not feasible for commissioners to seek to replace the large Trusts with multiple 
other providers. The large local Trusts also have the ability to compete for the same 
contracts and have done so in the past, which only further complicated the 
commissioning process from the perspective of the commissioners. Also, despite 
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such expectations, there is no evidence that providers have competed on price. 
Rather, if there is competition, it is based on the quality of service. Despite such 
instances, commissioners at site two remain determined to use procurement 
processes in this fashion. While they are not inherently predisposed to a more 
substantial presence of the private sector in the NHS they do see this type of use of 
procurement processes as a solution to the pressures that they face. This is further 
shaped by the significant positive experiences that commissioners have had with 
private providers who provide some services at the CCG. There is evidence in other 
literature which supports this, with commissioners seeking to use procurement to 
generate savings through moving care from hospital to community settings 
(Williams et al., 2017).  
 
In their attempt to reduce costs, commissioners at site two also attempt the change 
(or transformation) of contracts. Though they use this method sparingly, they do so 
when they wish to add services to existing arrangements or reduce the cost of the 
largest contracts, which are the Trust contracts. Commissioners at site two have 
also attempted to merge smaller contracts into single larger contracts, as well as 
attempting to encourage providers to adopt fixed value annual contracts, as 
opposed to PbR contracts. These types of commissioning behaviours are best 
understood as the commissioners at site two seeking to reduce expenditure. The 
commissioners at site two are less concerned with the type of provider they engage 
than by their need to achieve savings. However, many providers do not intend on 
changing from the PbR contracts, with the notable exception of the private MSK 
provider at site two, which has shown a willingness to change and thus reinforcing 
its favourable perception amongst commissioners. The data from this study 
reinforces the view that providers have little incentive to change their behaviour 
(i.e. accept fixed value annual contracts instead of PbR contracts) to assist 
purchasers (Allen and Petsoulas 2016, Smith et al., 2010).  
 
These behaviours are rationalised through the commissioners at site two seeking to 
avoid being placed in special measures by NHS England. This is an example of how 
the external regulatory framework can influence the internal commissioning 
objectives of a CCG. Commissioners are forced to make decisions led by financial 
considerations as they do not want to be placed under special measures, yet the 
cost-cutting process is left down to the commissioners. There is evidence to suggest 
the possibility that other CCGs may come under direct control of NHS England in 
the future (Hazell 2016). NHS England at both sites appears to be much more 
concerned with the stable financial running of commissioning organisations rather 
than issuing firm guidance on how to tackle such issues. To some degree new 
developments such as the Capped Expenditure Programmes (CEPs) provide more 
useful guidance on how to control expenditure and the relationship with the 
external regulatory bodies (The King's Fund 2017). Commissioners have latitude in 
deciding how and which services are altered to reach their goals. Thus, this role of 
the financial watchdog affected the decision making of commissioners who focused 
on generating savings and ensuring their own independence. NHS England 
maintains both its indirect and direct control over the CCGs. Directly, through the 
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threat of special measures, and indirectly, by shaping the commissioning agenda, as 
commissioners need to meet the targets set by NHS England.  
 
One of the more explicit ways in which the regulatory framework should impact the 
work of commissioners is through the assumption of the use of procurement. While 
commissioners are expected to make greater use of procurement in specific 
contexts, commissioners have adapted and used this new tool in situations which 
suits their own agendas. It is within the limit of the commissioners to determine the 
size of any contract, and how any particular procurement is written; for example, 
commissioners can procure a relatively small amount, or restrict the amount of 
subcontracting that can take place. In so doing, commissioners can incentivise 
certain types of providers to submit bids and discourage others. At site one this is 
done to bring in new providers, but at site two this is again conducted in order to 
relieve the financial pressures. Commissioners have to generate savings in order to 
be able to invest in new services. This has led to some care being moved in to the 
community in order to generate savings. In this sense, commissioners are 
subverting some of the statutory responsibilities as other pressures and issues 
become more important than their formal obligations. Hence, the CCGs are able to 
ignore some rules and regulations if it is in their interests and if it demonstrates to 
NHS England that the commissioners are in a stable financial situation.  
 
While commissioners have a variety of tools at their disposal, the way they have 
used them has resulted in a situation in which the number of private providers is 
not as high as might have been expected. At site one there is limited penetration of 
non-public providers in the local health economy. This is due to the internal focus 
on delivering care as quickly as possible so local existing providers are favoured. 
This is reflected in the evidence from this study, and those of other authors who 
also found that the penetration of private provider is not as marked as may have 
been imagined (Checkland et al., 2017). However, at site two where there is a 
relative lack of resources, there has been a greater involvement of private providers 
as they are one method of relieving the financial pressures faced by the 
commissioners. Although there is a cost to the procurement process, it enables 
commissioners to make long term savings and the apparent willingness of the 
private provider to move to a fixed value annual contract further enhances their 
attractiveness to the commissioners.  
 
This helps to explain how the financial context that commissioners must operate 
within plays a significant role in which tools they opt to use. The role of NHS 
England is one of a regulator which is primarily concerned with financial matters. 
At site one, the surplus position of the CCG enabled the Chair to pursue selecting 
new providers using any of the tools at their disposal. Site two was different. NHS 
England was more involved and threatened the commissioners with special 
measures. This enabled the Chair to focus the agenda on dealing with the 
financial pressure. Once NHS England was assured that this would be the priority 
of the commissioners they were given the freedom to complete the task. Other 
research has found similar conclusions, that the role of the regulatory bodies was 
vague but that it was concerned with financial issues (Allen et al., 2016) and that 
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it had less influence in the day-to-day running of the CCGs (Ham et al., 2015). In 
this sense, commissioners have less ability to exercise choice, as they rely on the 
resources that they are given.   
 
There was little evidence to suggest that third sector providers were used in the 
same fashion at site two. Even with non-NHS providers winning a third of all new 
contracts which are awarded via procurement (Iacobucci 2014). Private providers 
were utilised almost exclusively, and third sector organisations were seemingly 
not considered. There is limited evidence about the role of the third sector in the 
delivery of care. Of all the care provided by non-NHS providers, 71.3% of 
contracts are given to the private sector (Lafond et al., 2017).  The third sector 
only received 11% of spending that was given to non-NHS providers. They 
represent a much smaller proportion of spending and as such, they may not be 
viewed as viable alternatives  W at least not to the level that private providers are. 
Evidence from third sector providers in the NHS would reinforce this view, with 
many believing that commissioners are not supporting the third sector as they 
should under the NHS Five year forward view (Baird et al., 2016).    
 
tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞĂŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
public would be important in deciding commissioning priorities, this was not always 
clear. Early research on CCGs suggested a complex mixture of accountability 
networks (Checkland et al., 2013). The data gathered confirms that these do exist, 
but that their influence was limited. The key element of accountability was to NHS 
England and was generally of a financial nature. This manifests as a perceived 
obligation of maintaining high standards of fiscal responsibility and management, 
the alternative to which is the imposition of sanctions. As most commissioners tend 
ƚŽďĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂŶĚŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ƚŚĞ' ?ƐůŽƐƐŽĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚ
likely lead most of them to leave commissioning altogether. They do not feel that 
managers alone can reach the best decisions, whilst being deeply convinced of the 
importance of the role of clinical commissioning.  Some lay members of boards 
were vocal in their criticism but they were unable to really affect commissioning 
decisions. At site one there was more of a focus on delivering the services needed, 
including those which were deemed important by the public. However, at site two 
this proved to be less effective due to the financial constraints and the 
commissioning approach to dealing with it. Oversight from NHS England meant that 
ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?ĨŝƌƐƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇǁĂƐƐĂƚŝƐĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĚĞŵĂŶĚƐĂŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
public.  
Summary of similarities and differences at the two sites - 
Discussion 
The rules laid out by the Health and Social Care Act (2012) are undermined by other 
factors such as the financial pressures which have much more influence over the 
behaviour of the commissioners. A positive financial situation enables 
commissioners to seek arrangements which suit their local needs, whereas a 
negative situation means NHS England shapes commissioner behaviour and leads 
them to seek cost savings. While there is a lot of independence when it comes to 
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how these processes take place, it illustrates the power of the regulatory 
framework as something which drives behaviour of commissioners. The external 
influences of financial pressure and regulatory bodies dictate the way in which 
commissioners will behave under the auspices of the Health and Social Care Act 
(2012). Once there is a clear delineation of the sort of finances a CCG may have 
access too, the process of selecting providers becomes much clearer. There remains 
a lot of discretion with how CCGs may do this but, as long as regulatory bodies are 
satisfied, commissioners do possess some flexibility with regards to selecting new 
providers.  
 
ŽƚŚ ƐŝƚĞƐ ? ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ƚŽŽůƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƌĞ
faced with similar limitations, having to direct the majority of their resources to 
ůŽĐĂůE,^dƌƵƐƚƐ ?ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŽŶůǇŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ? ?ŝƚŝƐŽŶůǇŝŶƚŚŝƐ
space that the full range of commissioning tools are used. The way in which these 
tools are used is therefore quite limited, as is the commissioning of new services.  
 
The differences between the two sites emerge when trying to understand what 
may motivate the commissioners to choose which of the tools mentioned. While 
both sites rely on powerful Chairs in order to develop the commissioning agenda, 
the key difference seems to be the financial situation. At site one, the relatively 
stable financial situation allows commissioners to be more flexible in their choice of 
methods and how they employ them. They are able to absorb the potential costs of 
failed procurements and are also in a position to change the contracts of existing 
providers more frequently to provide additional services when the need arises. The 
commissioning agenda focuses heavily on the clinical needs and which provider or 
process may allow them to mobilise as quickly as possible. In essence, 
commissioners at site one use procurements only as a result of internal pressures 
(their commissioning agenda) and not due to pressures from the external 
regulatory framework. Similarly, they utilise the market only when they feel they 
have the time and scope to pursue new options. Significantly, the data indicates 
that the level of marketisation and privatisation is lower than that observed at site 
two which is subject to additional external pressures.  
 
As stated previously, at site two commissioners are more exposed to financial 
pressures and this becomes the primary concern of the Chair. Commissioning tools 
are primarily used in this context and in practice are expressed in attempts to move 
services out of the NHS Trusts, lowering the costs associated with the Trusts. There 
is evidence to suggest that PbR contracts and the new national tariffs have placed 
the commissioners under increasing financial pressure (Allen and Petsoulas 2016). 
This has led commissioners to seek ways in which they can divert care into the 
community, third sector or private providers, and has increasing the number of 
services transferred to the private and/or third sector. Procurements were carried 
out in a planned way to target a greater number of private providers in order to 
move care to less expensive providers. There is other evidence in the field to 
suggest that this is not a unique situation (Williams et al., 2017). This is an example 
of how commissioners attempt to overcome the formalised nature of the 
commissioning process and use it to their benefit. Commissioners at site two alter 
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existing contracts as much as they can ( “transformation ?) in a similar way to 
commissioners at site one, however their primary goal is to reduce costs by 
merging or eliminating contracts in contrast to site one where commissioners 
primarily use transformation when commissioning new services. The most notable 
example of this was the decommissioning of the podiatry clinic. Accordingly, at site 
two there is much clearer evidence of privatisation and marketisation than at site 
one, which indicates that CCGs under financial pressures may be more susceptible 
to privatisation and marketisation.   
 
A number of elements shape the commissioner's decisions. The decision of which 
commissioning tool to employ is the key decision which affects the likelihood of any 
particular type of provider being selected. It is here that commissioners exercise 
the greatest choice, whether or not to engage with potential new providers or to 
focus on exploring/improving existing arrangements. This choice itself is shaped 
primarily by the financial situation of the CCG, and this then has an effect on 
whether or not the regulatory framework, namely NHS England, does or does not 
dictate financial rules. Site one was able to resist any serious interference from NHS 
England and engage with commissioning according to the needs that the Chair 
deemed most important. They are also able to explore their commissioning options 
in more depth as they are usually commissioning new services rather than 
eliminating/limiting existing ones, and the financial surplus allows site one to 
absorb the cost if the processes fail. Furthermore, commissioners who have a 
surplus can look for opportunities to commission additional services from providers 
and to explore the best way of securing the service, i.e., which commissioning tool 
to use. It is also important to note that the majority of such commissioning takes 
place beyond ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ƐƉĂĐĞŽĨĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐůĂƌŐĞ contracts. The situation at site 
two was different. With their associated financial pressures, the commissioners 
were vulnerable to intervention from NHS England and this meant that the Chair 
focused the CCG on reducing the financial burden. While it restricted the ability of 
commissioners at site two to seek new providers, they still had considerable ability 
to address the financial issue using any tools at their disposal. Within the study it 
became clear that factors such as financial pressures were key determinants of 
behaviour. As a result, it dictated the behaviour of commissioners and was more 
important than some of the formal rules to do with commissioning.    
 
These decisions resulted in a limited increase in the amount of private provision 
at the two sites. The form of privatisation is best described as passive 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďŽƚƚŽŵŽĨ^ĂůƚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ?   ? ?ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?DĂŶǇ
of the commissioners, notably at site two, have sought to use the private sector 
so that some elements of care are delivered in the community and outside of 
hospital settings. Again this is supported by evidence from other research 
(Williams et al., 2017). This privatisation has taken place in areas in which the 
private sector has had prior success, such as MSK services. Commissioners seek 
to make these changes as they are able to influence the private providers who 
have also shown some flexibility and willingness to adopt fixed value annual 
contracts. Other research has noted that changes are required to continue the 
pattern of moving care out of hospital settings (Allen and Petsoulas 2016), but 
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they have not explored the way in which commissioners would use these specific 
tools to try and reach their aims. The total value of contracts procured out in this 
fashion is small and does not represent more than 2- ?A? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ' ?Ɛ ĂŶŶƵĂů
budget.  
 
Commissioners spend £12.7 billion on non-NHS providers which further 
highlights that privatisation which is occurring is limited (Lafond et al., 2017). This 
does represent an upward trend, with there being annual increases in the 
amount commissioners did spend on non-NHS providers (Ibid 2017). There is also 
a great difference in the amount that commissioners spend on non-NHS 
providers, something that is similar to the data from this study. There is little 
information about how this may manifest in terms of financial pressures but is 
something which is worth further exploration.   
 
To summarise, this study has found many similarities with previous research in 
this field. There has been an increased use of market mechanisms and of private 
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ƐƉĂĐĞ ?dŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂŶŽƚŝĐĞĂďůĞ ?ŝĨƌĞůĂƚŝǀely small, 
uptake of private providers which does represent a form of limited privatisation. 
The delivery of care has not been fragmented despite data that suggests that 
there is a certain degree of friction between the public providers and the newly 
contracted private providers. This is much more visible in services which already 
have some history of private provision. Another significant factor arising from the 
perception of relatively loose regulatory framework is the deepening conflicts 
between public and private providers due to the possibilities of legal challenges 
and other means of blocking the decisions of the commissioners, something that 
has also been discovered by others (Sanderson et al., 2017). The external 
regulatory framework functions more like a blunt tool, rather than exercising 
discretion as was anticipated when the reforms were announced (Davies 2013). 
There are other similarities with existing literature; the lack of a developed 
private market (Sheaff and Allen 2016); the issues arising from the financial 
power of the Trusts over the CCGs (Allen and Petsoulas 2016); the limited 
evidence of privatisation (Ham et al. 2015); and the limited decision making 
space of the commissioners (Checkland et al., 2017). In this regard, evidence 
from other research has come to similar conclusions. 
 
Marketisation has also increased with the commissioners' use of the tools, most 
notably using procurement to select providers, in an attempt to exploit 
competition to lower costs. At site two commissioners, being under the threat of 
E,^ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůŵeasures, have been in effect pushed to decommissioning 
and procurement to maintain their independence. This same outcome of an 
increased number of private providers occurred when commissioners similarly 
use procurement in their attempts to achieve savings. This process is much more 
visible in services where there is already some history of private provision. This 
could be significant in the future when and if the private market develops further 
and potentially attains the capacity to provide services similar to that of a large 
NHS Trust.  
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Another concern as argued by Peckham (2015) is that the expansion of private 
providers could result in a fragmentation of the system. Many different factors 
are mentioned, one of which is the possibility that the regulatory bodies fail to 
integrate care  W i.e., make sure that providers work together effectively. This 
potential unintended consequence of the reforms will be explored further in the 
subsequent section. This conflicting agenda, of promoting competition while 
simultaneously integrating care, has served only to amplify the issues with which 
commissioners are faces; balancing finances, and providing and coordinating 
care. At the same time, regulatory bodies are under pressure to regulate the 
service, adhere to financial objectives and to integrate various providers.  
Internal/External Framework Explanatory Power  ? Pettigrew et 
al., (1992) receptive change  
The approach taken to understanding the decision-making process adopted an 
internal/external conceptual framework (see figure 8, page 168) (Pettigrew et al., 
1992, Checkland et al., 2013). The framework suggests that two sets of pressures 
can influence commissioners  Wexternal (top-down) pressures created by the Health 
and Social Care Act (2012), and internal (new service/local area) pressures. This 
approach has proved to hold some explanatory power, although it needs further 
refinement in light of the evidence generated from this study. 
 
One dimension which seems to have been overlooked in the formulation of the 
conceptual framework is the significance of the experience of the commissioners 
themselves. At both sites, many of the GPs have considerable prior commissioning 
experience and adapting to new commissioning arrangements took less time than 
was anticipated. Initially, it had been thought that part of development process 
would relate to commissioners gaining experience in the new framework. This was 
aided by the fact that most of the commissioners previously worked for PCTs or 
other commissioning bodies. Hence, there is a reservoir of commissioning 
experience which the CCGs can draw upon (with senior commissioning roles being 
filled with these commissioners). This experience has helped commissioners at site 
one operate more effectively and manage contracts. On the other hand, regarding 
external pressures, the CCG is in a better position to allay the fears of NHS England 
when it comes to managing financial resources. Hence, these pressures (both 
internal and external) are a significant influencing factor on commissioners, limiting 
what options they have to pursue and how they can operate in the marketplace of 
providers.  
 
The internal/external framework has proved to have some explanatory power for 
how commissioners reach decisions. Evidence from the research suggests that a 
complex network of different elements influences the decisions made by 
commissioners. Clinicians are particularly insistent on their role and independence 
and are predisposed to maintaining existing relationships, as evidenced by the data, 
to ensure the continuing provision of services. They genuinely believe that they are 
best placed to make the decisions which are necessary for their population and 
view NHS England as too remote to best allocate resources as effectively. The 
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limited resources have had a more profound effect than initially thought. This has 
particularly reflected in the way NHS England involves itself in the affairs of the 
CCGs. This research discovered other themes that support the argument that there 
is a lack of systematic central leadership in the NHS, as has been described 
especially in chapter six (i.e., site two). It suggests that NHS England has assumed a 
passive role in regard to most issues, not operating as was imagined at the start of 
the reforms (i.e., providing advice and guidance to CCGs). NHS England has only 
been proactive in dealing with financial matters and management, arguably to the 
detriment of clinical care and best outcome for patients.    
 
The data suggests that the conceptual framework could be refined to include the 
relationship between the providers and commissioners in light of the regulatory 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?dŚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ
the regulatory framework in a period during which the NHS is faced with budget 
restraints is something that should be considered. Irrespective of the 
commissioning changes, if the budget reduction continues the commissioners may 
feel they have no choice but to abandon their plans and instead prioritise those 
that ensure their clinical and fiscal independence. NHS England is the key part of 
the regulatory framework which deals with this aspect and has been able to exert 
influence on CCGs. The future shape of commissioning will be affected by the 
adoption of Accountable Care Partnerships (ACPs) and Sustainability and 
Transformation Partnerships (STPs), which could lead to the merging of 
organisations to make necessary savings (Alderwick et al., 2016). The effect of 
commissioning being upscaled in this fashion is important to study further.   
 
Referring to the contexts for receptive change, the data from this study would 
suggest that of the eight criteria which Pettigrew et al., (1992) outlined as being 
important for change to be successful, there are five criteria which were clearly 
seen during the study as enabling change to occur. All eight criteria are still relevant 
in understanding change in the new NHS, however, five proved to be more crucial 
in understanding the success of CCGs. These were environmental pressure, 
supportive organisational culture, managerial and clinical relations, clarity and 
simplicity of goals and key people leading change (see figure 9). In this context site 
one exhibited all of these characteristics, while site two achieved as many aims as it 
could, but the financial pressures restricted the ability of commissioners there to 
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Figure 12 - Context for receptive change updated 
Source: Pettigrew et al., (1992) [emphasis added] 
 
 
1. Environmental pressures related to the budgetary issues and the role of the 
external framework, that were faced by the CCGs. In this sense, the financial 
situation was key to understanding the actions and decisions of commissioners with 
regards to selecting providers. Budgets were set by NHS England and were outside 
the control of commissioners. As seen at site two, the severe pressures and threat 
of sanctions by an external organisation led to commissioning in a specific manner, 
one in which the commissioners sought to limit expenditure and so reduce the 
numbers of providers that they commission. They were unable to exercise their 
powers to commission and had to focus on reducing the financial pressures they 
were facing. In this respect it has affected the remaining processes within the CCG. 
This relates to other research in the field which drew a similar conclusion, that 
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financial pressures could be disruptive and inhibit the system from functioning as 
intended (Hunter et al., 2015).  
 
2. The second key element in successful change from this study was key people 
leading change. Both sites relied on strong leadership from several individuals who 
set the agenda and decided what the aims and objectives of the CCG were to be. 
They were empowered by the external pressures, with the commissioners at site 
one following the lead of the Chair who had experience of commissioning. This led 
them to following a system which identified clinical needs and attempted to 
address them, while maintaining the budgetary surplus of the CCG. The situation at 
site two was one in which the Chair was seeking to address the financial deficit and 
the threat of the sanction from NHS England. However, in both cases the Chairs 
were elected to lead on certain platforms. At site one, the Chair, Vice-Chair and 
Managing Director had been working together over a period of years and used this 
to ensure that the CCG continued to operate smoothly. At site two, the Chair and 
Vice-Chair had been elected to address the financial pressures and this led to the 
commissioning strategies which they employed. In this sense at both sites these 
clinical leaders were able to exert control over the agenda, illustrating the second 
face of power. This was the most common expression of their power and proved to 
be effective in environments where the agenda was key to completing their tasks. 
Both sites shared longer term aims which were implemented by staff with the 
ability and the power to carry out those aims.  
 
3. Linked to the second factor are managerial-clinical relations. Without the close 
co-operation of managerial staff, the clinical commissioners would have struggled 
to achieve their aims. They enable the commissioners to carry out their work and at 
site two enabled the CCG to seek new ways to relieve the financial pressures. 
Through this cooperation, the clinical commissioners and managers are able to 
affect change in the way that their commissioning agenda needs them too. At site 
one this was through identifying clinical needs and methods of addressing them 
with the available resources and tools. At site two, this enabled the CCG to find 
ways of relieving pressure through seeking additional reduction in contracts or 
utilising procurement for the same aim.  
 
4. The ability of actors to carry out change was also affected by the simplicity and 
clarity of the goals. At both sites the CCG leadership had very clear objectives and 
aims, which were communicated to other members of the organisation. At site one, 
this focused on commissioning new providers within their local health economy 
while at site two, the focus was firmly on alleviating the financial issues. The clear 
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ Ăƚ ďŽƚŚ ĞŶƐƵƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ Ă  ‘ďƵǇ-ŝŶ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƐƚĂĨĨ ĂŶĚ Ă ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ
delivering what was needed.  
 
5. The next characteristic is a supportive organisational culture. This relates to the 
previous characteristics. Having a supportive culture is important to succeeding in 
the aims and objectives of the organisation. According to Pettigrew et al., (1992), 
this relates to having an open risk-taking approach, openness to evaluation, a 
strong value base and a positive self-image. These develop over time and reflect the 
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values of key leaders within that environment. This was on clear display at site one, 
where commissioners did seek to be innovative and find solutions using the tools at 
their disposal. There was a somewhat similar situation at site two, but with a 
different focus and some limit to risk-taking and more of a focus on one key issue.  
 
These elements all fit within the evidence from this study. The ability of powerful 
actors shaped the approach of commissioners and focused their decision making. 
The other elements of the Pettigrew et al., (1992) framework did have some 
bearing although this was much more limited than the five listed characteristics.  
 
6. While co-operative networks proved to be an aid to commissioners in the study, 
they were not key determinants of commissioning behaviour. The presence of local 
commissioning collaborative (several CCGs commissioning some services together 
across their geographical boundaries) provided commissioners with some safety in 
cases of unexpected severe financial pressure, but they did not dictate the overall 
strategy of the CCG.  
 
7. While the change agenda and its locale is somewhat important, the CCGs in this 
study did co-operate and function with other local actors in the delivery of care. 
DĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĞǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽ
work together. However, this did not dictate their approach to commissioning, 
which instead was much more affected by the external policy framework.  
 
8. Finally, the quality and coherence of policy was not a key factor in the way in 
which Pettigrew et al., (1992) viewed it. The lack of strict rules and boundaries 
enabled commissioners to contend with issues which they thought were more 
important. They were able to adapt to and utilise external policy or clinical 
pressures by utilising commissioning tools as they saw fit, rather than being 
restricted by following regulatory guidance (which remained weak).    
 
In this sense, the Pettigrew et al., (1992) framework remains an important work in 
understanding how change takes place. Many of its key characteristics remain 
important and assist in understanding how change may succeed in the NHS. 
However, the change seems to be developing organically and avoiding some of the 
rules and regulations which have been set up in the Health and Social Care Act 
(2012). Commissioners at site one were looking for ways in which to select and 
work with existing providers to avoid having to carry out procurements. The key 
influence of how commissioners behave is outside of their control and relates to 
the environmental pressures they face, usually financial concerns. These external 
factors will generally lead to a CCG electing a leadership group which could be 
suited to carry out an agenda which insulates the CCG from these factors. With 
cooperation of other actors, such as managers, they will be able to commission 
according to their local needs. This also relies on cooperation of other staff and 
finding methods which circumvent formal rules and to commission as they see fit, 
within a restricted area, outside of existing commitments to NHS Trusts. It serves as 
a useful guide for understanding the elements which will be helpful in 
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understanding if change is successful, and it highlights how vulnerable 
commissioners are to pressures which are outside of their control. 
The strengths and limitations of the study  
The research was qualitative and comprised of two ethnographies across two 
different CCGs sites. There are well-documented limitations and strengths to 
collecting data using this design and methodological approach (Giacomini and Cook 
2000), and they will be discussed in this section.  
 
The collected data is rich and allows for a fuller/more in-depth understanding of 
how commissioners work in the environment in which they were observed. This 
was one of the advantages of using a symbolic interactionist perspective, as it 
allowed the researcher to embed themselves in the work of the participants and to 
let them inform data collection. This does not mean that it can be presumed that 
other commissioners in different locales function in the same way, as previously 
mentioned the local context in which commissioners operate heavily influences 
their decisions. The major difference between the two sites that were studied was 
the availability of resources, as it determines how they approach commissioning 
new services.  
 
Despite this, the evidence from this study is transferable. The conclusions that were 
drawn here can be applied to CCGs which are of similar size and which face similar 
resource pressures (surplus or deficit positions). They can be expected to behave 
similarly, using the tools at their disposal in a similar manner. One caveat to this is 
that the sites observed had the ability to draw additional resources from the 
commissioning collaborative clusters that they belong to, which is not something 
which is universal across all CCGs.  
 
One key issue when conducting ethnographies is collecting credible data (Guba and 
Lincoln 1985). In this study the researcher had to collect the data in isolation, which 
can raise questions about the quality of the data. There was no other researcher 
available to validate the interpretations, particularly of the data collected through 
non-participant observation. The interviews were in part used to triangulate what 
the researcher discovered during the observations. Further, not all key members of 
the CCG were interviewed during data collection at site two, with several 
commissioners unavailable to participate. The research focused on interviewing the 
key commissioners and managers, while the staff members who implement 
decisions on a day-to-day basis did not participate.  
 
Future research could explore the perspective of service providers and 
representatives of the framework (such as NHS England) to understand the 
development of the supply side in the new NHS. This would allow for a deeper and 
fuller understanding of the commissioning process, particularly as the Trusts can 
subcontract services, which is a possibility that was not explored as deeply as it 
could have been due to issues of access.  
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Gaining access proved to be a significant barrier during the research. Initial contacts 
with the CCGs were established via email. Arranging access with site one took three 
months and had to be negotiated with two gatekeepers. These discussions took 
place when the CCGs were still relatively new and just beginning to operate. After 
access to site one was negotiated, there were promising discussions with a second 
site. However, after four months the CCG ended discussions as a new Chief Officer 
was appointed who did not want to proceed. This was a setback as time was 
needed to identify an adequate second site and agree on access. Of the two 
alternative options, one agreed to proceed and an initial confidentiality agreement 
was signed. After a period of discussion, the communication ceased and nothing 
further was heard from the gatekeeper. This resulted in identifying another CCG 
where access was ultimately successfully agreed. The processes of securing access 
took over six months across both sites which prolonged the collection of data and 
necessitated a compromise about which sites were pursued. Also, the collection of 
data itself took longer than anticipated. However, this more prolonged period of 
data collection allowed the researcher to immerse themselves fully in the work of 
the CCG and to understand the creation of the social spaces within the decision 
making processes. 
 
Accessing a different second site resulted in some compromise with regards to the 
desired criteria. The initial aim was to select CCGs which would have several 
characteristics in common, so that the comparison which would be conducted 
ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ  ‘ůŝĨĞ ĨŽƌ ůŝŬĞ ? ?  dŚĞ ƚǁŽ ƐŝƚĞƐ ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƐŝǌĞ ?
population, and access to private providers. Between the two sites, the key 
difference was the financial situation, but rather than providing to be a detriment 
to the study, it enhanced the data, as it provided new insights. There was also a 
practical consideration as well. The researcher had a limited budget and ability to 
continue contacting other CCGs to gain access. There was a pragmatic choice about 
selecting the best possible site which the researcher could access on a regular basis.  
 
Elective procedures as one of the initially chosen focuses were replaced after 
research at site one. The majority of elective care was carried out by the Trusts in 
the form of contracts, as such there was little data that could be gained without 
access to them, the provider organisations. Elective procedures were replaced by 
MSK services, which yielded more insightful data (with commissioners at site two 
arranging access to a provider). The service was selected on the basis that there 
was a relative abundance of different types of provider that commissioners were 
able to choose. This provided the researcher with a good source of data. Mental 
Health services yielded data at both sites and this provided the researcher with the 
ability to observe differences in how CCGs commissioned the same type of service.  
 
In addition to selecting a different site, there was the issue of gaining access to the 
Leadership Executive committee meetings. The candidate was denied access on the 
grounds of sensitive commercial data. The research did interview the three 
members that comprised that group (Chair, Vice-Chair and Managing Director) to 
gain some insight about its purpose and how it did/did not affect the decision-
making process at site two. This was aided with some triangulation through 
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observing the other sub-committees. Any decision made by this group would also 
need to be ratified by these sub-committees and be approved by the Governing 
Body, which would suggest that the researcher would have discovered how these 
affected the decision-making process.   
 
The political climate could have also had an impact on the nature of the data being 
collected. The first round of data collection took place during an election year, 
2015, and this might explain why two CCGs declined to take part. Also, the 
commissioners appeared sensitive to what they perceived to be an uncertain 
political climate and so were less likely to disclose their genuine views. Whilst it is 
impossible to confirm that the commissioners were completely sincere and open, 
many of them did not appear to shy away from discussing their opinions of 
politicians and what they thought about further proposed reform and change. This 
indirectly also highlighted the importance of the broader environment in which the 
CCGs work, as many commissioners were openly wary of political interference and 
seemed dissatisfied with the structures within which they had to work. 
 
The collected data was rich, with continuing access being granted to regular 
meetings of commissioners over the course of the ethnography and with the 
researcher being given limited access to providers at both sites. This allowed for 
data gathering from multiple sources and a comparison of the views of the 
commissioners on the one hand, with those of the providers that they have worked 
with over a prolonged period on the other. This means that the researcher was able 
to gain an in-depth understanding of the process from within as well as, outside the 
CCGs that were observed.  
Towards a future research agenda 
The evidence from this study has highlighted a need for further research. A 
common belief held by informants in this study was that they did not think that the 
framework created by the Health and Social Care Act (2012) will last. The 
perception is that the commissioning units that were created are too small to 
influence the larger Trusts and that future arrangements would follow the 
Accountable Care Partnerships (ACPs) model. The contractual issues between 
commissioners and providers is not a new phenomenon, and with an increasing 
focus on ACPs there will most likely be a change of rhetoric and further 
development of cooperation between providers and purchasers. There is the belief 
that commissioning as it has been practiced over the last 20 years may not be 
pursued by future policy makers (Ham and Murray 2018, Timmins 2017).  
 
Further research into the way in which commissioners interact with Trusts and 
other provider organisations could validate the conclusions of this study. This is 
about the issue of the public/private balance in the NHS, wherein much more could 
be determined after further investigation, particularly of the nature of sub-
contracting arrangements. Further research would need to secure access to Trusts 
and explore if and to what degree they may have engaged with private providers 
themselves to determine the actual level of privatisation.   
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Another direction of possible further research is a more detailed study and analysis 
of the private sector and third sectors to see if they are expanding and approaching 
levels of scale and quality to be a viable partner or alternative to NHS organisations. 
Most measures would suggest that they are not growing very rapidly (Lafond et al., 
2017). The current evidence has confirmed that the private sector has so far been 
mostly focused on providing specific services, although recently there have been 
moves to penetrate the purchaser side of the NHS market, i.e. private companies 
have begun to purchase GP services. The data from this study found that the 
majority of private provider breakthrough was in services in which they generated 
profit. This new trend of higher private sector activity could present both a 
challenge and an opportunity for both the sectors in the future.  
 
The development of private providers could be further encouraged by events linked 
to the UK leaving the European Union (EU) with some of the participants suggesting 
that larger health provider conglomerates may enter the UK market with a change 
in trade barriers. If there was to be a growth of private providers, the marketplace 
would develop and offer commissioners a more extensive choice of potential 
providers. Likewise, the conglomerates could begin to play a role in the future 
delivery of services and become part of the mixed economy of care. Taking into 
account the present deficit within the health service, the potential challenge of a 
growing, more assertive private sector means that the future of the NHS is more 
uncertain than at any other point in time, although there are still some that 
disagree with this analysis (Ham 2017).  
 
The commissioning of Public Health services is also of interest. There was limited 
data about how CCGs interacted with Local Authorities and Councils with whom 
some CCGs work to deliver services. There is data that suggests that commissioners 
would struggle with the additional workload, also lacking some of the expertise to 
commission effectively in this context. If there is a move towards ACP-style 
organisations, the relationship between clinical and Local Authority commissioners 
could be critical to the success of such organisations. 
 
Finally, the definition of privatisation and marketisation used during the research 
proved to be effective. Saltman's (2003) definition provided a clear path by which 
to track the process and to engage with commissioners. Many commissioners were 
not aware of the difference between marketisation and privatisation. This 
definition helped them engage critically with the subject matter while allowing the 
researcher to track two separate processes with some additional clarity. This 
distinction between these two processes could provide the basis for additional 
comparative research. 
Policy Implications: The influence of the Health and Social Care 
Act (2012) on the selection of providers 
The manner in which commissioners make decisions about services dictates the 
rate at which private providers will enter and be part of the NHS. Commissioners 
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have been given the power and the tools to make radical changes, such as 
decommissioning any provider they choose. They can purchase services from a 
wide range of bodies, public and private, and have the ability to decommission 
providers who are not meeting agreed targets. 
 
Formally, the CCGs have wide-ranging powers in the selection of providers, but in 
everyday practice they are rarely able to use their autonomy to the fullest extent. 
This is because of a combination of internal and external pressures. At the outset, 
ƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŽĨĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽĂ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ƐƉĂĐĞ ?ĂƐĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ
have no alternative but to commit the majority of their budgets to local Trusts. In 
many respects, CCG commissioners face restrictions which other, older primary 
care-led commissioners faced. The most important of these pressures is financial 
situation of the CCG. If the CCG is facing a surplus position, then they are able to 
resist other internal and external pressures and opt for the solution they feel is 
optimal, rather than be forced to compromise. In a situation where the CCG faces 
financial pressures, they are vulnerable to having their already limited autonomy 
restricted further, either through the regulation of the external policy framework or 
the pressures stemming from local providers. 
 
dŚĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making are a combination of 
internal and external pressures. The financial pressures appear to be the critical 
determinant of the level of a commissioner's discretion. In a scenario in which the 
CCG has at its disposal a budget surplus, they are more likely to exercise a higher 
level of autonomy which allows them to pursue their own commissioning priorities 
without interference from the external regulatory framework. This allows a more 
effective relationship with the local Trusts and the freedom to choose any of the 
commissioning tools they feel are best suited in any given situation. However, even 
in this the commissioners remain limited in their choices, as the provider market 
has not matured and grown. Their options are restricted, and there is a public 
sector ethos where commissioners believe they should also still support other NHS 
bodies. This is one of the reasons that the private sector has not emerged as a 
credible alternative to public providers and has restricted itself to activities in the 
services in which they have traditionally been active and thriving. The autonomy of 
commissioners is limited by financial constraints, coupled with a market which is 
underdeveloped and still favours public providers and tools which have limited 
effectiveness in selecting new providers and/or changing the status quo. 
 
Commissioners exercise their autonomy to the highest degree when they decide 
which tool to use to commission any particular service. This is an area in which their 
only constraint is the selection of tools that are on offer and which have been 
defined by the Health and Social Care Act (2012). It is also where whatever limited 
autonomy the commissioners have can be applied to the goal of maximising their 
effectiveness and control over the broader landscape. Believing they are best 
placed to meet local demands and possess greater knowledge of their area, 
commissioners generally have a clear idea of which provider they would like to 
secure for any service, and would ideally like to be in full control of that process. 
However, faced with financial constraints, the commissioners tend to opt for 
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options/methods which give them the maximum possible control, avoid risk from 
provider failure and legal challenges, and allows for faster service delivery. When 
dealing with Trusts, their significant partners, they generally opt for the 
transformation of existing contracts which is seen as the least expensive and least 
hazardous arrangement. The tendency is to avoid procurement as it is a lengthy 
and costly process in which they have little control over the final selection due to 
the formalities of the method, and there is a possibility that it could be overturned. 
The general feeling is that the commissioners are, on the whole, disposed to 
maintaining the status quo whilst using procurement only on the margins in the 
 ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ƐƉĂĐĞ ƚŽĂĨĨĞĐƚĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚĂůůŽǁƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĞŶƚƌǇŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŽƌ ƚŚŝƌĚ
sector providers into the system. 
 
The balance between the public and private sectors has changed in the NHS but not 
to the extent that many of the critics of the Act feared. Exploring this via the matrix 
which was presented in chapter two, the private sector has managed to alter the 
balance in the provision of services to a limited extent. It has managed to expand 
operations in some services, albeit ones where they have been successful in the 
past. However, the private sector has not supplanted, or become a viable 
alternative to, the large existing public providers. Rather, they have carved out a 
niche as an alternative in some smaller elements of care. Privatisation, when it has 
occurred, has done so only within the provision of services. The private sector has 
not expanded its role to the funding of any services. The most effective 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ  ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ
services granted to the private sector are those in which the treatment of patients 
is possible outside of hospital settings. Commissioners, have not been led or driven 
by any ideological agendas, but have instead used procurement as and when it can 
assist them in generating savings. This would, in turn, protect their autonomy from 
the external policy framework. Therefore, it can be concluded that the combination 
of internal and external pressures has helped to move smaller contracts from the 
public to the private sector, but on a very limited scale. 
 
What has resulted from the reforms is an increase in the marketisation of the NHS. 
Commissioners are comfortable in using market principles when they feel they can 
secure a better deal. Procurement has become an accepted norm within the CCGs 
and commissioners have not been ideologically opposed to the introduction of 
these mechanisms, or even the appointment of private providers, but are more 
concerned with the length of time and other associated issues (i.e. the legal 
challenge, the need to re-procure). Indeed, if the private sector was developed 
enough to function as a genuine alternative to the large NHS Trusts, there would 
likely have been some movement on behalf of commissioners, exercising their 
autonomy to move away from existing arrangements. The majority of 
procurements still are awarded to public providers; therefore, there is no large-
scale transfer of assets but an ever-increasing use of market principles and 
management, which represents a significant level of marketisation of the system. 
  
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) brought commissioning back under the 
control of GPs, to make commissioning responsive to local needs. It promised to 
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involve the private sector to a more significant degree and to increase the flexibility 
of the NHS in this regard. The Act has had the effect of further marketisation of the 
system through the use of the described market mechanisms, the opening of the 
internal market to outside competition. The role of the private sector was 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞE,^ďƵƚ ?ŵŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?ŝƚŚĂƐ
allowed them to present themselves as a direct competitor to public Trusts in 
specific fields. The private sector could move in the direction of extending its 
activity to services other than those they have traditionally occupied. Virgin Care 
has already purchased 21 primary care services in the UK (Virgin Care, 2017).  The 
reforms have left the NHS a more marketised system, with the expansion of market 
mechanisms and in which there is higher potential for increased levels of 
privatisation.  
 
Describing GP Fundholding, Le Grand stated:  “ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌaints were too strong and 
ƚŚĞŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐƚŽŽǁĞĂŬ ?(Le Grand, 2002). This seems to be an accurate description 
of the current state of the NHS after the Health and Social Care Act (2012). While 
commissioners have the powers to change the service radically, they are in fact 
restricted in doing so by the dynamics between the internal and external pressures. 
In practice, they do not seem to have any incentive to change the status quo in 
seeking to ensure the continued provision of services in an increasingly complex 
and uncertain environment. There is little that the commissioners would gain from 
radically altering any existing services. The possibility that the reform has further 
opened the door to future privatisation is still a realistic possibility particularly in 
the current climate where austerity continues to dominate the public service 
discussion.  
 
In the future, a more cohesive and integrated NHS without the present 
purchaser/provider split could allow for a more joined-up approach to care, that 
would also help to alleviate cost pressures. However, an obstacle to this scenario is 
that to make it possible, the present regulatory framework would have to be 
replaced, and future governments are likely to be reluctant to put the NHS through 
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Introduction  
1. Confirm with the participant that they have consented and remind them of 
their confidentiality ͒ 
2. Talk through the information sheet ͒ 
3. Background information on the participant, how long they have been a 
clinical ͒commissioner, thoughts on the new reforms, how the 
reforms have affected their job. ͒ 
1 The new reforms ͒ 
 How have the new reforms changed the day-to-day work of the 
commissioners? ͒ 
 What are your thoughts on care being commissioned by GPs? ͒ 
 What kind of working atmosphere does there exist in the CCG? ͒ 
 How much extra responsibility does the head of a CCG need to take on?  
2 The Commissioning Process ͒ 
 How does the commissioning process take place? ͒ 
 Are services tendered for? ͒ 
 Are there preferred providers or arrangements that the CCG pursues? ͒ 
 Which services are the most difficult to commission? ͒ 
 How much input do other commissioners have? ͒ 
 tŚĂƚƐŽƌƚŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚŽƚŚĞ ‘ůĂǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŚĂǀĞ ?͒ 
3 The providers  
 Have providers approached the CCG? ͒ 
 If so, what types of providers have approached the CCG? ͒ 
 What preference do they have? ͒ 
 What role does the Health and Wellbeing board play? ͒ 






Ref: CCG Access.  
Vid alovski  
PhD Researcher  
T: +44 (0)1227 764000 switchboard F: +44 (0)1227 827868͒E: vc202@kent.ac.uk www.kent.ac.uk/chss  
Dear X,͒I am currently studying as a full-time PhD researcher in the School of Social 
Policy,  
Sociology and Social Research at the University of Kent. The focus of my research is 
decision making in the commissioning process and how different providers are 
chosen in the wake of the implementation of the Health and Social Care Act (2012) 
and the accompanying policy framework.  
I am writing to ask for permission to include your CCG as a site for my fieldwork. If 
granted access I will conduct ethnographic research, which will include observing 
the commissioning process and interviewing CCG members and another key people 
involved with the commissioning process. The research would take place over a 
period of approximately 12 months, with the initial stage consisting of observing 
and following the commissioning process. The second stage will involve follow-up 
interviews to gain a better understanding of the process.  
The specific services the research would be examining would be elective 
procedures and mental health services. I am enclosing an information sheet with 
further details of the research; please do refer to it to discover what my research 
will look like in practice.  
Once my fieldwork is completed, you would be given a summary of the findings of 
my research and I can provide other forms of feedback if required. Although I am 
not evaluating the commissioning process directly, the results may be useful to 
yourself and other commissioners in gaining a deeper understanding of how the 
process may have changed since 2012. This summary would include what may be 
the most common type of provider, the perception of providers and their views on 
the system as well as gaining a better understanding of the entire process.  
I would also be happy to come and meet with you to discuss any concerns that you 
may have. I am also happy to speak with you on the phone if that is easier.  
In keeping with Ethical Guidelines and Data Protection I would anonymise the 
results of the research conducted to ensure that nothing can be traced back to your 
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CCG. I have received ethical approval from my School Research Ethics Committee, 
however if you have any queries about the ethical approval please do contact the 
Director of Research Services, Simon Kerridge 
(directorofresearchservices@kent.ac.uk, 01227 82 3229).  
My research supervisors are Professor Michael Calnan and Professor Stephen 
Peckham  W Director of the Centre for Health Services Studies. Their email addresses 
are, M.W.Calnan@kent.ac.uk and S.Peckham@kent.ac.uk and their contact 
numbers are 01227 823687 and 01227 827645 respectively.  
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch. Yours 
faithfully,  

























Information Sheet  
 
Information about the research͒ 
Exploring clinical commissioning decisions about the use of 
healthcare providers  
Dear Sir/Madam,  
I would like to invite you to take part in my research. Before you 
decide, I would like you to understand why the research is taking 
place and what it involves. I will go through the information sheet 
with you and will answer any questions you may have. The first 
section will outline the purpose and aims of the research, while the 
second section will provide you with information about the conduct 
of the study. If you have concerns please do not hesitate to contact 
me or my supervisors. Contact details can be found at the bottom of 
this sheet.  
Section 1  
Information about the research  
The focus of the research is to gain a better understanding of the 
commissioning process and how providers are chosen. This piece of 
research is an ethnographic study that will involve non- participant 
observations of committee meetings as well as, interviews with 
members of the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG).  
I am a PhD student in the School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social 
Research (SSPSSR) at the University of Kent and have undertaken 
extensive research methods training.  
Purpose of the research  
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The purpose of the research is to gain a better understanding of how 
the commissioning process takes places and how it has changed 
under the new arrangements brought in by the Health and Social 
Care Act (2012), and what role commissioners play in the process. 
The research will assist with assessing how these changes have (if at 
all) changed the public/private balance in the NHS.  
Why have you been asked to take part?  
I am asking all members of the CCG who take part in the 
commissioning process to be a part of the research.  
Do you have to take part?  
It is up to you whether or not you decide to take part in the research. 
You are free to withdraw from the research at any point without 
needing to provide a reason. Before making a decision, please allow 
me to go through the information sheet and answer any question 
that you may have. You will be provided with a consent form to sign 
and will be given a copy to keep.  
    
   
1  
What will be involved?  
Your participation will involve taking part in a confidential, face-to-
face interview with the researcher either at your own practice or at 
the CCG building during your normal work hours. The interview 
should last no more than 20 minutes and it will be recorded (with 
your permission) on a digital recorder so that your responses may be 
transcribed for inclusion in the analysis of the research. The type of 
questions that will be asked is explained below.  
I am willing to travel to individual practices/office locations to 
interview participants. What sort of questions will be asked during 
the interview?  
The questions will be about how the commissioning process takes 
place and your perceptions of the process. There will be questions 
about your role within the process and how providers are chosen for 
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certain services.  
I will ensure that you will not be identifiable in the transcript or in 
any subsequent publication that emerges from the research.  
Confidentiality  
Any one that you may refer to while discussing an aspect of 
commissioning will also be anonymised and pseudonyms will be used 
ŝŶƉůĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŶĂŵĞƐŝŶĂŶǇƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ
of the research.  
Section 2  
Confidentiality  
Your responses will be confidential. The transcript of any interview 
that you give will be coded and anonymised so that you will not be 
identifiable, except to me. The only person who will have access to 
the recordings will be me, who will also carry out the transcription 
alone. Data which is kept during the process will be kept in line with 
ƚŚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽĨĚĂƚĂƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƌ ĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƐǁŝůůďĞ
deleted once transcription has taken place. The transcriptions will be 
put onto a password-protected computer with access being limited 
to me.  
Use of quotations  
If quotations are used in the final draft of the PhD thesis any details 
which could potentially lead to identifying the participant will be 
removed.  
Who has reviewed the research?  
The research has been approved by the SSPSSR Research Ethics 
Committee, as well as, both of my supervisors.  
Who is organising the research?  
The research will form the fieldwork element of my PhD thesis. It is 
being carried out by me with the guidance of my supervisors, who 
are senior staff within my School.  
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2  
Further information and contact details  
If you would like any further information please contact me - my 
contact details can be found at the bottom of this information sheet.  
Complaints  
If you have any serious concerns about this research, then please do 
not hesitate to get in touch with me. If you would like to speak with 
my supervisors, their details are also available at bottom of this 
sheet. If you do wish to complain formally, the please get in touch 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨ<ĞŶƚ ?ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞ^ƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?^ŝŵŽŶ
Kerridge, directorofresearchservices@kent.ac.uk, 01227 82 3229. 
They will conduct an investigation and respond.  
Yours,  
Vid Calovski BA,MA  
PhD student at the University of Kent  W School of Sociology, Social 
Policy and Social Research (SSPSSR)  
Email: Vc202@kent.ac.uk Contact Number: 0773 056 9469 
Supervisors: Professor Michael Calnan & Professor Stephen Peckham 
Email: M.W.Calnan@kent.ac.uk; S.Peckham@kent.ac.uk͒Contact 
Numbers: 01227 823687 & 01227 827645  





















Consent Form for interviews͒Exploring clinical commissioning 
decisions about the use of healthcare providers  
4. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the chance to ask questions. ͒Please tick 
box ͒ 
5. I understand that taking part in the project is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, and without my 
rights being affected at any time during or after the interview. ͒Please 
tick box ͒ 
6. I agree to take part in the interview. ͒Please tick box ͒ 
7. I agree to the interview being voice recorded. Please tick box ͒Name of 
participant:__________________________ 
Signature:_______________________ Date:______________ Name 
of Researcher:____________________________ 
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Signature:_______________________ Date:_______________ ͒ 
Vid Calovski PhD Candidate at the University of Kent  W School of 
Sociology, Social Policy and Social Research (SSPSSR) Email: 
Vc202@kent.ac.uk Contact Number: 0773 056 9469  
 
